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Abstract
This work broadens the narrative of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) by incorporating the
perspective of the supporters of dictators Porfirio Díaz and Victoriano Huerta. I focus specifically on
urban professional Porfiristas, examining the changes and continuities in their identity over the course
of the revolution. Identity formation is the central theme of this study, and I rely on memoirs,
newspapers, government documents, and oral history interviews in order to analyze the motivations of
Porfiristas as they fought to sustain their worldview during a decade of global conflict.
My study draws upon the frameworks of post-colonialism, feminist theory, cultural studies,
migration/diaspora studies, and historical memory. I analyze the complex reasons for which Porfiristas
supported Díaz and Huerta, even though it cost them their homes, jobs, and separated them from their
homeland. Porfiristas collectively went into exile in mid-1914, and this work traces the attempts at
military and political counter-revolution in the latter part of the decade. Many exiles settled in San
Antonio, Texas, and they relied on the publications La Prensa and Revista Mexicana to present their
political views and cultural ideals to the Mexican immigrant population, referred to as el México de
afuera. Porfiristas promoted education, patriarchy, and Catholicism, while also privileging whiteness.
However, Porfiristas in the United States were forced to contend with Anglo racism, and this group
became active in support of the immigrant community.
Furthermore, this group dealt with the effects of exile, displacement, and nostalgia; sharing their
values helped them to cope with their struggles. Porfiristas understood that they were characterized as
the villains of the revolution, and many spent the remainder of their lives defending their reputations.
By presenting the narrative of the revolution from their perspective, this study challenges this
homogenous view. This project also broadens the scholarship on Mexican, Mexican-American,
Borderlands, and U.S. Spanish-language Media History.
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Introduction
“Since I know that a great number of readers will search these Memoirs for the apologies they assume I
will give for…[opposing] the Revolution, I feel it necessary to say right now that I am not apologizing
for anything.”1
- Nemesio García Naranjo, Memorias, 1952

The 1910s were a complex decade during which global war prompted societies to redefine
empire, the nation-state, nationalism, and patriotism. World War I also directly challenged Eurocentric
views on modernity, and by the end of the war in 1918, Western civilization had proven that it was no
more civilized than the ‘oriental’ groups that it considered inferior. In Mexico, this process took place
against the background of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). At its core, the revolution was a
struggle to define “Mexico” and to determine which of the competing factions acted as the ‘authentic’
purveyor of Benito Juárez’s legacy of liberalism. Porfirio Díaz and his advisers, known as the
científicos, used monuments and rewrote official history in order to cast the dictator as Juárez’s political
descendant. However, various revolutionary factions claimed that dictator had betrayed Juárez’s ideals
by denying legitimate democratic elections. The revolutionaries also accused the científicos of
disregarding most of the Mexican population by denying peasants the right to ejidos (communal
property), and allowing foreign investors to take control of Mexico’s economy at the expense of the
lower classes. Díaz supporters, on the other hand, believed that the regime achieved unprecedented
political stability and economic growth for Mexico. From the perspective of these Porfiristas, the
revolution destroyed their thriving modern nation.
Porfiristas openly rejected the revolution and its initial leader Francisco I. Madero. After
Madero’s assassination in February 1913, they supported General Victoriano Huerta because they
perceived him as a strongman who could restore order in Mexico. However, backing Huerta’s

1

Nemesio García Naranjo, Memorias, 10 vols. (Monterrey: Talleres “El Porvenir,” nd), 1: 59.
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dictatorship turned out to be a mistake that cost Porfiristas their homes, jobs, families, and in certain
cases, their lives. When Venustiano Carranza overthrew Huerta in July 1914, he ordered all supporters
of the Díaz and Huerta regimes out of Mexico. The exiled Porfiristas attempted to organize several
counter-revolutions, but all of their efforts failed. By 1920, the revolution had triumphed, and the new
regime soon began to rewrite official Mexican history to essentialize the Porfiriato as a period of tyranny
and Porfiristas as traitors to democracy. The national government used the revolution to claim
hegemony, and society organized around a culture that celebrated the heroes of the revolution and
vilified the Porfiristas.
This study examines the revolution from the Porfirista perspective, and I argue that this group
faced triple displacement. They were banished from their homeland, they became the racialized “other”
in the United States although they considered themselves to be white, and the European world they
idealized as the center of civilization self-destructed in a war that killed millions. This group faced
intense political, ideological, and personal challenges in these ten years, but their identity as Porfiristas
served as a point of reference, a way to find personal stability in the midst of chaos. This group based
their collective and individual identities on their veneration of Díaz, and they put themselves at risk to
fight for the Mexico that he created. In exile, Pofiristas held on to their identity in spite of the cultural
and political changes that threatened their way of life. They formed a network that stretched from
several points in the United States, to Havana, and Europe, but they were most active in San Antonio,
where they developed newspapers and encouraged political activity, education, and literacy in an effort
to “elevate the masses” as the Díaz regime had done. Although the world significantly changed after
1910, Porfiristas remained faithful to Díaz for the rest of their lives. They also worked to defend their
reputations and prove their patriotism despite having opposed the revolution.

2

Historiography
This dissertation is a transnational study that bridges three major fields of scholarship. First, it
broadens the literature on identity formation during the Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution.
Secondly, it contributes to Borderlands History by addressing the political and cultural influences of
Porfiristas in the United States. This project also adds to the work on the Spanish-language press in the
United States by examining the Porfirista newspapers La Prensa and Revista Mexicana, established in
San Antonio in the 1910s.
A number of scholars have examined the construction of nationalism and Mexican identity by
Porfirio Díaz’s regime. Víctor M. Macías-González analyzes the influence of the aristocracy on this
process. This group revered European (specifically French) culture and whiteness, and upheld
patriarchy.2 The Díaz regime adopted these cultural values as characteristics of Mexican identity in
order to project the image of Mexico as a modern nation, while simultaneously hiding or exoticizing the
nation’s indigenous heritage. Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo carefully traces this process in Mexico at the
World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation.3 The author focuses on the performance of Mexican national
identity for the European gaze, and the importance of these fairs in Mexico’s acceptance as modern by
Western nations. This performance of modernity took place on a domestic level, as well. Tenorio and
Barbara A. Tenenbaum study urban planning, the edification of monuments, and renovation of the Paseo
de la Reforma (Reforma Boulevard) in preparation for Mexico’s centennial in 1910. The authors
examine public spaces and their importance for Mexico City’s image as a clean, organized, and modern

2 Víctor Manuel Macías-González “The Mexican Aristocracy and Porfirio Díaz, 1876-1911” (Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian
University, 1999).
3 Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo, Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1996).
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city. They also analyze the historical, cultural, and political symbolism of the monuments
commissioned by the Díaz regime along Reforma Boulevard, and their influence on national identity.4
Scholars have also addressed elite gender relations during the Porfiriato. Macías-González
addresses masculinity and femininity among Porfirista aristocrats. Gabriela Cano focuses on femininity
in her essay entitled “The Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution: Constructions of Feminism and
Nationalism.”5 This piece examines the competing influences of feminism, patriarchy, and patriotism in
the definitions of Porfirista femininity in the 1910s. Other scholars have examined the influence of
media on gender. Cristina Ramírez and Lorraine Dipp de Holaschutz analyze the Porfirista women’s
newspaper Las Hijas del Anáhuac (1886-1887) and its role in opening the public sphere to women,
albeit in the literary realm.6 Pablo Piccato’s The Tyranny of Opinion: Honor in the Construction of the
Mexican Public Sphere analyzes the importance of journalists in the construction and proliferation of
ideals of masculinity and honor in late nineteenth-century Mexico.7 The author argues that during the
Porfiriato, men did not have as many opportunities to display their masculinity on the battlefield;
therefore, newspapers and the public sphere served as the space for literate men to negotiate their honor
and defend their reputations. These studies on media are important because they emphasize the
relationship between literacy, power, and identity.

4

Tenorio-Trillo, “1910 Mexico City: Space and Nation in the City of the Centenario,” in Journal of Latin American Studies
28, no. 1 (Feb. 1996): 75-104; Barbara A. Tenenbaum, “Streetwise History: The Paseo de la Reforma and the Porfirian State,
1876-1910,” in Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico, ed. William H.
Beezly, Cheryl English Martin, and William E. French (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1994).
5

Gabriela Cano, “The Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution: Constructions of Feminism and Nationalism,” in Nation,
Empire, Colony: Historicizing Gender and Race, ed. Ruth Roach Pierson and Nupur Chaudhuri (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1998).

6

Lorraine Dipp de Holaschutz, “Women and the Culture of Modernity in Mexico City and El Paso, Texas, 1880-1900”
(Master’s thesis, University of Texas at El Paso, 2005); Cristina Devereaux Ramírez, “Claiming the Discursive Self: The
Rhetoric of Mexican Women Journalists, 1876-1924” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at El Paso, 2009).
7

Pablo Piccato, The Tyranny of Opinion: Honor in the Construction of the Mexican Public Sphere (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2010).
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Scholars interested in conservative factions during the revolution have increasingly paid
attention to the Huerta regime and the activities of its participants in exile. Mario Ramírez Rancaño’s
La Reacción Mexicana y Su Exilio durante la Revolución de 1910 is a political history of the counterrevolution by what he (and revolutionaries at the time) called “la reacción,” or the reactionaries against
Carranza. This work is important because the author focuses on the various groups of exiles, including
politicians, military generals, and Catholic Church officials. He lists all of the major characters and
offers information about where they relocated in exile and what happened to them. However, Ramírez
Rancaño bases his work on Jean Meyer’s argument that “all of…Mexico was Huertista,” including the
political, intellectual, military, religious, and business sectors. The author adds that “what is difficult to
understand is how a government strongly supported” across Mexico ultimately failed.8 This assertion is
highly problematic because he assumes that acceptance from members of the upper and professional
classes equated to widespread support. If this had been the case, Huerta would not have been driven out
of Mexico less than two years after assuming power. Moreover, the author does not consider the
complex and sometimes contradictory reasons for why these men joined the Huerta regime, or even
what constituted “support” during this tumultuous period. My work challenges these claims by
suggesting that it is difficult to define “Huertista” and that “Huertismo” as a cohesive ideology or
political agenda did not exist.
Ramírez Rancaño and other historians have also paid specific attention to Aureliano Urrutia,
Minister of the Interior under Victoriano Huerta, and the myths surrounding his identity. Ramírez
Rancaño and Manuel Servín Massieu describe Urrutia as a complex figure who has been (sometimes

8

Mario Ramírez Rancaño, La Reacción Mexicana y Su Exilio durante la Revolución de 1910 (México: Instituto de
Investigaciones Históricas, 2002), 31-32.

5

unfairly) characterized as a murderous villain.9 They contrast this with Urrutia’s reputation as a worldrenowned surgeon, and both authors let readers form their own conclusions about Urrutia’s role in the
Mexican Revolution. Cristina Urrutia Martínez, meanwhile, published a biography of her grandfather
Aureliano, relying on an extensive collection of family documents for her research. Urrutia Martínez,
like Ramírez Rancaño, demonstrates that some of the popular stories surrounding Aureliano are based
on inconsistencies in the sources or outright myths.10 She does not devote much attention to Urrutia’s
life in exile after 1914, but scholars Kathryn O’Rourke and William Hoar have undertaken this task.
They carefully examine Urrutia’s mansion in San Antonio, Miraflores, and analyze the ways in which
the surgeon used art, public space, and monuments to take control of his identity in spite of the rumors,
myths, and accusations against his character.
My study contributes to this literature by tracing the construction of Porfirismo during the Díaz
regime, and the complex ways in which Porfiristas (specifically the urban professionals) upheld their
identity as the revolution attacked their worldview. In exile, Porfirismo served as a coping mechanism
for displacement and nostalgia. I examine the ways in which Porfiristas, particularly in the United
States, attempted to impart Porfirismo to the Mexican immigrant community. I also analyze the
continuities and changes within Porfirismo after the exiles were forced out of Mexico.
Gloria Anzaldúa describes the borderlands as “una herida abierta, where the Third World grates
against the first and bleeds. And before a scab forms hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds
merging to form a third country- a border culture.”11 During the revolution, people, weapons, money,
and ideas constantly intersected at the borderlands, sometimes violently, and Porfiristas took part in
9 Ramírez

Rancaño, “Aureliano Urrutia, ¿El Asesino De Una República Castrense?” Signos Históricos 7 (Jan.-Jun. 2002);
Manuel Servín Massieu, ¿Tras Las Huellas De Urrutia: Médico Eminente O Político Represor? (México: Plaza y Valdés,
2005).
10

Cristina Urrutia Martínez, Aureliano Urrutia: Del Crimen Político al Exilio (México: Tiempo de Memoria Tusquets,
2008).
11

Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, 2nd ed. (San Francisco:Aunt Lute Books, 1999), 25-26.
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these interactions. These exchanges shaped international relations, changed the cultural dynamics in
border communities, and impacted thousands of families. Such historians as Rodolfo Acuña, Manuel G.
González, David G. Gutiérrez, David Montejano, Vicki Ruiz, and George Sánchez, have published
studies tracing the general history of the Mexican community in the United States.12 Their work offers
important information on the demographic, political, cultural, and economic changes that occurred as
hundreds of thousands of immigrants entered the United States between 1900 and 1920. More
importantly, these authors tie immigration to broader dynamics in the twentieth-century United States.
As barrios grew, Mexican culture spread throughout U.S. cities while acculturation created generational
conflicts in Mexican families. Immigration also resulted in rising racial tensions between immigrants,
Mexican Americans, and Anglos, and these are dynamics still present today. These studies
contextualize Mexican immigration in the 1910s within the broader history of Mexicans in the United
States, and they complement the historiography that focuses specifically on the Mexican Revolution in
the United States.
The earliest studies of revolutionary activity in the United States were political histories. In
Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, 1910-13, Peter V.N. Henderson examines “the activities of… these
Mexican exiles,” specifically Ricardo Flores Magón and Francisco I. Madero, “in their immediate
attempts to overturn the incumbent…regimes from 1910-1913.”13 Ward S. Albro undertakes extensive
research on Flores Magón, his relationship with the U.S. government, and the impact of Regeneración
and the PLM (Mexican Liberal Party), on the Mexican communities in the United States. In Always a

12

I use the term “Mexican” to refer to all people of Mexican descent in the United States. I use “Mexican immigrant” and
“Mexican American” to distinguish between these two groups in the U.S. Mexican community.
13

Peter V.N. Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, 1910-13 (El Paso, TX: Texas Western Press, 1979), 5.

7

Rebel: Ricardo Flores Magón and the Mexican Revolution, Albro argues that Flores Magón’s revolution
ultimately failed because he was too radical in comparison with more centrist figures such as Madero.14
W. Dirk Raat’s Revoltosos: Mexico’s Rebels in the United States, 1903-1923 attempts to expand
on these political histories by studying “insurgents and political refugees on the Right and the Left.”15
He offers the example of Enrique C. Creel, Minister of Foreign Relations under Díaz in 1910 and 1911,
who had a spy network during this time in cooperation with the U.S. government. When Creel moved to
Los Angeles in 1915 as an exile during the revolution, he was not treated as a “revoltoso,”
demonstrating the U.S. government’s biased attitudes and behavior towards the Mexican regimes and
political leaders that favored their northern neighbor. This is important information, but it is an
extremely limited example of right-wing activity in the borderlands during this period. Instead, Raat
focuses mostly on the Magonista rebels.
These early studies also emphasize key events, particularly the Plan of San Diego revolt in South
Texas in 1915. The plan called for a no-quarter race war against Anglo men by ethnic minorities in
Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and California. The plot was discovered before its
implementation began, but it sparked widespread racial violence between Mexicans, Tejanos, and
Anglos. Charles H Harris III and Louis R. Sadler offer an overview of the violence in the region,
suggesting that Venustiano Carranza’s regime manipulated these racial tensions, offering to help stop
the raids in exchange for formal U.S. recognition.16 Scholars since then have revised this work, giving
less credence to the assertion that the Carranza government was completely behind the Plan of San

14 Ward S. Albro, Always a Rebel: Ricardo Flores Magón and the Mexican Revolution (Ft. Worth: Texas Christian
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Liberal Party: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Mexican Revolution of 1910” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 1967).
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Diego revolt. James Sandos suggests that Magonista ideas about liberty (spread through Regeneración)
inspired Mexicans in South Texas to fight against Anglo oppression.17 The author’s hypothesis is
problematic, however, because it equates rebellion with anarchy and Magonismo, and it simplifies race
relations in South Texas within the dichotomy of Mexicans versus Anglos. In a more recent study,
Benjamin Johnson examines the complex political and ethnic tensions that contributed to the violence in
South Texas. He argues that the violence against Mexicans by the Texas Rangers in South Texas
encouraged Tejanos in the region to organize for full inclusion as U.S. citizens.18 In 1929, these Tejanos
formed the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), a Mexican American civil rights
organization.
In addition to studies on South Texas, there is also a growing body of literature on the revolution
in El Paso. Macías-González examines Porfirismo in El Paso during the 1910s, focusing on the
Chihuahua elites and how they influenced El Paso’s development.19 Macías-González argues that as
proponents of modernity, these elites helped to establish successful businesses and a Eurocentric
Mexican culture in the city, which they upheld throughout the Revolution. Sadler and Harris recently
published The Secret War in El Paso, an extensive political history of the revolutionary activity in El
Paso between 1906 and 1920. This text offers useful information on the politics of the revolution in this
region, but it does not examine the broader cultural implications of the war the way David Dorado Romo
did earlier in Ringside Seat to a Revolution: An Underground Cultural History of El Paso and Juárez:
1893-1923. Romo engages cultural and public history to depict daily life in El Paso during this period.
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More importantly, he demonstrates the ways in which the revolution impacted the city’s Anglo,
Mexican, African American, Japanese and Chinese inhabitants.
San Antonio was at least as significant to the revolution as El Paso. Flores Magón, Madero,
General Bernardo Reyes, Venustiano Carranza, and other exiles from all factions conspired in this city
between 1905 and 1920. There is limited scholarship on San Antonio politics during the revolution;
historians have instead focused on the cultural influence of the Mexican exiles. The most
comprehensive study on this topic is Richard A. García’s Rise of the Mexican American Middle Class:
San Antonio, 1929-1941. García devotes one chapter of his study to a group he calls the ricos, the
wealthy “conservative…politicians, generals, businesspeople, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and
government officials.”20 Although the author analyzes this group’s influence on the San Antonio
community in the 1930s, it is useful for this study because the ricos included exiled Porfirista elites who
chose to remain in the United States. García refers in particular to Porfirista Ignacio E. Lozano as the
leader of the ricos, and his Porfirista newspaper La Prensa (1913-1963) as the most important medium
for the proliferation of Mexican identity in the United States during this period.
Much of the work on the revolution north of the U.S./Mexico border focuses on specific regions.
Arnoldo De León’s edited volume, War Along the Border: The Mexican Revolution and Tejano
Communities, marks a shift in the historiography. The volume focuses on the effects of war and other
forms of violence on identity formation across the borderlands in Texas. It includes important chapters
on elite women in San Antonio, race relations in El Paso and Chihuahua and between Anglos, Mexicans,
and African Americans, revolutionary activity in the Big Bend region, and the impact of the war on the
development of Mexican American identity.
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Taken together, this work by Borderlands scholars is important because it considers the complex
relationship between politics and identity formation during a decade of significant turmoil. Scholars of
the Spanish-language press engage these issues within a media context. In 1977, historian Richard
Griswold del Castillo published the landmark article entitled “The Mexican Revolution and the SpanishLanguage Press in the Borderlands.”21 He outlined the major publications established by revolutionaries
of varying factions, arguing that the immigrant press thrived because of a strong demand for propaganda
and reports from the homeland.
Since then the exile press has received attention from historians including Juan Bruce-Novoa,
Ramón D. Chacón, Onofre Di Stefano, Francine Medeiros, Michael M. Smith, Roberto R. Treviño, and
Nicolás Kanellos, director of the “Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage Project.” BruceNovoa and Di Stefano have published analyses of La Prensa, the largest-selling Spanish-language
newspaper in the United States by 1920.22 Their studies provide an important overview of the
publications, but are limited in several ways. Bruce-Novoa wrote about the general legacy of La
Prensa, and Di Stefano offered a thorough examination of the newspaper’s “Página Literaria” from
1913-1915 in his doctoral dissertation.23
A significant problem with these studies is that they contextualize this newspaper within the
framework of the U.S. nation-state. Revolutionary leaders including Emiliano Zapata and Álvaro
Obregón wrote to La Prensa from Mexico in an effort to promote their agendas to Mexicans in the

21 Richard Griswold Del Castillo, “The Mexican Revolution and the Spanish-Language Press in the Borderlands,”
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United States. La Prensa was also smuggled into Mexico, demonstrating that it had an audience south
of the U.S./Mexico border. No scholar has critically analyzed the impact of La Prensa in Mexico.
Meanwhile, the San Antonio Porfirista newspaper Revista Mexicana is almost entirely missing
from the historiography.24 Nemesio García Naranjo, Minister of Public Instruction under Victoriano
Huerta, established this newspaper in 1915 as part of the counter-revolutionary efforts against
Venustiano Carranza’s government. La Prensa presented itself as politically neutral, but Revista
Mexicana harshly criticized the regimes of both Carranza and Woodrow Wilson. Both newspapers were
highly significant because they allowed Porfiristas to express themselves without fear of the censorship
that was then being exercised in Mexico. My project will examine these publications as transnational
media that influenced Mexican politics and identity in Mexico and the United States in the 1910s.
Moreover, I will use these sources to draw attention to the importance of San Antonio during the
revolution.

Defining “Porfirismo” and “Huertismo”
Díaz supporters were known as “Porfiristas,” but in this dissertation, I focus primarily on the
urban professionals. The científicos were also Porfiristas, but in order to address the tension between
this group and the urban professionals, I will refer to Díaz’s advisers as the “científicos” and the
professional class as “Porfiristas.” The latter group resented the aristocratic científicos for their elitism,
detachment from Mexican society, holding on to their positions of power despite advancing age, and
their allegiance to foreign investors. This division became especially marked during the revolution,
when Porfiristas blamed the científicos (but not Díaz) for sacrificing Mexico by giving in to Madero. In
exile, Porfiristas took an active interest in the counter-revolutionary efforts, while the científicos
preferred to stay away from politics and live the remainder of their lives in relative peace, a choice that
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contributed to the bitterness between the factions. Although the urban professionals and científicos all
experienced difficulties resulting from exile, this study focuses primarily on the urban professionals
because they were the ones who remained most engaged with Mexico, opposing the revolution while
defending Díaz’s vision for their nation.
Not all opponents of the revolution were Porfiristas, at least initially. Querido Moheno, a lawyer
from Chiapas, was imprisoned in 1892 after speaking out against Díaz for violating the no-reelection
principle in the Constitution of 1857. In 1912, Moheno was elected senator, and he became friends with
Porfirista senators Nemesio García Naranjo, José María Lozano, and Francisco M. de Olaguíbel, who all
disliked Madero and his policies. The four men formed the “Cuadrilátero,” a bloc that opposed Madero
in the federal legislature and joined the Huerta cabinet in late 1913. They shared several ideals,
including a belief in liberalism and apprehension of the U.S. government under Woodrow Wilson.
Despite his collaboration with the Cuadrilátero, Moheno did not characterize himself as a Porfirista.
However, during the protest against the 1917 Constitution, Moheno and exiles from various factions
(including Maderistas) joined the Porfiristas in their defense of the Constitution of 1857. Moheno also
supported General Félix Díaz (Porfirio’s nephew) after 1917, making him what we might call a latterday Porfirista.
I use “Porfirismo” to describe Porfirista identity. Porfirismo was the national identity
constructed by the Díaz regime in its effort to maintain hegemony over Mexican society. This identity
was based on positivism, a theory that favored science over religion and ideology as the basis for
modernity and progress. As a result, an emphasis on public education became a fundamental feature of
Porfirismo. The Díaz regime restructured the public school system to focus more on the sciences, and it
doubled the number of public schools in Mexico.
Porfirismo also had racial, class, religious, and gender components. Positivists believed in the
racial superiority of whites, an attitude that legitimized the colonialist enterprise of Western European
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expansion in the late nineteenth century. Adherents to Porfirismo could not fully deny Mexico’s
indigenous roots, but they downplayed them while simultaneously emphasizing the country’s European
heritage. From their perspective, whiteness was a privilege, and light skin was more appealing and
conducive to social mobility. Furthermore, Porfirismo was inherently patriarchal, and gender roles were
directly tied to Catholicism. Women were supposed to become educated in order to produce better
offspring, but they were only allowed to participate in literary circles, where they could express their
emotions. Porfirista notions of femininity also called for women to model their lives and behavior after
the Virgin Mary, a mother who personified “sweetness, submission and domesticity.”25 Catholicism
also played an important role in Porfirista and broader Mexican masculinity. During the revolution,
Emiliano Zapata’s forces carried a banner with the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe to demonstrate
their devotion to her as well as their nationalism. When U.S. forces occupied Veracruz in 1914, El
Imparcial published an illustration of Huerta holding this same banner as he protected Mexico from the
foreign invader.26 When Mexican men appropriated this feminine nationalist symbol, it was to prove
their patriotism as they defended the homeland. The Virgin of Guadalupe became a motherly symbol of
hope for Porfiristas in exile.
Porfiristas faced a collective identity crisis when Díaz was ousted from power in 1911. The
group quickly fragmented after Díaz left Mexico, but according to Alan Knight, Huerta “pandered to the
hopes of those many Mexicans – and foreigners – who believed that a ‘strong man’, a new Díaz, could
restore peace through authoritarian means.”27 However, Porfiristas did not necessarily wish to revert to
the Porfiriato, and Porfirismo did not simply evolve into “Huertismo.” For example, as Minister of
Public Instruction, García Naranjo moved away from positivism by expanding the arts within the public
25
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school curriculum. Also, Ireneo Paz, the Porfirista editor of the Mexico City newspaper La Patria,
initially supported Huerta, but then actively criticized him after he dissolved congress and declared
himself dictator in October 1913. The dynamics within the Huerta administration were volatile, at best,
with most cabinet members lasting less than six months in office. Moreover, Huerta’s decision to
suspend congress and imprison over one hundred legislators severely hurt his credibility and support.
The internal problems of the regime and U.S. intervention in Veracruz in April 1914 ensured the rapid
decline of the regime before it could create any sort of ideology through which it could attain hegemony.
In other words, the term “Huertista” has been used to describe the supporters of Victoriano
Huerta, but the word “support” in this context is problematic. The original members of Huerta’s cabinet
resigned because of their tense relations with the dictator; yet, they were all sent into exile in 1914 for
“supporting” Huerta. Other members of the cabinet, including the Cuadrilátero, claimed that they did
not know Huerta before he invited them to serve as ministers. According to Moheno, he and his three
colleagues accepted Huerta’s offer because they knew that rejecting it might cost them their lives. This
differed from the experience of Minister of the Interior Aureliano Urrutia, who gladly served with his
compadre Huerta. Since it is difficult to pinpoint who exactly constituted a “Huertista,” I refer to this
group as the members of the Huerta cabinet or regime.

Methodology
Porfiristas produced an extensive collection of written material, published in newspapers and
memoirs. My aim is to critically analyze these sources in order to trace their experiences. The dominant
theme throughout this study is identity formation through the “politics of representation.” Cultural
studies and feminist scholars have used this concept to probe the ways in which individuals and/or
groups compete for the privilege of constructing their notions of “self” in relation to the “other.”28
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According to Amy Hinterberger, “these practices of representation are directly tied to the production of
knowledge and power and are thus ethical and political.”29 Indeed, the exiles used media and other
forms of discourse to sustain Porfirismo and their vision for Mexico, and it became the most important
strategy for dealing with displacement.
I examine the politics of representation on three levels—the Porfirista public sphere, the exile
memoirs, and oral histories of Porfirista descendants. First, I use the concept of the public sphere as a
framework to analyze Porfirista media and their relationship with Mexican society during the Porfiriato
and the revolution. Díaz and the científicos understood the relationship between information, literacy,
and power, and Díaz heavily censored media in order to manipulate public opinion and create the
illusion of hegemony. The Mexico City newspapers El Imparcial, La Patria, and Las Hijas del
Anáhuac are important to this study because they demonstrate the ways in which Porfirista media helped
to carry out Díaz’s modernization project while promoting specific ideas about race, class, and gender in
Mexico. El Imparcial and La Patria also played a significant role in identity politics during the
revolution, highlighting the divisions within Porfirismo after Díaz’s resignation as Díaz supporters used
the public sphere to voice their opposition to the revolution. The realm that had been censored by Díaz
became a space for political dissent.
The Carranza regime shut down all Porfirista media in Mexico in August 1914. Immediately
thereafter, the Porfirista public sphere reemerged in San Antonio through La Prensa and Revista
Mexicana, newspapers with readerships in the United States, Mexico, Cuba, and Europe. Ignacio E.
Lozano, García Naranjo, and their colleagues used media to impart Porfirista cultural norms to their
transnational audience. All of these newspapers embodied certain elements of Porfirista identity, and a
comparison of these sources will reveal the continuities and changes within Porfirismo during the 1910s.
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The exile memoirs are also important in understanding the politics of representation. In
analyzing these texts, it is necessary to consider the context, what was said, and what was not. The
exiles understood their position as the villains of the revolution, and they used the memoirs to justify
their political stance and defend their reputations. These texts also served to keep Porfiristas and their
experiences in the historical record despite the efforts of the revolutionary regime to diminish their place
or erase them from the official history. The memoirs are valuable because they provide insight into the
mindset of the authors and the role of memory, especially since they were written in different decades.
For example, Federico Gamboa, Minister of Foreign Relations under Díaz and Huerta, began keeping a
diary (with the intention to publish it) in 1892. Other memoirs were written in the 1910s and 1920s, and
García Naranjo wrote his autobiography in the 1950s. This broad variation in time is useful for studying
the politics of representation. The memoirs produced in the 1910s and 1920s were written when the
authors had much at stake politically because they opposed the revolution. By the 1950s, however, the
Mexican government had reconciled with García Naranjo and he was free to express his thoughts, which
happened to be much different from his attitudes as a younger man in the 1910s.
In engaging the memoirs, my goal is not to answer whether or not Porfiristas were justified in
their support for the Díaz and Huerta regimes. In fact, this would not be possible since the authors of the
memoirs offer various (and sometimes contradictory) versions about each other and the events of the
decade. Instead, my aim is to broaden our understanding of the revolution by adding a different set of
voices to the narrative. This also includes the descendants of Porfirista exiles who lived in the United
States. As the revolutionary regime claimed hegemony in Mexico and worked to replace Porfirista
culture, Porfirismo thrived and reproduced itself in the United States. Porfirista exiles in the United
States (and more specifically, in San Antonio) became prominent leaders in media, medicine, and
education. Their descendants remain active in these fields today, while holding on to the cultural values
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that their parents and grandparents taught them. More importantly, the politics of representation remain
at play in the ways in which the descendants remember and commemorate the Porfirista exiles today.
A final consideration is the way in which a politics of representation approach offers a
framework for studying the limitations of these primary sources. The newspapers, memoirs, and oral
histories offer important insights into Porfirista identity, but with the exception of Las Hijas del
Anáhuac, all of the primary sources that inform this study were produced by men. This is a testament to
patriarchal Porfirista society, where the public sphere was a space for literate men. Porfirista women
became increasingly active in the United States in the 1920s, establishing charity organizations and
participating in media through La Prensa’s “Ladies’ Page” beginning in 1924. In Mexico, right-wing
women also became more active in the 1920s, organizing, for instance, the Mexican Catholic Women’s
Union in defense of Catholics during the Cristero War against the Mexican government (1926-1929).
However, during the 1910s, Porfiristas expected men to display their patriotism on the battlefield and in
the public sphere while women defended the homeland by producing strong, healthy, and educated
children. Although women’s voices and perspectives are difficult to assess in the sources I use, a gender
analysis is still possible and necessary. As the world descended into war in the 1910s, societies were
contesting modern notions of race, class, empire, and gender. An examination of patriarchy and
Porfirismo demonstrates the ways in which this group attempted to uphold the gendered status quo
before the feminist movements of the 1920s in Mexico and the United States.

Chapter Outline
The first two chapters of this project focus on the Porfirista experience in Mexico. The story of
the Porfiristas begins in the 1850s with the ratification of the Constitution of 1857 and the “triumph” of
Benito Juárez and the liberals. The ideals of these liberals helped shape Porfirismo, the identity and
worldview of Díaz supporters. Chapter 1 begins by tracing the evolution of nineteenth-century
liberalism in Mexico. Díaz adopted elements of both liberalism and conservatism in his efforts to
18

sustain political cohesion in his government, but he and his supporters called themselves liberals in the
tradition of Juárez.
This chapter continues by exploring the background of the nation-building project undertaken by
Díaz and the científicos. They believed in achieving “order and progress” through education and a
curriculum based on science, and the public education system grew substantially. The científicos also
encouraged foreign investment in the nation’s economy. Between 1890 and 1907, Mexico experienced
unprecedented economic growth and increases in infrastructure, but these advancements came at the
expense of Mexico’s lower and indigenous classes. The científicos also took advantage of the nation’s
indigenous heritage to appeal to the Western gaze at the world’s fairs, while simultaneously privileging
whiteness and European culture in Mexico. During Mexico’s centennial in 1910, Porfiristas celebrated
the Díaz regime’s accomplishments, the supposed political stability throughout the nation, and the
acceptance of Mexico by white Western society. In reality, hegemony and peace were only illusions,
and Madero successfully launched his revolution only two months after the centennial.
Chapter 2 examines the period from the beginning of the revolution in November 1910 to
Victoriano Huerta’s resignation in July 1914. The first section addresses the identity crisis that
Porfiristas faced when Díaz went into exile. A comparison of El Imparcial and La Patria demonstrates
the conflicts that existed between the científicos and the urban professionals. These sources also
demonstrate how Porfirista media created new heroes in Huerta and Félix Díaz to replace Don Porfirio.
This chapter next reconstructs this time period through a critical analysis of the memoirs of Huerta’s
cabinet. These sources illuminate the complex political and personal dynamics that influenced the
decision to join the Huerta administration. More importantly, the memoirs complicate notions of
Mexican patriotism that tied love for the homeland with the revolution. Although the members of the
Huerta regime had different experiences, they all justified their actions as patriotic and accused the
revolutionaries of being the real traitors for plunging Mexico into civil war.
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In July and August 1914, Venustiano Carranza ordered all people with ties to the Díaz and
Huerta regimes out of Mexico. Chapter 3 begins the story of exile in the United States, Havana, and
Europe, focusing on the counter-revolutionary efforts undertaken against the Carranza regime. San
Antonio was a center for exile activity, and the first major attempt to organize the exile took place in
February 1915, with the formation of the Asamblea Pacificadora Mexicana, or Mexican Peace-Making
Assembly. The group was short-lived, and any hopes for counter-revolution were severely diminished
after Huerta’s death in January 1916 because he was considered the strongest military leader in exile.
However, the ratification of the Constitution of 1917 angered exiled Porfiristas as well as some
Maderistas who considered themselves Juarista liberals. They rallied together to protest the new
constitution, and García Naranjo used Revista Mexicana to lead the charge. Again, their efforts failed,
since the group had limited finances and lacked a strong military leader on whom to pin their hopes—
this problem grew even worse after General Aureliano Blanquet’s death in 1919. By this point, the
exiles faced definitive political defeat.
Chapter 4 tells the story of exile from a cultural perspective. In addition to their counterrevolutionary politics, Porfirista exiles felt a duty to elevate the Mexican masses in their new
communities. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana served this purpose. The contributors upheld patriarchal
gender roles and Catholicism, advertised skin bleach and whitening products, and encouraged education
and participation in the public sphere. Porfiristas also had to face the realities of living outside of
Mexico, and they worked against Anglo discrimination. Both newspapers continually expressed love
and nostalgia for the homeland, but by 1918, they had drifted apart to represent two different sectors in
the immigrant community. La Prensa was considered the “voice” of el México de afuera and appealed
to a broader base of Mexicans who chose to permanently settle in the United States. Revista Mexicana,
on the other hand, had a smaller audience of political exiles; as members of this readership returned to
Mexico in 1919, the newspaper lost its audience and was forced to shut down in January 1920.
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While chapter 4 focuses on media and community formation, Chapter 5 addresses the personal
implications of exile in the midst of the turbulent 1910s. The Huerta regime fell just as World War I
began in Europe. The exiles had difficulty dealing with the abrupt changes in their lives, leaving them
angry, embittered, and in certain cases, in precarious psychological conditions. This chapter will
explore Porfirista reactions to World War I, their animosity against the Carranza and Wilson regimes,
and Anglo discrimination in the United States. Some Porfistas relied on humor to overcome their
struggles, others on their faith in God, and the most resistant continued to venerate the memory of Díaz
as if the general would somehow save them. Meanwhile, the modern world that these men idealized
during the Porfiriato violently disappeared, and by 1920, the exiles had to contend with a globally
dominant United States, the increasing influence of communism, and the cultural changes in Mexico
resulting from the revolution.
The final chapter analyzes the continuities and changes within Porfirismo after 1920. I argue
that the Porfiristas who returned to Mexico encountered different circumstances than their counterparts
who remained in self-imposed exile in the United States. Porfiristas in Mexico challenged the new
revolutionary culture that embraced the nation’s mestizo, or mixed, ethnic identity. They also continued
to criticize the Mexican government, defend their reputations, and honor the memory of Díaz. In the
United States, Porfiristas and their descendants have worked to combat acculturation and improve
immigrant communities north of the border. Chapter 6 also includes a case study of Dr. Aureliano
Urrutia, who remained in San Antonio and is most remembered as a murderer who cut out a man’s
tongue during the Huerta dictatorship. Urrutia purposely never clarified whether or not this story was a
myth, and he enjoyed the notoriety, but his family has taken on the task of separating fact from myth.
Overall, this chapter examines the act of remembering from 1920 to the present, and the ways in which
time, family ties, politics, and collective memory continue to shape the ways in which Porfiristas are
perceived.
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Chapter 1: Modern Mexicanidad: Constructing a National Identity during the
Porfiriato, 1876-1910
The Constitution of 1857 and the Ideological Foundations of the Porfiriato
On February 11, 1917, Nemesio García Naranjo, Victoriano Huerta’s former Minister of Public
Instruction, commented on the ratification of the Constitution of 1917 that had taken place six days
earlier in the city of Querétaro. García Naranjo, a staunch Porfirista, considered the ratification “the
most horrendous act of sacrilege that Mexico had ever witnessed.” He added that “the Constitution of
1857…was the flag of the grandest men in our History, and it infiltrated the popular consciousness and
become a symbol. It [was] as sacred as [Agustín de] Iturbide’s banner, the image of La Guadalupana,
[José María] Morelos’ uniform, as all of the relics that materialize national creeds.” He continued by
stating that the replacement of Mexico’s “Magna Carta” by the Carrancistas was the equivalent of
substituting the national anthem with the popular song “La Cucaracha.” For García Naranjo, Mexico’s
Constitution of 1857 contained guiding principles necessary for the nation’s political and economic
development; ideologically, it formed the basis for a Mexican national identity carefully crafted by
liberals since the period of La Reforma (1855-1861).30
This idealizing of the former constitution reflects the process through which nationalism and
Mexicanidad were negotiated in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Mexico. Supporters of the
Constitution of 1857 had much at stake in early 1917, since a new constitution threatened Mexico as
they defined it and marked them as the “old regime.” García Naranjo drew upon popular cultural and
Catholic symbols that manifested lo mexicano in order to insist on the legitimacy of the Constitution of
1857 and the “Mexico” created by Benito Juárez, Porfirio Díaz, and other liberals. He also used the
rhetoric of patriotism to construct a “hero/villain” binary that formed the basis for his critiques of the
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Carrancistas. In doing so, he practiced the “politics of representation,” in which individuals and/or
groups work for the privilege of constructing their notions of “self” in relation to the “other.”31
The politics of representation and the development of national identity have been important
elements in the course of state formation in Mexico since independence. Political, military, and clerical
leaders depended on the use of cultural symbols to garner support and establish hegemony.32 In early
nineteenth-century Mexico, internal political turmoil, foreign and civil wars, and economic stagnation
limited the ability of leaders to construct effective hegemonic relationships that would unite the country
through the popular acceptance of a common identity. At the core of this struggle was a conflict
between conservatism and liberalism, the two dominant political philosophies of the period.
Charles Hale defines liberalism as a product of the Enlightenment that “embraced a vision of
social progress and economic development” based on the individual’s right to property.33 It also
supported the freedom of the press, federalism, republicanism, a secular state and individual political
freedom. The emphasis on private property resulted in a strong anti-clerical stance among liberals in
Mexico, since the Catholic Church was the largest land-owner in Mexico. Conservatism, on the other
hand, favored a strong centralist government that brought “order” to Mexico through the institutions of
the Catholic Church and the military.34 These factions had fought for control of Mexico since the 1820s,
but liberalism seemingly won out during La Reforma, a period of extensive political reform. It was also
a period of renewed civil war, which began with the rebellion of the Plan of Ayutla, in which liberals
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fought conservatives and expelled the dictator Antonio López de Santa Anna in 1855. Once in power,
liberals including Juárez, Juan Álvarez, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, and Ignacio Comonfort, took control
of Mexico City, they passed a series of laws and drafted the Constitution of 1857, thus setting what they
believed to be the foundation for “modern Mexico” and the consolidation of a national identity.
The liberal project during La Reforma centered on establishing democracy while breaking down
the power of conservative institutions such as the Catholic Church. In 1855, the Ley Júarez abolished
military and ecclesiastical fueros, or special courts. The Ley Iglesias (1857) forbade “clergy from
charging exorbitant fees for the sacraments” including marriage, funerals, and baptisms. The Ley Lerdo
(1856) prohibited “corporate landholding.”35 Finally, the new constitution, ratified on February 5, 1857,
established legislative, executive, and judicial branches within the federal government. It abolished
slavery, eliminated the death penalty, called for universal male suffrage, and freedom of speech and the
press. Liberals who supported these policies believed that Mexico was headed in the direction of
progress. However, the Constitution of 1857 and the Reforma laws alienated conservatives and, in their
democratic provisions, even some moderate liberals.
The ensuing “Guerra de la Reforma” (1857-1860) began as a reaction against the radical
liberalism of the constitution. As Mexico’s leaders fought for power, Mexicans of different classes
debated the meaning of “Mexico,” nationhood, and citizenship. The Constitution of 1857 defined
citizens as all people “born within or outside of the territory of the Republic, with Mexican parents,”
naturalized foreigners, and foreigners who owned property in Mexico or had children born in Mexico, as
long as they did not “conserve their nationality.”36 Although this was an effort to incorporate all
Mexicans into the nation, it was not immediately effective. In Yucatán, Maya Indians had launched a
war for independence (known as the Guerra de Castas, or Caste War) against elite landowners in 1847,
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which was still ongoing. In the northern borderlands in Sonora, Yaqui Indians claimed their own
national sovereignty. Both of the groups represented factions living within the Mexican political state
that did not identify as Mexican. Furthermore, there was a marked contradiction between liberalism in
theory and practice. The constitution called for mass political participation and universal male suffrage.
Most of Mexico’s leaders, however, did not want the lower classes to act as political agents, not only
because they were perceived to be intellectually incapable but also because they might threaten elite
hegemony. Nevertheless, the promises of democracy and incorporation into the nation were attractive,
especially for those who saw in Juárez, a Zapotec Indian who had become president of Mexico, the
possibility of upward mobility.
At the local level, the struggle between liberalism and conservatism was much more complex.
The Ley Lerdo was aimed directly at the Church, but it also targeted ejidos, indigenous communal
landholdings. Liberal secularism also opposed religious celebrations and religious education. These
policies threatened what Francie Chassen de López calls “usos y costumbres” (cultural practices).37
Indigenous communities in the nineteenth century “represented societies where identity tended to be
collective rather than individual.” In describing the Nuyoo community in Oaxaca, Chassen de López
writes that “they did not erect boundaries between the economic and social, or the political and social,
the specializations so characteristic of modernity.”38 This worldview conflicted with liberal notions of
economic progress, private property, and individualism, but conservatism was not a much better
alternative. Conservatives were pro-clerical, and the Church had a history of economic, cultural, and
corporal exploitation of indigenous populations. The fundamental problem was the necessity, from the
perspective of Mexico’s political leaders, for campesinos to choose between the two philosophies that

37 Francie R. Chassen de López, From Liberal to Revolutionary Oaxaca: The View from the South: Mexico, 1867-1911
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 279.
38

Ibid., 284.

25

threatened their way of life. Perhaps, it was a necessity if there was to be any hope for Mexico’s
political consolidation and economic expansion.
The ten years following the ratification of the Constitution of 1857 continued the tradition of war
and political instability. Juárez and his administration were forced out of Mexico City after the French
intervention in 1861 and the Hapsburg Maximilian was established as emperor in 1864 (with
conservative support). Republicanism failed to bring peace to Mexico and it failed to foster economic
development. Mexico was no more united; in fact, it was now ruled by a foreign monarch. Yet Juárez
and his supporters, who lived as far north as Paso del Norte in the state of Chihuahua by 1865, claimed
constitutional legitimacy and authenticity—Mexico for Mexicans. These years were crucial in the
development of a national identity because they positioned Juárez as a symbol of mexicanidad, freedom,
and democracy within the popular consciousness. Erika Pani argues that foreign intervention resulted in
the creation of a “patriotic myth,” in which Juárez and other leaders of the Reforma became heroes
engaged in a battle of good versus evil.39 Within the collective memory, this became a period of “liberal
idealism and conservative foolishness…overwhelmingly dominated by the personality of Benito
Juárez.”40 The myth of Juárez eventually overshadowed any legitimate criticisms against the president
and his administration.
Mark Wasserman suggests that liberals also gained greater support than conservatives because
they were more active at the grassroots level (which coincided with their emphasis on local autonomy).
Liberals created the National Guard and juntas patrióticas, and they encouraged members of the lower
classes to participate in these organizations that gave individuals a sense of national identity. More
importantly, this set in motion the development of civil society in Mexico, which in turn helped the state
establish hegemony, albeit very slowly. The juntas patrióticas organized commemorations for important
39
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events such as the Grito de Dolores, which sparked the independence movement, and Cinco de Mayo,
the anniversary of the defeat of French troops during the Battle of Puebla on May 5, 1862. Wasserman
notes that these “fiesta days had an educational component, because they invariably included the
participation of school children. While music and fireworks hardly indicated a sense of citizenship,
these celebrations certainly were beginnings for tying local with national concerns.”41 The celebration
of Cinco de Mayo was especially important since it asserted Mexican nationalism and patriotism in
opposition to the monarchy and imperialism. Ultimately, liberals garnered enough support to defeat
imperial troops and overthrow Maximilian, who was executed in June 1867. A month before then,
Juárez returned to Mexico City in order to resume the liberal project and transform Mexico into a
modern nation-state. According to Guy P. C. Thompson, this represented the “triumph of Liberalism,”
since the defeat of Maximilian “also condemned the Conservative Party, deeply implicated in this illfated European imperial adventure.”42 However, characterizing this period of the Restored Republic
(1867-1876) as the “triumph of liberalism” is overly simplistic. Although liberals succeeded militarily,
they faced the same political and ideological conflicts they had encountered in the previous decade.
During the Restored Republic (the decade between Juárez’s victory over Maximilian and Díaz’s
presidential victory) the inconsistencies between liberal ideology and practice became increasingly clear,
and Mexico’s leadership grappled with the problem of sacrificing idealism for the sake of political
stability. Moderate liberals, unlike their radical counterparts, “advocated a strong executive and central
state, primarily to bring about order and to encourage economic development.” This demonstrates the
blurred lines between political ideologies in Mexico, since centralism was a conservative principle.
Juárez and other moderates believed, in fact, in the necessity of limiting democracy, and they established
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an increasingly authoritarian system. According to Wasserman, Congress suspended constitutional
rights nine times between 1867 and 1876, and Juárez (re-elected president in 1871) was granted
extraordinary powers for all except fifty-seven days of his final presidency.43 The “triumph of
liberalism” was certainly not a triumph for democracy.
Meanwhile, radical liberals united under the banner of “no re-election” and they criticized the
Juárez administration for limiting the progression of democracy. They were especially indignant about
the 1871 presidential elections. Juárez ran against Lerdo and General Porfirio Díaz, but none of them
won the majority vote. In this scenario, the constitution granted Congress the authority to select the
president, and since Juaristas had won the majority of congressional seats, Juárez became president.
Díaz accused the government of voting fraud and launched the Plan de la Noria rebellion. This conflict,
which proclaimed the illegitimacy of the Juárez presidency, quickly ended after one battle because of
Juárez’s death in 1872 (after which Lerdo assumed the presidency). A stronger rebellion broke out in
1876 under Díaz’s Plan de Tuxtepec. The general had the backing of former military officers, Catholics
offended by Lerdo’s attacks on religious orders, vows, and holidays, and people who supported
democracy. The rebels (who also included Supreme Court president José María Iglesias) overthrew
Lerdo, and Díaz was elected president that year.
The new executive faced the same task as his predecessors, but why did he succeed in
establishing peace, creating a progressive nation-state, and forging a national identity, while all other
presidents before him failed? Díaz, part of a new generation of liberals, would build on Juárez’s
beginnings to adeptly incorporate liberal and conservative elements into his policies in order to finally
establish a “modern Mexico.” He was also a star general who led Mexican troops to victory against
French forces on May 5, 1862, and April 2, 1867. As such, he became known as the hero of May 5
(Cinco de Mayo) and April 2 (Dos de Abril), and his widespread popularity helped him ascend to the
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presidency. The changes that took place during his regime provide insight into the process of political,
economic, and ideological state formation during the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries and
thus explain why Porfirio Díaz continued to have a following after the outbreak of the revolution.
As Díaz took over the presidency in 1876, Mexicans struggled to recover from decades of civil
war that weakened an already unstable economy. Díaz understood the need for political stability, and
during his first term (1877-1880) he began the process of stabilizing Mexico through conciliatory
measures. He removed regional caciques (bosses) that had supported Lerdo, but did not attack them
financially by taking their property. Díaz also allowed the Church to “publicly practice religion and to
clandestinely obtain property.”44 Most importantly, he stepped down after one term in office, seemingly
adhering to the constitutional principle of no re-election. Díaz did not fully alienate his detractors as a
result, and he set the foundations for the peaceful transfer of power to his successor Manuel González,
president from 1880-1884. In essence, González was an extension of Díaz because he implemented
many policies set forth by Díaz without actually posing as a political threat.45 At this point, however, no
one else was a serious contender for the presidency besides Díaz, who was the most popular choice in
1884 despite having already served as president. The foundations of political stability and economic
growth were set, and when Congress amended the constitution to allow presidential re-elections, Díaz
began what would become a dictatorship legitimized by popular, military, and Congressional support.

Imagining Mexico during the Porfiriato
Under Díaz, Mexico was able to look outward in a way it had not been able to before. The
constant civil wars and political struggles left Mexico vulnerable throughout the nineteenth century.
There was no possibility for Mexico to be incorporated into a global economy; in fact, Juárez had
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suspended the repayment of Mexico’s international debt in 1861, resulting in military intervention from
Great Britain, Spain, and France. Mexicans were deemed incapable of ruling themselves or fulfilling
their obligations to other nations, and the placement of Maximilian in power demonstrated this. Mexico
was certainly not considered among the world’s modern Western nations when Díaz began his second
term. However, Mexico was not the only country facing political and ideological conflicts. Throughout
Latin America, countries including Argentina and Brazil faced similar problems of underdevelopment
and instability. There was a growing consensus across Latin America in the late nineteenth century that
liberalism had not succeeded, and political leaders and intellectuals began to consider positivism as
method for achieving liberal goals.46
William D. Raat defines positivism, developed in France by Auguste Comte in the 1850s, “as a
philosophy of science- or rather, a synthesis of the particular ‘truths’ of the individual sciences
[mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, and social physics] which were all considered to be
manifestations of natural phenomena.”47 Positivism suggests that “truth” can only be found and
understood through scientific practice, and humanity can only advance through science. This
philosophy was introduced into Mexico by Gabino Barreda, Comte’s “Mexican disciple” and founder of
the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria, or National Preparatory School, in 1868.48 His students formed a
generation of adherents to positivism who would apply this philosophy to Mexico during the Porfiriato.
They became part of the científicos—Díaz’s closest advisers after 1884. Justo Sierra, the intellectual
leader of the científicos, saw himself as part of a new generation of liberals that “[superseded] the ‘old’
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liberals of the Reforma era.”49 According to Charles Hale, this new generation criticized the
“metaphysical politics” of their predecessors, which were based on the idea that “society…should be
molded to conform to the rights of man.”50 The científicos believed that science, not doctrine, would
solve Mexico’s economic and social problems.
The Díaz administration’s central goal was to achieve modernity. As Díaz stabilized the nation
politically by personally selecting state governors and other local leaders who were loyal to him and
posed no threat, the científicos forged a modern Mexico that could achieve global admiration.
Economic progress was crucial, but Díaz’s advisers also understood that Mexico needed to act like a
modern nation. Thus, the científicos also set out to transform Mexico culturally. Liberals during La
Reforma had attempted this in their secularization policies, but científicos took this a step further by
“Europeanizing” Mexico, particularly the nation’s capital. Científicos imagined Mexico as a civilized
nation on par with Western Europe, and they inscribed the nation’s landscapes and urban centers with
elements of modernity including the railroad, grand boulevards, and monuments honoring historical
figures. They also inscribed modernity onto the bodies of Mexicans through public hygiene measures
and eugenic practices. Because there was no opposition until 1910 with enough political power to assert
a competing vision for Mexico, científicos defined Mexico’s national identity during the Porfiriato.
Nationalism is a collective consciousness in which members of a community accept certain
characteristics of their nation-state, which then becomes a national identity. Ernest Gellner argues that
nationalism is a product of modernization, as a society shifts from agrarian to industrialized, and it can
manifest itself in a society with “universal literacy…committed to economic growth through its formal
commitment to social mobility-both horizontal and vertical.” Gellner also suggests that nationalism can
only be spread to the masses by the educated class, the purveyors of “high culture.” In industrial
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societies, “nationalism is an essential part of the cultural atmosphere…educating persons in a culture
that mostly frees them from familial and corporate ties” present in pre-agrarian and agrarian societies.51
Gellner’s definition of nationalism describes the way in which the científicos conceptualized
their nation-building project. They viewed nationalism as unilateral, resulting strictly from a movement
of high culture from the elites to the lower class. This did not account for nationalistic sentiment formed
at the grassroots level, or dependent on cultural markers such as religious symbols.52 It also downplayed
the important ethnic or provincial affiliations that could also contribute to a heterogeneous Mexican
national identity.
The científicos did correlate modernity with industrialization and a “commitment to social
mobility.” Education was a central component to their national project, and Sierra, the Minister of Public
Instruction, promoted literacy and education on an unprecedented level in Mexico. Sierra “became an
ardent defender of the positivist curriculum at the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria” after 1877, and he
endorsed the use of textbooks on logic.53 Sierra pushed for reforms of the Mexican public education
system, and for mandatory public education, “resisting the widespread Darwinist skepticism regarding
the capacity for Indians to become educated.”54 Like Gabino Barreda, Sierra believed that a modern
liberal nation should have educated citizens. The number of primary schools doubled during the
Porfiriato, from 5,194 in 1878 to 12,068 in 1908, and enrollment increased from 141,780 to 658,843.55
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Furthermore, Sierra helped to establish the Universidad Nacional in 1910. Two other científicos,
Enrique C. Creel (governor of Chihuahua) and Ramón Corral (governor of Sonora) formed state boards
of education and expanded the number of normal schools to train teachers. Creel even set out to educate
the Tarahumara Indians of Chihuahua. The expansion of secular public education was one of the farreaching accomplishments of the Porfiriato, since more Mexican children and young adults were be
exposed to modern ideals and science, rather than religious catechism. Education also became a way to
encourage nationalism, promote civic participation and forge a sense of inclusion and national identity
in Mexican children. In the case of the Tarahumaras, education became a tool for “incorporation and
betterment,” an effort to assimilate this group (though with limited success) into the Mexican nation.56
The científicos were far from reaching their goals, however, and since most schools were in urban areas,
Mexico “still had 2 million Indians not speaking Spanish” by 1910.57 Still, they set the foundation for
the modern national education system.
As the public education system expanded, Mexico’s economy, under the direction of José Yves
Limantour, moved towards modernity, with three decades of unprecedented, if uneven, growth in
Mexico. One of the major economic successes of the Porfiriato was the construction of over 20,000
kilometers of railways, which connected Mexico’s urban centers such as Mexico City and Veracruz, and
facilitated access to U.S. border cities including Laredo and El Paso. For the first time, Mexico was tied
together by a relatively inexpensive mode of transportation. The following industries expanded during
the Porfiriato: cotton, livestock, coffee, henequen, rubber, tobacco, beer and liquor, glass, cement, soap,
meat-packing and tobacco. By 1904, textile plants across the country had an annual production of 45.5
million pesos.58 A mining boom began in 1892, in part because of technological advances. Electricity
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powered pumps and lit mines and the use of cyanide sped up the refining process. Between 1891 and
1910, silver production increased from 1.08 million kilograms to 2.42 million kilograms. Lead
production rose from 30,187 metric tons to 124,292 metric tons, and copper rose from 5,650 metric tons
to 48,160 metric tons.59 Economic expansion was widespread, but uneven. As Ramón Ruiz points out,
the northern states (Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas) experienced the most
rapid development because of their proximity to the United States and increased opportunities for
foreign investors.
In 1895, Mexico experienced its first budget surplus, and the modified banking system provided
a stable national financial system. Banamex, the Banco Nacional de México, was formed in 1884 to
“establish and maintain a uniform national currency…[and] ensure a stable banking system and prevent
financial panics.”60 Foreign investors obtained credit through Banamex, which increased Mexico’s
trustworthiness and helped it become incorporated into the global economy. Domestically, the Díaz
administration passed semi-protectionist policies in an effort to stimulate industrial growth. Limantour,
who became Finance Minister in 1892 and supported high tariffs, “decreed that no bank could open
without approval from the Treasury Minister.” He established a limited number of state banks to keep
Banamex from becoming a monopoly.61
The key to Mexico’s growth was foreign investment in all sectors of the economy. Wasserman
notes that between 1884 and 1900, almost $1.2 billion U.S. dollars were invested in Mexico primarily by
British, U.S., and German investors. Scholars suggest that the Díaz administration sacrificed domestic
development because they catered so much to foreign business owners. John Coatsworth calls this
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“growth against development.”62 Railroad construction resulted in the expropriation of ejidos and
property of small landowners. Public land was purchased by foreign businessmen and Mexican
hacendados such as Luis Terrazas, who owned over 10 million acres of land in the state of Chihuahua.
Moreover, before 1900, two U.S. railroad corporations—the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, and the
Denver-Rio Grande owned the Mexican Central and Mexican National railways, respectively. The
British company Interoceanic owned the line connecting Mexico City and Veracruz.63 Although
Limantour officially nationalized the Central and National lines in 1908, they remained under the
control of foreign investors.
Economic expansion initiated Mexico’s entry into the “modern” world, but it also underscored
the problems with applying modernity at the domestic level. Bank charters, privileges, and profits were
divided among a select few elites, and “banks made financing decisions based on the personal
connections of their directors.”64 This limited the number of people that could obtain credit, open a
business, and profit from the economic growth. Moreover, it created a financial system with minimal
competition, which had the long-term consequence of stunting Mexican industrialization. Certain
families rose to prominence during the Porfiriato, including the Terrazas-Creel family in Chihuahua, and
the Maderos in Coahuila, making millions of pesos from banking, mining, and other endeavors, but
Mexico’s lower and campesino classes were not successfully integrated into the growing capitalist
system. Haber argues that the “productivity of Mexican labor was far lower than that of workers in the
advanced industrial countries. As had been the case in Europe in the early nineteenth century, Mexican
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workers actively resisted the routinization and discipline of the factory system.”65 Lower productivity
meant that Mexico could not compete with developed nations with higher production rates, despite
protectionist policies meant to aid Mexican industries. Científicos perceived this as a problem of the
Mexican worker. Foreign laborers (especially Europeans) were perceived as more productive;
consequently, foreign laborers often earned higher wages than Mexican obreros.
Científicos viewed Mexico’s lower classes as economically ‘backward’ (especially because of
their desire to maintain ejidos), but also as racially and culturally uncivilized. The idea of “civilization”
was a fundamental component of the way in which científicos imagined and constructed Mexico.
Western Europe, particularly France, was the epicenter of the civilized world in the late nineteenth
century. Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo suggests that although Mexican liberals in the 1860s remained
resentful because of French intervention, the growing popularity of positivism (a French philosophy) in
the 1870s moved intellectuals in favor of France, leading to Mexico’s afrancesamiento, or Francophilia.
He adds that
France, as arbiter of late-nineteenth-century culture and politics, was a process of colonization
and homogenization of which the ostensible center was Paris but which in fact had no center.
Ideas, products, and people circulated throughout the world in an uncontrollable fashion.
Mexican and French elites, as well as those of other Western nations, were simultaneously
colonizers and colonized in this process. 66
The científicos in the 1880s willingly became colonized subjects, positioning the Mexican population as
inferior to Western Europeans because they were Mexicano—non white, and worst of all, Indian.
Colonialism defined what it meant to be human by violently creating subjectivity, the ‘self’
versus the ‘other.’ In Latin America, the European slave trade, the Catholic Church, and capitalism
were among the colonial institutions used to dominate the bodies and cultural practices of non-
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Westerners. Judith Butler suggests that domination actually begins with the speech act; objects and
people cannot exist unless they are recognized through speech, which can result in “linguistic death.”67
Consequently, speech can injure and silence people. In late nineteenth-century Mexico, where the
majority of the population was illiterate, literacy equaled power. The científicos used the rhetoric of
civilization and modernity, which deemed a person fully human if she/he became Western European, to
impose their own subjectivity onto the Mexican population, in effect, re-colonizing Mexicans.
Modernity was an economic and political ideal dependent upon national unity. Nationalism was
an expression of this unity, and the world’s fairs became the center stage for the performance of
modernity. According to Tenorio-Trillo, developed nations used the world’s fairs to demonstrate their
superiority, while developing nations (including Mexico) sought to prove their worth in the eyes of the
civilized world. For científicos, or “wizards of progress,” these events provided an opportunity to
present the Mexico they were creating.68
As the Díaz administration prepared for the world’s fairs, it faced a conflict between its goals
and Mexico’s reality. Científicos wanted to represent Mexico as a white, progressive, and civilized
nation, despite its predominantly Indian and mestizo population that had not been fully integrated into
the capitalist system. To deal with this conflict, científicos engaged in what Homi Bhabha considers
“colonial mimicry,” the “desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is
almost the same, but not quite.”69 A mimetic relationship is based on the ambivalence of “difference
and desire.” The colonizer gazes upon the colonized in an act of surveillance, while the colonized
subject desires what she/he can almost become.70 When colonized subjects perform the mimicry,
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colonizers must face what they partially are, turning the “ambivalence of colonial authority…from
mimicry…to menace- a difference that is almost total but not quite.”71 Mexico’s científicos dealt with a
dual ambivalence as both the colonizer and colonized. They fetishized Europe but could only mimic the
object of their desire because they were Mexican. In turn, as they gazed upon the Mexican population,
científicos could not escape the reality that under the nationalism they constructed, they were as
Mexican as the poorest campesino. Científicos resolved this issue by exoticizing Mexico and becoming
a desirable ‘Other,’ proving that Mexicans could be modern, in spite of their differences with Europeans.
The world’s fairs were the ideal setting for científicos to put mexicanidad on display, to be
gazed upon and judged by the Western powers. Science was the integral component of Mexico’s
exhibition. At the 1889 Paris World’s Fair, Mexico showcased advances in media, work from public
schools, and metallurgy.72 The científicos also presented statistics, which “were an important part of a
larger social, cultural, and physical topography of the nation which included, in addition to statistics,
maps, photographs, and natural history studies.”73 Finally, a display on public health and hygiene
highlighted advances in medicine. Science in the 1880s emphasized the importance of individual and
social hygiene in order to combat disease and clean urban spaces. Tenorio-Trillo notes that for Mexico
public hygiene was important for these reasons, but also because it needed to combat the “country's
long-standing image as an unhygienic and unsanitary place.”74 At the fair, científicos presented plans for
a drainage system in Mexico City, a sanitary code, and the National Medical Institute.
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Moreover, Mexican hygienists attended congresses on syphilology, leprosy, dermatology, and
mental health.75 Hygienists from around the world also discussed hymenology, and women’s bodies
became the site for debates about cleanliness and public health, nationalism, and modernity. However,
women who studied this subject were not allowed to participate in these congresses. Public health
campaigns were aimed at cleaning urban spaces of trash, disease, and also from prostitutes, who were
“proven” to be the primary transmitters of syphilis. Officials used science to explain women’s sexuality
and justify measures to control it. For example, Francisco Flores, author of El Himen en México,
studied the hymens of 181 Mexican women, concluding that the “ring-shaped hymen” was the “normal”
type for them. He argued that his study was important because it “would help forensic medicine to
protect female virginity.” The author’s work was an indirect extension of an earlier study performed in
1881 by Dr. Florencio Flores, which compared the pelvises of Mexican and European women. He
considered the differences between Mexican women and “normal” European women to be a
consequence of an inherent “physical defect” in the Mexican women.76 Although Mexicanas were
‘defective,’ Flores’s study demonstrated that they did have distinctive “Mexican” physical
characteristics. Through the modern practice of hymenology, Mexican scientists seemingly proved the
existence of unique Mexican traits, albeit inferior to European ones. More importantly, modern science
legitimized patriarchy and the development of policies used to control women’s bodies and behavior for
the benefit of public health and the national image. Mexican men proved they were civilized enough to
keep women clean and pure.
Regardless of colonialist scientific studies that determined Mexicans to be biologically flawed,
the delegation to the 1889 Paris World’s Fair attempted to positively portray Mexico’s uniqueness by

75

Ibid., 148.

76

Ibid., 150.

39

highlighting the nation’s “glorious” Aztec past.77 The Aztec Palace, Mexico’s pavilion at the fair,
resembled an “authentic” Aztec temple and it served as a text through which científicos claimed the
authenticity of Mexican nationalism. This monument to Mexico’s past formed the bridge between
modernity and the indigenous past, and became emblematic of the Mexican national identity. More
importantly, it counteracted the scientific discourse that positioned Mexicans as inferior to Europeans.
The Aztecs, from whom the “Mexican race” originated according to this narrative, succeeded in
commerce, philosophy, poetry, art, and war; they were civilized. Mexicans, however, also had Spanish
blood; in essence, mexicanidad was based on two traditions of civilization, which set them apart from
other cultures.
Tenorio-Trillo argues that the Aztec Palace was part of a larger project in which intellectuals
reconceptualized and rewrote Mexico’s history during this decade. México a Través de Los Siglos,
written under the direction of Vicente Riva Palacio, synthesized Mexican history from the preColumbian period to the present day. According to Tenorio Trillo, this history “put special emphasis on
two central issues: on one hand, the creation of a civic religion with a well-delineated chronology and
hierarchy of events and a demarcated set of heroes; on the other, the reconstitution of the Indian past as
an inherent component of Mexican nationhood.”78 Riva Palacio and other historians were not the first to
give importance to Mexico’s indigenous heritage, however. “Criollo patriotism,” a sense of pride in a
mixed European/indigenous ethnic heritage, developed among criollos across Latin America in the
eighteenth century, as Enlightenment ideals about nationalism gained popularity among intellectuals.
Historian David Brading argues that this sense of common identity, a “proto-nationalism” which
emphasized a “national character” (Catholic, anti-Spanish) and a “national [Aztec] past,” influenced the
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independence movements of the 1810s. 79 Mexico’s liberals relied heavily on this sense of patriotism to
unite Mexicans during the French intervention. The científicos took this a step further by writing a
national history with three central figures- Miguel Hidalgo, Benito Juárez, and Porfirio Díaz. Hidalgo
was the hero of the independence movement, Juárez fought for liberty, and Díaz peacefully consolidated
the nation.80 These men, a creole, a mestizo and a full-blooded Zapotec Indian, guided Mexico through
its difficulties and set the foundation for modernity. The científicos were pushing Mexico toward its full
potential.
At the Paris World’s Fair of 1889, científicos defined Mexico as a nation with civilized European
and indigenous roots. Though Mexicans were not fully European, they were capable of engaging the
sciences and progressing economically. The Díaz administration set out to prove that Mexico was just
as modern as Western European nations, and it based Mexican nationalism on the sense of pride in
achieving modernity. Tenorio-Trillo argues that “the national image that Mexico was at such pains to
project was received either with indifference or with an ostentatious paternalism that is so often the
imitator’s reward.”81 Nevertheless, the Díaz regime persisted in its efforts to have its national identity
validated and accepted among the Western community.

Nationalism, Colonial Mimicry, and the Emergence of Porfirismo, 1890-1910
By 1890, the pax porfiriana had begun: Mexico achieved political stability and economic
growth, it became increasingly interconnected through railroad lines, and Díaz, now dictator, oversaw
intricate relationships in which everyone in Mexico seemingly owed him allegiance. The nation was
finally taken seriously by the Western powers, and Díaz became well-respected among international
diplomats. The científicos developed a national identity that placed Díaz alongside Hidalgo and Juárez
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as a national hero, and they used the image of Díaz to maintain legitimacy. However, the Mexico that
the científicos presented in Paris in 1889 and at subsequent world’s fairs masked the political, economic
and social realities in Mexico. Díaz and his advisors maintained an uneasy balance between appealing
to foreign investors and seeking to attract white European immigrants (one of the goals of the Mexican
delegations to the world’s fairs), while dealing with Mexico’s mostly “uncivilized” masses.
Because they were modern, educated, and civilized, científicos laid claim to Mexican
nationalism, purporting to act in the nation’s best interests. They positioned Mexico’s elites as
colonizers, even as they performed the colonial mimicry before European powers. In essence, they put
on what Frantz Fanon calls a “white mask,” which allows non-whites to come closer to achieving
subjectivity by mimicking the act of being white, or fully human.82
At the turn of the twentieth century, Mexico was in the midst of its belle époque, a “neocolonial” period of “cultural dependency” on Britain and France.83 The Porfirista aristocracy (including
the científicos) enjoyed the fruits of Mexico’s modernization and set the standard for cultured and
civilized Mexican society. The aristocrat class grew as Díaz increased the number of diplomats sent to
Europe through Mexico’s foreign service. According to Macías-González, “by 1890, members of the
leading [aristocratic] families occupied practically all of Mexico’s top posts at its legations in Europe.”84
These diplomats adopted Western high culture and sometimes married into upper-class European
families, and they acted as arbitrators between the Díaz regime and high society in Mexico and in
Europe. For example, male foreign investors were invited on tours of haciendas and organized hunts,
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which “dispelled fears about banditry in the countryside” while demonstrating the masculinity, class,
and manners of Mexican hacendados.85
The upper-class also exhibited gentility by speaking numerous languages, particularly French, by
organizing extravagant social functions (largely a woman’s task), and introducing the latest European
cultural trends that Mexico’s professional classes “rushed to adopt.”86 The National Theatre hosted
opera performances, the development of shopping districts promoted European-style consumer culture,
and aristocrats began riding in automobiles (or at least in fancy horse-drawn carriages). Women wore
imported European dresses and they received help with their children from foreign nannies and tutors.
Most children (both male and female) of the “conservative criollo aristocracy and noveaux-riches
plutocrats” studied abroad in Spain, France, or Great Britain.87 Meanwhile, children of aristocratic
hacendados or business owners studied in the United States, where they were trained in the fields of
finance and entrepreneurship. Mexico’s upper classes disregarded the public education system, in effect
perpetuating class differences by separating their children from the lower classes and offering them a
seemingly superior education.88
Eurocentric cultural values influenced the aristocratic and urban- professional Porfiristas, who
internalized notions of class, race, and gender based on Francophilia, Social Darwinism, and positivism.
Social Darwinism, a theory prevalent during the period, sustained the superiority of the “white”
European race; scientific studies at the time confirmed it. Nancy Leys Stepan argues that the growing
field of eugenics offered a solution for “race improvement.” The científicos relied on positivism and
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scientific studies to legitimize their race-betterment policies and validate their increasing xenofilia
towards Western Europe.89
The burden of race-betterment fell disproportionately on women as Mexican nationalism became
increasingly tied to patriarchal notions about motherhood. Women during the Porfiriato were active
participants in the modernization project, and they worked at becoming modern as much as their male
counterparts. However, they did this primarily through the domestic sphere, focusing on improving
their families for the benefit of the national “family.” Scientific studies, eugenics, and public health
campaigns prompted women to care for themselves in order to give birth to healthy Mexican children.
Advertising in newspapers aimed at the female audience promoted vitamins for women in their childbearing years. Moreover, women needed to take care not only of their bodies, but also their minds and
spirits. Gabriela Cano notes that the Porfirista feminine ideal consisted of “domesticity,
modesty…sentimentalism, and submissiveness.” Marriage was important, and a woman’s purity was
considered her “most precious treasure,” since it symbolized her family’s honor.90 Prostitutes posed a
danger in that they would not reproduce the Mexican race within the holy union of marriage.
Femininity also had direct ties to Catholicism. Although Mexico’s liberals were anti-clerical,
Catholicism was widely popular among all social classes. Carmen Romero Rubio de Díaz, the
president’s wife, was attributed with influencing her husband’s conciliatory efforts with the Church.
Catholics considered the Virgin Mary the ideal woman who exemplified domesticity, piety, and
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submissiveness. In Mexico, devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe united Mexicans since before
independence; as preacher Miguel Sánchez stated in the 1730s, “the Mother of God had chosen Mexico
as her patria.”91 La Guadalupana became the symbol of criollo patriotism since she appeared to a
Mexican, not a Spaniard. The image of the Virgin of Guadalupe was carried by Hidalgo in battle, and it
was the one cultural marker that represented the indigenous, European, and Catholic roots of Mexican
nationalism, despite the efforts of anti-clerical liberals. In the context of the Porfiriato, criollo patriotism
was important because it justified the acceptance of the dark-skinned Virgin Mary in a society that
privileged whiteness.
The Virgin of Guadalupe defended Mexico as the nation’s patroness. She was not a passive
figure within Catholicism, nor were Mexican women expected to be passive. Women needed to be
educated and refined according to European standards culturally “whitened” in order to pass these
qualities to their children. As mentioned earlier, Cano argues that women during the Porfiriato were
allowed to participate in the literary sphere, as long as they expressed “sweetness, submission and
domesticity.” Literature, particularly poetry, provided an outlet for women’s emotions. Women were
also allowed to express their creativity through artwork, and crafts from Indian women became popular
during this period. Indigenous tapestry, pottery, and embroidery exuded “an element of exoticism and a
symbol of a heritage destined to disappear” as the Mexican race whitened. 92 On the opposite end of the
social strata, elite women engaged civil society through activism in charities. They practiced what
Gabriela González calls the “politics of benevolence,” with the “idea that women bore moral
responsibility for society.”93 These women justified their social activities using the rhetoric of
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nationalism. Though they stepped outside the domestic sphere, it was for the benefit of the national
family.
If the Virgin of Guadalupe represented the feminine ideal, Díaz was her masculine counterpart—
a warrior in defense of the national family, willing to sacrifice himself for la patria, or the homeland. In
regard to race, however, Díaz occupied a contradictory position within Mexico’s racial hierarchy. His
mother, Petrona Mori, was a Mixtec Indian from Oaxaca, and she raised five children after Porfirio’s
father, José Faustino Díaz (a criollo), died in 1833. Their son attended the Instituto de Ciencias y Artes,
where he became Benito Juárez’s protégé. Although Díaz and Juárez eventually had a falling out during
the Restored Republic, the two “native sons” of Oaxaca were a source of pride for Mexico’s lower
classes because they demonstrated that social mobility was possible.94 Chassen de López suggests that
while Juárez “laid the groundwork for the transition to a more mestizo nation,” Díaz “witnessed the
emergence of the mestizo as a symbol of Mexico and the transition of power from the Indian south to
the more mestizo Centro and north.”95 This transition, however, became possible at the expense of
Mexico’s indigenous population. During the Porfiriato, Díaz violently repressed Yaqui Indians in
Sonora and Mayas in Yucatán for the sake of national unity and capitalism. Business owners and
developers attempted to take over Yaqui territory considered ideal for railroad expansion, commercial
agriculture, and mining. As the Yaquis fought the ‘colonists’ for their land and for their sense of
national sovereignty, Díaz authorized the deportation of thousands of Yaquis to the Yucatán peninsula to
work on the henequen plantations. At the same time, the Caste War continued in Yucatán, and Díaz
appointed General Victoriano Huerta, known for his ruthlessness in battle, to defeat the Mayas.
As Díaz used violence to subjugate indigenous populations who had different conceptions of
nationality than his, the dictator literally and symbolically whitened himself in order to appear more
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European. Díaz biographer Carlton Beals commented on the changes in the dictator’s appearance as he
increasingly emphasized his criollo heritage. When Díaz assumed the presidency in 1877, he was
“bronzed as an Indian,” and “the gilt buttons on the vest of his three-piece gray suit were half unfastened
revealing his shirt front, mussed and wrinkled.”96 In 1882, he married socialite Carmen Romero Rubio,
who transformed his image from that of a “rude, heavy…provincial,” to a man with “dignified gray hair,
formerly so unruly and coarse but at last obedient to brush and comb [which] made even his skin seem
much lighter.”97 Famed Mexican novelist Federico Gamboa commented on the change in the Díaz’s
appearance upon his first meeting with the president in 1893, stating that Díaz “was not the same man
that I once saw, scruffy, with the aspect of a warrior, of a veteran soldier; this was now a proper
gentleman, with English manners and skills, clean-shaven, very serious, irreproachable.”98 In his
portraits, Díaz was depicted with lighter skin, which he used alabastrum talcum to whiten.99 The hero of
Cinco de Mayo, the mestizo from humble origins in Oaxaca, the son of an Indian woman, was now a
dignified, whiter-skinned statesman, the leader of a developing modern nation who lived in Chapultepec
Castle, hosted galas, and was a member of Mexico’s civilized society. Yet Díaz never learned to write
correctly or use proper spelling and grammar, and he was unable to “erase” his Oaxacan accent.100
Meanwhile, he supported the breakdown of ejidos and sometimes the massacre of Indians and
their expulsion from their land, all for the sake of modernity, economic development, and Mexico’s
civility. Carlos Tello Díaz, a descendant of Porfirio Díaz, suggests that for his tatarabuelo, “the concept
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of nation was different- and far superior- to the concept of pueblo [people].” In a letter dated February
28, 1912, Díaz (then in exile) lamented not suppressing the Mexican Revolution in 1910 because of his
desire to respect the wishes of the pueblo at the expense of “national happiness.”101 Don Porfirio felt
this was the first time he placed Mexico’s people ahead of the interests of the national body, and it
would lead to Mexico’s ruin. Tello Díaz notes that in retrospect, the exiled president understood that he
had established “order and progress” by sacrificing democracy, the ideal that prompted his break with
Juárez in the 1870s. Díaz spent the rest of his life “conscious…of the fact that he had not knownbecause he did not want to- how to resolve once and for all the problem of his succession” and move
Mexico towards democracy.102
Díaz’s thoughts on democracy and nationalism exhibit the fundamental characteristics of
Porfirismo. In exile, Díaz rarely regretted sacrificing democracy or Mexico’s lower classes in order to
improve the nation’s image, establish peace, and improve infrastructure and the public education system.
He considered himself a patriot who understood the necessity for Mexicans to place the nation above
their religious and political differences. Porfiristas supported these ideas and believed that Díaz’s wise
leadership saved Mexico. In 1901, Gamboa, a self-proclaimed Porfirista, wrote “yes! General Díaz has
shed human blood, of brothers and strangers; he has infringed on our rights, yes! He has mutilated
liberties, yes! He has perpetrated his share of reprehensible acts, yes!...but, is there any area in the world
where there has been a ruler who has not committed these sins?...And what has Porfirio Díaz given
Mexico?” The president “above all else, was a builder” who would be remembered for his “firm and
grand labor; uniting and mending a destroyed land.”103
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Gamboa’s praise exemplifies the Porfirista nationalism that developed during the Porfiriato.
Científico nationalism was based on improving Mexico through science and promoting Mexico as a
modern Euro-centric nation, but it was only a subset of a broader Porfirista nationalism centered around
a cult of personality of the charismatic Díaz. Max Weber defines “charisma” as
a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men
and treated as endowed with supernatural, super-human, or at least specifically exceptional
powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded
as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated
as a leader…How the quality in question would be judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other
such point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone
important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by
his “followers” or “disciples.”104
Charismatic authority derives from the public recognition of a leader’s charisma, a psychological
expression “of complete personal devotion” to this leader, “arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair or
hope.”105 Weber argues that a true charismatic leader rules by what he/she says, not according to any
established laws or socio-political norms. Moreover, charismatic leaders counter bureaucratic and/or
traditional authority because they base their hegemony not on rational laws but on emotional ties to their
followers.
In Mexico (and throughout Latin America), caudillos, or regional strong-men, manifested this
charismatic authority. According to Ariel de la Fuente, caudillos “were perceived as the highest
authority.” They gained this power through military leadership and by uniting people against certain
institutions or political factions. Moreover, “popular culture underscored not only their position as
political leaders but also distinguished the caudillos as moral authorities and role models in the
communities they ruled over.”106 Charisma was integral for caudillos because it helped them to form
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different types of connections with their supporters. Compadrazgo, for example, was an important
cultural relationship established between parents and the godparents of their children. Caudillos used
these types of cultural ties to “mobilize support through family and friends as well as through patronage
networks that linked them to people below them in the social hierarchy.”107
On a national level, caudillos often ruled as dictators, gaining legitimacy through this popular
support. Macías-González argues that Díaz relied on a “cult of personality” in his quest for absolute
power. In order to attain this goal, the general and his advisers created “the Díaz myth” based on Díaz’s
image as an indispensable, messianic héroe de la paz—“hero of peace”…publicized in
biographies, music, poems, texts, etiquette manuals, films, and sound recordings, the myth
cultivated deference toward Díaz, establishing him as the fountain of political legitimacy and
authority. Photographs, paintings, and other images placed Díaz at the center of the nation’s
struggle against internal and external enemies. Accordingly, Díaz and his entourage modified his
image as necessary; he appeared in uniform when his military glory needed to be highlighted and
dressed in civilian attire to underscore his government’s stability.108
Díaz’s charisma served as the foundation for his legitimacy, but his mythical status grew (at least
initially) as he brought peace and economic development to Mexico.
Public spaces became important in constructing this myth while showcasing Mexico’s
transformation into a modern nation, and the Díaz administration made extensive efforts to Europeanize
the capital. Cosmopolitanism inspired the transformation of Mexico City, and officials inscribed
modernity onto Mexico’s urban landscape through the use of monuments to memorialize Mexico’s
historical narrative. The most important architectural achievement of the Porfiriato was the construction
of the Paseo de la Reforma (Reforma Boulevard) in Mexico City. The boulevard, commissioned in the
1870s, was inspired by Parisian boulevards. It included the Monument to Independence (El Ángel) and
statues of Cuauhtémoc and Christopher Columbus. Like the Aztec Palace, Reforma Boulevard served as
a space uniting Mexico’s European and indigenous pasts. The monument to Cuauhtémoc includes a
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depiction of the Aztec leader having his feet burned by Spanish conquerors, symbolizing his heroism
against the invaders. The Díaz administration used this statue to “reconfirm the power of Mexico City
and its right to rule the nation by inheritance.”109 Government officials laid claim to the status of direct
descendants of the Aztecs through the design of the boulevard. The statue of Columbus included a
quote in which the navigator described his success in the new colonies in a letter to King Ferdinand.
This statue was a tribute to Spain, but also to the Catholic Church, since the colonial project was
promoted by the Church as part of its evangelical efforts. These statues and the Monument to
Independence form a straight line which ends at Chapultepec Castle, Díaz’s home, thus symbolizing a
linear progression from Columbus to Cuauhtémoc, to Hidalgo, to Díaz. As Barbara Tenenbaum
suggests, Riva Palacio and those involved in the renovation of Reforma Boulevard justified including
these different (and conflicting) symbols by positioning them as markers of “creole nationalism.”110 The
Aztecs were glorious leaders, but the Spanish helped the Indians evolve into a more civilized Christian
population. Hidalgo and the leaders of the independence struggle established the Mexican nation, and
Díaz moved the nation toward modernity.
In addition to Reforma Boulevard, government buildings were renovated in order to better
represent Díaz and the “Republic.” For example, in the 1890s, the bell used by Hidalgo during his
“Grito de Dolores” was placed above the central balcony of the National Palace. The Treasury
purchased existing palaces in order to house different government agencies, and they were equipped
with commodities including electrical wiring, telephones, and lighting. Throughout Mexico City,
advances in transportation led to the paving of major boulevards, which were also lined with flowers and
decorated with monuments. The ultimate goal was for Mexico City to become a well-respected center
of civilization and modernity—the “Paris of Latin America.”
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All of these changes brought about by modernity elevated Mexico, its upper classes, and the
capital, but Porfirio Díaz would not be outdone. If aristocrats showcased gentility and class, the
president had to be more genteel, elegant, and distinguished. Thus, Don Porfirio and Doña Carmen used
the “Burgundian ceremonial model” to give the presidency an air of monarchical grandeur. This model,
“developed in the court of the medieval dukes of Burgundy, whereby petitioners were made to approach
the monarch through a succession of magnificently appointed halls or antechambers.”111 The couple
“employed light, sound, as well as temporal and spatial mechanisms to awe those in their presence.”112
If anyone (regardless of status) approached the dictator, he/she had to pass through spaces with elaborate
ornaments, trophies, and other symbols of Díaz’s power—a reminder of who the supreme leader was.
Petitioners to the president underwent an elaborate process for the privilege of visiting with Díaz.
Macías-González notes that once petitioners submitted proper documentation (letters of introduction
from acquaintances, and the actual request) and had it approved, they could meet Díaz during his public
audiences on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. After crossing the National Palace’s largest patio, the
visitor climbed the “escalera de honor” or grand staircase to the executive suite, after which it was
necessary to pass through three antechambers before reaching the president. However, acceptance into
the second antechamber was not guaranteed, though social standing and personal connections improved
a person’s chances. Even then a person could wait for weeks in the second room. The fortunate few
(approximately ten) who were called daily for a personal audience with Díaz had twenty minutes to
present their case before the president. Gamboa recounts the experience of his first interview with Díaz
in 1893.
Mr. [Ignacio] Mariscal [Minister of Foreign Relations] indicates for me to wait for the president
in a spacious lounge, after having crossed several rooms and antechambers that were deserted
and cold…The minister disappears through a thick door to the left, antique and artistic; once I
adjusted to the semi-darkness of the room, I was surprised by its beautiful tapestry. In the
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background I see our eagle inscribed on a red satin background, with a crown and imperial crest;
below it, the motto of Archduke Maximilian’s government…”Equality in Justice”…I am happy
that the tapestry survived, yes, it proves that Mexico does not destroy for the sake of
destruction…we are one grade above the victorious assailants of Tuileries Palace…My
enthusiasm wanes as I see…horrible Chinese spittoons and on top of two tables, petroleum
lamps, grossly modest…Suddenly, almost without sound, I see before me the president of the
Republic, arbitrator of the destinies of the nation’s 14 million inhabitants…We sit down, he in
the shadows, and I in the light, a trait that I do not dislike in a wise leader, in an observer and
manipulator like him. We speak of generalities for ten or fifteen minutes…his sudden silence
indicates that our interview is finished.113
Díaz purposely sat his guests in direct sunlight, so that he could see them while making it difficult for
them to see him. Such manipulation perpetuated the “cult of personality” surrounding Díaz. Mexicans
from all social classes could aspire to a personal meeting with the benevolent president, who gave the
impression that he was accessible to the masses. In reality, Díaz forced everyone who went to visit him
via this path to humble themselves before him, acting out his position of power while keeping his
visitors in place.
Mexico’s aristocrats and científicos based their identities and their sense of nationalism on acting
as European as possible, while other Porfiristas (among them the urban professionals that are the focus
of this study) aspired to reach this ideal. Although the two groups held similar cultural values, the
tension between them increased during the first decade of the twentieth century. As the nation faced
economic problems with the world recession in 1907, and Díaz refused to select a successor, Mexicans
became increasingly disenchanted with the Porfiriato. This disenchantment turned into open resentment
and hostility as Mexico’s problems worsened while Díaz and the científicos continued congratulating
themselves for modernizing Mexico.

“El Derrumbamiento Porfirista,” 1906-1910
On January 1, 1909, Federico Gamboa noted in his memoirs “today, it is an honor for a person to
declare that he is Mexican; if we look to the past we see this was not always the case, and perhaps it will
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not be in the future, since we can not discern what lies ahead in the unknown and mysterious future.
The omens, therefore, must be of optimism and strength.”114 Exactly one year later, the novelist wrote
“my mind, intermittingly, looks through a window and sees a dark and foggy field of omens,
conjectures, and premonitions…I hear the muffled echoes of a storm…[the field’s] darkness divided by
flashes of lightning…General Díaz is now very old, and though he tries, he cannot defy the laws of
nature…There is much hatred in the air against his prolonged administration.”115
In the last years of the Díaz regime, as the dictator and his advisors alienated members of almost
every sector of the population, the Porfiriato became a spectacle, ridiculed, mocked, and openly
contested. In 1907 a world-wide recession drastically affected Mexico and stopped the economic
growth of the previous decades. The agrarian sector faced problems with crop yields during droughts,
and conditions in haciendas worsened. The purchasing power of peones declined as prices for basic
food staples such as corn and chile rose. In fact, harvests were so poor that corn had to be imported. As
exports decreased, unemployment rates grew and the rural population faced widespread poverty.
These problems were not limited to the peones, however. Lower-class urban Mexicans lived in
terrible, unsanitary conditions with high levels of disease, malnutrition, and child mortality.116
Mexicans in the urban sector also dealt with unemployment, racial discrimination and stagnant wages.
Employers viewed this problem differently, however, and employers in the northern states in particular
complained of labor shortages. The Mexico City newspaper El Imparcial attributed this to “the shiftless
character of the Mexican worker who, accustomed to just getting along, lacked the incentive to improve
himself” unlike foreign employees.117 The conflict between laborers and employers resulted in two
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major strikes. The first protest took place at the American-owned copper mines of Cananea, Sonora, in
1906. Mexican workers demanded an end to discrimination and a wage of five pesos per day, the same
as their American counterparts. In 1907, workers at the Rio Blanco textile mills (owned by a
Frenchman) in Veracruz and Puebla made similar demands. Díaz not only sided with the foreign
company owners; he sent the military to violently suppress the strikes. Before these events, Díaz had
generally relied on the rurales, rural police, to settle these types of local disputes. The fact that he used
military force in these two cases demonstrates that he knew they posed a genuine threat to his authority.
Suddenly, the pax porfiriana had begun to deteriorate.
In addition to Mexico’s economic problems, the population was growing weary of the
dictatorship. At the turn of the century, Mexico experienced a “revival of Juarista liberalism,” and
Mexicans reevaluated the liberal project of the 1850s-1870s in relation to Díaz’s policies.118 Groups
opposed to Díaz formed liberal clubs across the nation in an effort to restore the democratic principles
set forth by the Constitution of 1857. In Oaxaca, Díaz critics established the Liberal Regeneration Club
“Benito Juárez” in 1900. The club’s mission was to use the press and “public denunciations” to
“regenerate [the masses] from the barbarian state which…the nefarious, retrograde [científico] party
[had] tried to submerge them.”119 That same year, engineer Camilo Arriaga led the opposition in San
Luis Potosí, where they organized the Liberal Club “Ponciano Arriaga” and the First Liberal Congress in
1901.120 Women also participated in this opposition movement. In Mexico City, they established the
Feminine Antireelectionist Club “Daughters of Cuauhtémoc” in 1909 and the Feminine League of
Political Propaganda in 1910.
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The opposition press also expanded during this period. The most prominent anti-Porfirista
newspapers included Mexico City’s Diario del Hogar and El Hijo del Ahuizote, and Regeneración,
published by Oaxacan brothers Ricardo, Jesús, and Enrique Flores Magón.121 The editors of these
newspapers often met with persecution, and Filomeno Mata (director of Diario del Hogar) was
incarcerated for acting against the Díaz regime. The Flores Magón brothers were also imprisoned for
seditious activity, and they fled to the United States in 1904, where they continued to publish
Regeneración.
In 1905, Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón helped to organize the Partido Liberal Mexicano
(PLM, or Mexican Liberal Party). Ricardo had participated in the First Liberal Congress in San Luis
Potosí, and the influence of the earlier liberal clubs was evident within the PLM. Like its predecessors,
the PLM claimed that Díaz betrayed Juárez, his liberal ideals, and democracy. However, the PLM
differed from other liberal clubs because it acted primarily in exile, and Regeneración circulated across
the U.S. borderlands and other cities such as St. Louis, Missouri. The Flores Magón brothers
demonstrated that in spite of their exile, they could effectively act against the Díaz regime. More
importantly, the dictator could no longer quell the growing opposition against his regime by imprisoning
or banishing his critics.
In 1908, Díaz addressed the issue of democracy during an interview with American journalist
James Creelman. The president stated that Mexico was ready for democracy, and he made the critical
mistake of saying he would not seek re-election in 1910. The interview generated extensive buzz as
Mexicans began discussing potential presidential candidates. This moment also exposed the differences
between the científicos and other Porfiristas. As the elections approached, Díaz announced his run for
re-election in 1909, though the vice-presidential candidate had not been determined. The dictator was
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almost eighty years of age, and speculation that he would probably not live through another term in
office made the vice-presidential candidate a central concern in debates about Mexico’s future. General
Bernardo Reyes, a Porfirista from the state of Nuevo León, was the favorite candidate nation-wide.122
Reyes supporters believed that he was capable of ruling the nation because he fostered peace and
economic growth in Nuevo León (and the important capital city of Monterrey). Díaz, however, backed
Ramón Corral, a científico and the current vice-president. Corral represented the status quo, and his
opponents believed that Díaz and the científicos (many of them now in their seventies) only looked after
themselves and their own longevity in office. They received the nickname las momias, or “the
mummies.”123
The conflict over the vice-presidential candidate highlighted the growing rift between the urban
professional Porfiristas and the científicos. Both groups accepted Díaz’s repressive tactics as a patriotic
necessity and neither openly questioned the dictator’s wisdom and authority. However, middle class
Porfiristas were ready for the “mummies” to step down, and most feared that Díaz would perpetuate the
status quo by selecting another científico as his running mate. García Naranjo, originally from Nuevo
León, became caught up in the dispute between supporters of Reyes and Corral. García Naranjo was in
a unique position; he did not consider Corral an ideal successor, but he could not support the general
because of a feud between the Reyes and Naranjo families.124 Choosing the lesser of two problematic

122

According to Michael J. Gonzáles, Reyes “wanted to be vice-president…but he had not encouraged big rallies or other
forms of popular manifestation. General Reyes was comfortable with Porfirian authoritarianism and uncomfortable with
popular democracy.” See The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 72.

123

García Naranjo, 5: 94.

124

Ibid., 1:120-125. In his memoirs, García Naranjo relates the story of his birth to Díaz and politics in Nuevo León in 1883
and 1884. On March 8, 1883, Díaz and his wife Carmen stopped in Lampazos de Naranjo, Nuevo León, as they traveled to
Monterrey. Nemesio García y García (García Naranjo’s father and mayor of Lampazos), organized a celebration to honor
Díaz. Nuevo León’s leading caudillos, Generals Jerónimo Treviño and Francisco Naranjo (García Naranjo’s uncle), also
took part in the festivities. Treviño was Díaz’s compadre, and Francisco Naranjo was the acting Minister of War under
President Manuel González. As the town waited for General Díaz and Doña Carmen, García y García received the news that
his pregnant wife was in labor. He arrived home in time for the birth of his son, Nemesio, and then rushed back to greet
Díaz, who congratulated the mayor and praised him for prioritizing family before his political duties. Nevertheless, when
Díaz assumed the presidency in 1884 and began restructuring the system of caudillaje, he placed Bernardo Reyes as the

57

candidates, García Naranjo joined a delegation of Corralistas on a trip to the city of Guadalajara in July
1909 in order to promote Corral’s vice-presidential bid.125 Reyistas gathered around the delegation’s
hotel and threw stones at the windows, threatening the group’s safety. Later, during the Corral
delegation’s public appearance, they were met with protests and insults.126 As the public shouted “¡Viva
Reyes!” and for death to Corral, García Naranjo imagined the beginning of a revolution. These shouts
were “a transcendental cry – down with las momias, and since President Díaz would soon turn eighty
years old, everyone understood that this attack was against him.”127 These protestors “showed the
elderly Dictator that his former agent [Reyes] approached the horizon as [a] possible rival.”128
Consequently, Díaz sent Reyes into unofficial exile in Europe and rigged the presidential elections,
effectively “bringing a cold shower down on the fire” that was the growing revolutionary movement.129
Problems increased within the federal government as well, as congress became increasingly
divided. In 1910, Díaz appointed García Naranjo as a diputado, or deputy, to the Federal Congress at
the age of twenty-seven. In his memoires, García Naranjo recalled “the euphoria” he experienced when
he took office, believing that “it was exceptional that a twenty-seven year old man, who was not the son,
nephew, or godson of an influential person” was granted a congressional seat. He also thought he could
energize the aging congress in which “almost all members had passed the half-century mark.” In
retrospect, the deputy realized that his excitement and optimism in early 1910 resulted from naïveté, and
governor of Nuevo León, effectively overthrowing Treviño and Francisco Naranjo. García y García opposed this move and
defended his brother-in-law, and Díaz exiled him to Texas. This was the origin of the feud between the Reyes and García y
García/Naranjo families. García Naranjo states that his father, in spite of his exile, admired Díaz for his service to Mexico,
always called him a “great man,” and taught his children to do the same. Any resentment was aimed at Reyes, and not at
Díaz.
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he soon learned that instead of enjoying his triumph, he would face “a series of storms.”130 The twentyfifth federal legislature began on September 1, 1910, and the majority of the deputies “were exclusively
porfiristas…who…followed Caesar unconditionally.” Contrary to popular belief, these Porfiristas “were
notoriously anticientíficos,” and did not waste any opportunity to criticize them and their policies.131 In
fact, the científicos were now the scapegoats for Mexico’s problems. Though the Mexican government
was rapidly dividing, Díaz and his advisors insisted on remaining in power for the rest of their lives
without establishing any mechanism for the transfer of power.
Despite the growing discontent in all sectors of society, the Díaz administration embarked on
celebrating the Mexico they created as they prepared to commemorate the centennial. As they did at the
world’s fairs, científicos put Mexico on display for the international community. In 1910, however,
Mexicans rejected the white mask placed upon the nation. This did not mean that the population did not
celebrate Mexico’s independence. On the contrary, it became an opportunity for the population to
reevaluate the meaning of Mexican independence and nationalism while enjoying the patriotic
milestone.
For the organizers of the centennial celebrations, the months leading to the commemoration in
Mexico City were a period of “rehabilitation” and “hope.”132 Ireneo Paz, director of the Mexico City
newspaper La Patria, discussed the importance of preparing the city for the centennial, particularly by
cleaning its streets. He stated that in September, “many guests [would] set foot in Mexico for the first
time, and without a doubt…leave with an unpleasant impression if they [saw] the streets magnificently
adorned…but dirty and untidy.”133 Furthermore, schoolchildren organized a parade, poets wrote odes to
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their nation, artists depicted Mexico’s history and heritage in elaborate works, and the Díaz cabinet
prepared to host diplomats from around the world. In August 1910, the government unveiled
commemorative postage stamps with the images of the heroes of independence, including Ignacio
Allende and Juan Aldama.134 Regardless of Mexico’s problems, the preparations seemingly united
Mexicans through their love of the patria. Unlike the world’s fairs, Mexicans in Mexico, from various
classes and of all ages, could partake in representing Mexico with pride to the global audience.
The festivities took place for several weeks. On September 7, El Imparcial published images of
38,000 children gathered around the national flag to express their “love for the homeland.”135 Their
program was directed specifically to Díaz and Justo Sierra. On September 8, El Imparcial reported the
arrival of diplomatic delegations from Belgium, Spain, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia.136 Three days
later, Díaz hosted the French ambassador and delegations from Bolivia, Holland, Perú, and Ecuador.137
Overall, a total of thirty-two delegations visited Mexico City, all received by Gamboa, now the Minister
of Foreign Relations. El Imparcial also published congratulatory letters written to Díaz from
ambassadors of Italy, Japan, Spain, France, and China.138 The various delegations offered gifts to
Mexico, and in an effort at historical reconciliation, Spain returned the uniform of independence leader
José María Morelos, an action that greatly moved Díaz.139
Mexicans expressed nationalism through these public displays and other symbolic imagery. The
Sunday supplement of El Imparcial included patriotic drawings used to represent Mexican national
identity. Carlos Alcalde’s “Alegoría de ‘La Paz’” depicted a female angel with the eagle and serpent
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perched on her head, surrounded by a halo with “1910” inscribed inside it. She had her arms stretched
out and her gaze toward the heavens. This angel spread her wings, which resembled those of archangels
but also of an eagle. The central figure, with two other female angels on each side, stood above a crown,
an imperial crest, a sickle, and a cart wheel. These angels, symbols of good, were surrounded by light.
One of the angels to the side was writing, while the other looked out at a campesino plowing a field in
the background.140 The angel was the dominant symbol for Mexican nationalism during this time.
Always female, she looked over Mexico and granted God’s favor to the nation. She was also pure and
represented the ideal female. In this particular allegory, the central angel is “peace,” illustrating
women’s roles as peacemakers, gentle and pure of spirit.
Female angels were a popular symbol during these festivities, and they became iconic of lo
mexicano. In an advertisement for the Toluca y Mexico Beer Company, female angels rode chariots up
to the heavens, and the caption read “as the Mexican nation celebrates the first centennial of its liberty
and independence, the Toluca y Mexico Beer Company unites joyfully with its people, as an act of
gratitude for the preference given to our beer.”141 The most popular was El Ángel- the angel atop the
Monument of Independence, unveiled on Reforma Boulevard on September 16. It “contained four
seated women representing Peace, Law, Justice, and War,” and the base of the monument was inscribed
with the names of twenty-four leaders of the independence movement. Italian Enrique Alciati sculpted
the angel at the top of the monument as Nike, the goddess of victory, holding laurels and broken chains,
honoring triumph and the abolition of slavery.142 In Porfirian society, men were warriors. Women, on
the other hand, improved the nation through their proximity to God and heaven, and by leading Mexico
to peace, tranquility, and ultimately divinity.
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The weeks of parades, odes to national heroes, and diplomatic visits reached a peak on
September 15. Don Porfirio and Doña Carmen planned to host a ball for the foreign delegates and a
total of 1,500 guests. The night culminated with the “Grito,” which was now pronounced on September
15 (Díaz’s birthday) rather than the sixteenth (the actual anniversary). Díaz celebrated his eightieth
birthday in grand fashion; in the midst of the endless accolades, the president reached the apex of his
career.
Yet, Mexico’s problems had not disappeared, though public officials attempted to ignore them.
In La Patria, Paz proclaimed that regardless of any national problems, he and his staff would ”put a lock
on [their] mouths this month” and not comment on national problems.143 The night of the “Grito,”
Gamboa and German Ambassador Karl Bünz watched from the central plaza (the Zócalo) rather than
from the National Palace. As the public began to disperse, the two spectators saw a group form, yelling
loudly and firing gunshots. The group, increasingly disorderly, headed towards the National Palace.
Gamboa and Bünz, now curious, approached the group, and Gamboa clearly heard the shouts- ¡Viva
Madero! Bünz did not understand what was happening, so Gamboa explained that the group yelled
“long live the dead heroes and President Díaz.” He lied again when Bünz asked for the name of the man
on the banner the group carried—“Diaz...who wore a beard as a young man.”144 In reality, the man on
the banner was, again, Madero. The following morning, September 16, Díaz and his cabinet met in the
presidential office before the day’s festivities. Gamboa told Díaz about the incident from the previous
night. The rest of the cabinet chided Gamboa for his “imprudence,” and Díaz responded without
emotion, telling the gentlemen that it was time to go.145
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During the centennial celebrations, Díaz and his closest friends, family, and advisors looked back at the
modern Mexico they had constructed over the previous four decades with a sense of pride. Porfiristasboth científicos and their opponents- believed that despite the lack of democracy, Díaz had ruled Mexico
correctly, and that the nation owed all of its present success to the president. However, any sense of
security this group had began to vanish two months later, as revolts broke out in northern Mexico and
Madero launched the Plan de San Luis Potosí, officially beginning the Mexican Revolution. For almost
forty years, Díaz controlled the definition of “Mexico,” reconciling liberals and conservatives and
bringing a new kind of order. At the end of 1910, the issue of democracy created an ideological division
that would again lead Mexico to civil war. Between November 1910 and May 1911, Mexicans
unleashed their resentments against the aging regime, and the científicos and other Porfiristas
experienced a crisis, facing life-changing and potentially dangerous consequences for their adherence to
the dictator. During the course of the Mexican Revolution, Porfiristas would face political and
ideological banishment, and even death, as they fought against the revolution to uphold the Mexico Díaz
created.
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Chapter 2: The Mexican Revolution and the Struggle for “La Patria,” 1910-1914
“Unity is what we ask for, unity that sets aside all discord, because the Homeland is not on the right
path. There is ruin at its feet.”
-La Patria, March 1, 1911

By late 1910, it was clear that Díaz and the científicos had no intention of stepping down from
their positions of power. Díaz also refused to establish any process for presidential succession. When
the Mexican Revolution began on November 20, 1910, the weaknesses of the regime were exposed.
Díaz supporters became increasingly divided as civil war spread across Mexico, and Porfiristas were
forced to confront a popular movement that threatened their way of life and worldview. Within six
months, Díaz resigned and went into exile; the crisis within Porfirismo was augmented after their hero
(and the symbol that united them) abandoned the nation.
This chapter traces the formation of anti-revolutionary ideologies by Porfiristas in the period
between November 1910 and July 1914, which ended with the fall of the Huerta regime. These
ideologies shared a number of commonalities. Porfiristas claimed adherence to Juarista liberal values,
and they relied on the rhetoric of honor and masculinity to position themselves favorably against the
revolutionary leaders and U.S. government under Woodrow Wilson. Porfiristas developed these
ideologies through the press, and in their memoirs. These texts demonstrate that anti-revolutionary
ideologies were not homogenous, and that they were heavily influenced by politics and personal
loyalties.
The Porfirista press in Mexico City opposed the Madero government, but it presented sometimes
conflicting anti-revolutionary ideologies while underscoring the tensions between the científicos and
urban professionals. El Imparcial, directed by Rafael Reyes Spíndola, was a científico publication, and
La Patria, directed by Ireneo Paz, represented the urban professionals among the Porfiristas. These two
newspapers frequently attacked each other, illustrating the growing resentment between the factions.
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Despite their differences, however, Porfiristas had something important in common—they needed a
hero-figure. No one would replace Díaz, but they believed that Mexico could only be governed by a
strong authoritarian leader. Thus, both newspapers supported Victoriano Huerta when he assumed the
presidency in 1913. During the U.S. military intervention in Veracruz in April 1914, both emphasized
the heroic qualities of Huerta in order to garner support for the dictator. They differed, however, in that
El Imparcial fully backed Huerta throughout his regime, while La Patria shifted its support to Félix
Díaz (Porfirio’s nephew) after Huerta began ruling as a dictator in October 1913.
The memoirs complicate the analysis of anti-revolutionary ideologies because the authors
(especially those who wrote in hindsight) had to address the issue of morality as they justified their
political stance. Gamboa, García Naranjo, former senator Querido Moheno and Rodolfo Reyes (son of
Bernardo Reyes) chronicled their experiences between 1910 and 1914, and they defended their actions
and their participation in the Huerta regime as patriotic. These memoirs warrant careful analysis for a
number of reasons. The information in these texts is contradictory at times, and they were written in
different time periods. Gamboa and Moheno wrote as the events took place, Reyes wrote his memoirs
in the 1920s, and García Naranjo penned his autobiography in the 1950s. The differences in context are
crucial in understanding the motivations of the authors, as well as the discrepancies and similarities
among their narratives. But despite the challenges of interpretation, together these memoirs help to
explain why these men and their colleagues opposed the revolution.

A Brief Overview of Mexican National Politics: 1910-1914
The primary sources I engage throughout this chapter give different accounts of revolutionary
events between 1910 and 1914. It is therefore necessary, for the sake of clarity, to first provide a general
overview of the revolution during this period. Francisco I. Madero, who would become known as the
“apostle of the revolution,” was a member of the landowning upper-class, educated in France and the
University of California at Berkeley. His family (wealthy hacendados in the state of Coahuila)
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supported Díaz and looked down on Madero’s idealism and calls for democracy. However, Madero
became increasingly popular across Mexico, and he was selected as the presidential candidate of the
Partido Antireeleccionista (Anti-Reelection Party). Díaz had Madero imprisoned during the election,
but he was freed and then fled to San Antonio, Texas. There, he drafted the Plan of San Luis Potosí, a
manifesto that declared Díaz’s reelection to the presidency in 1910 illegitimate. The plan also marked
November 20 as the official start of the revolution, and groups across Mexico slowly began to take up
arms against the Díaz regime after that date. Madero’s troops (under the command of Francisco
“Pancho” Villa and Pascual Orozco) fought the federal army in the north. Meanwhile, Emiliano Zapata
led the uprising in the state of Morelos in central Mexico. In April and May 1911, Villa and Orozco
won a definitive victory in Ciudad Juárez, and Zapata’s forces drove the federal army from Morelos. As
the political and military pressure mounted against the eighty year-old Díaz, he agreed to negotiate with
Madero.146 The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez was signed on May 21; all revolutionaries were granted general
amnesty, Díaz and vice-president Corral stepped down, and Minister of Foreign Relations Francisco
León de la Barra became the interim president. On May 25, Díaz and his family left Mexico for Paris.
Alan Knight argues that “Maderismo, successful on the battlefield in 1911, failed in the political
arena in 1911-1913.”147 Madero, elected president in November 1911, turned out to be an idealist
without the strength of character to pacify Mexico. The general population expected widespread reform,
particularly in the agrarian sector, and Madero’s disregard for this issue quickly hurt his credibility. He
became increasingly unpopular, and the press mocked his personal “weaknesses” such as his adherence
to spiritism, his short stature, and his public displays of emotion that went against traditional notions of
machismo.
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Madero also faced problems with the twenty-sixth congressional legislature, which began in
September 1912. Though the Maderista Progressive Constitutionalist Party won the majority of the 250
deputy seats, the Catholic Party, the PLM, and the Antireeleccionist Party were also represented in the
legislature, winning at least thirty seats. Although these deputies were not numerically significant, they
symbolized a rejection of Madero’s revolution on a congressional level. Also, deputies Nemesio García
Naranjo, José María Lozano, and Francisco M. de Olaguíbel received the nickname “El Triangulo” (The
Triangle) because they formed an independent coalition that frequently spoke out against Madero.148
Another deputy named Querido Moheno joined this group in late 1912, and it then became known as the
“cuadrilátero luminoso.”149
All four members of the Cuadrilátero were lawyers, but the similarities ended there. García
Naranjo was a norteño, part of a powerful military and political family in Nuevo León. He found a
passion for journalism, and directed the Mexico City anti-Maderista newspaper La Tribuna. Lozano, a
Reyista from Jalisco, was García Naranjo’s “political adversary” when they met in law school in
1903.150 However, in 1909, Lozano became disenchanted with Reyes and formed part of Vice-President
Corral’s re-election campaign. He and García Naranjo also became writers for the anti-Reyista
newspaper El Debate.151 Olaguíbel, born in Mexico City, was a writer and poet. According to García
Naranjo, he was part of a generation of writers who, influenced by French culture, “ennobled and
aristocratized Mexican poetry.”152 Moheno, a politician from the state of Chiapas, formed part of the
anti-reelection movement against Díaz in 1892, and though his antagonism towards the dictator lessened
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over the years, he was not a Porfirista in 1912. The four men were united, however, by their
disillusionment with Madero, and they led the criticism against the president at the parliamentary level.
On the military front, Madero made the mistake of alienating many of his initial supporters,
including Zapata, Bernardo and Rodolfo Reyes, and Orozco. In November 1911, Zapata signed the Plan
of Ayala, a manifesto that accused Madero of betraying the principles of the revolution by breaking his
promise to enact agrarian reform. The plan also denounced Madero for sustaining many of the same
government officials and institutions from the Díaz regime, which continued working for the interests of
the upper classes. Zapatistas united under this plan and waged war on the Madero administration.
The president also faced opposition on the northern front. In late 1911, Bernardo and Rodolfo
Reyes plotted a revolt. Bernardo believed he would be appointed Minister of War; instead, the Madero
government forced him to leave Mexico because it feared his popularity. Bernardo and Rodolfo moved
to San Antonio, where they conspired against Madero with the help of Francisco Chapa, an adviser for
Texas Governor Oscar B. Colquitt. Unfortunately for them, Mexican authorities found out about the
plan and arrested Bernardo when he crossed into Mexico in January 1912. Around the same time,
Orozco launched his own revolt in the state of Chihuahua. Orozco expected a government position as a
reward for his military service, and when Madero failed to follow through, Orozco and his troops turned
against the president. After months of fighting, Orozco was defeated by Huerta, Madero’s trusted leader
of the federal army.
Huerta continuously expressed his loyalty to the president, but the general may have been
conspiring against Madero as early as 1912. Michael C. Meyer refutes this, arguing that Huerta declined
an offer by Bernardo Reyes’s agents to take part in the plans for a coup (cuartelazo).153 However, more
recent scholarship by Cristina Urrutia Martínez suggests that Huerta did consider turning against
Madero in 1912. Aureliano Urrutia, Huerta’s personal physician and compadre, worked in the Sanatorio
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Urrutia, a sanatorium he commissioned in Coyoacán, a town south of Mexico City. Urrutia and Huerta
spent a significant amount of time there in 1912, as Huerta recovered from cataract surgery. Urrutia
Martínez suggests that Huerta and Urrutia discussed the plans for a coup against Madero and unlike
Meyer, she does not consider the rejection of Reyes’s offer as evidence that Huerta was not conspiring
on his own.154
These revolts and conspiracies exposed the weakness and unpopularity of the Madero
government. Even Félix Díaz attempted to start an uprising in Veracruz in October 1912, albeit
unsuccessfully. The general was known for his ineptitude, especially in comparison with his uncle,
Porfirio. Despite these negative characteristics, Félix continued to fight against Madero, seeking the
presidency for himself. Peter V.N. Henderson argues that Díaz was motivated by ambition and his
family name, but his stubbornness made him relentless in the face of defeat.155 Díaz was sent to
Lecumberri prison, where Bernardo Reyes was also held. Together, they planned the cuartelazo with
Rodolfo Reyes, Generals Manuel Mondragón, Gregorio Ruiz, and Manuel Velázquez, and civilians
Cecilio Ocón, Luis Liceaga, Miguel Othón de Mendizábal, Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros, and
Rafael Zayas Enríquez. The coup took place from February 9-18, 1913, and became known as the
Decena Trágica, or Ten Tragic Days. On the first day of the coup, Félix Díaz and Bernardo Reyes
escaped from prison and Reyes was killed in the initial advance against government troops. Madero and
Vice-President José María Pino Suárez then moved into the National Palace, and Mexico City
experienced bloody combat between the conspirators and the federal army led by Huerta. During these
ten days, U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and Huerta joined the conspiracy, even as Huerta
continued to “fight the rebels.” Wilson, Huerta, Rodolfo Reyes, Díaz, and their co-conspirators
eventually agreed to the “Pacto de la Embajada,” or Pact of the Embassy. It called for Madero and Pino
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Suárez to be overthrown, Huerta to become interim president, and the subsequent transfer of power to
Díaz under the guise of legitimate elections.
On February 18, Huerta ordered the arrests of Madero and Pino Suárez, and the two were forced
to resign. Pedro Lascuráin, Minister of Foreign Relations, became interim president on February 20,
and he named Huerta to the Foreign Relations post, which was next in line to the presidency. Within an
hour, Lascuráin resigned, and Huerta became president of Mexico.156 Meanwhile, Madero and his
associates faced a tragic end. Gustavo Madero, Francisco’s brother and one of the intellectual forces
behind Maderismo, was brutally tortured and killed under Huerta’s orders. Francisco and Pino Suárez
were assassinated on February 22. The deaths of the president and vice-president were intended to look
accidental, but it was clear to most people that the murders were planned. However, it is still unclear as
to who exactly ordered the executions.
The new regime was initially supported by both Porfiristas and foreign interests, but Huerta
faced military pressure from Villa, Zapata, Governor of Coahuila Venustiano Carranza, and Álvaro
Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles in Sonora. Huerta dealt with this pressure by displaying his
capability for brutality against his opponents. Leaders such as Governor of Chihuahua Abraham
González and Senator Belisario Domínguez were executed in 1913 at Huerta’s orders, and political
assassinations and disappearances became increasingly common. Huerta also carried out another coup
in early October 1913. He oversaw a fraudulent presidential election that was nullified because no
candidate won the majority vote, dissolved congress, and ordered the arrest and imprisonment of over a
hundred members of the legislature.157

156 The first Huerta cabinet consisted of Francisco León de la Barra as Minister of Foreign Relations, Toribio Esquivel
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Public Instruction, and David de la Fuente as Minister of Communication.
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This contributed to growing concerns about Huerta’s legitimacy in Mexico, where the general
became known as “el usurpador,” or “the usurper,” for the manner in which he rose to power. The
United States government under President Woodrow Wilson refused to grant the Huerta administration
formal recognition, and diplomatic relations deteriorated further in April 1914, when U.S. forces
invaded Veracruz. The subsequent peace conference was held in Niagara Falls and mediated by
delegates from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Knight suggests that these negotiations were important for
the Huerta regime because they presented an opportunity to determine the future of the administration.
The members of the cabinet understood that the regime would fall. However, if there was a mediated
transfer of power from Huerta to a provisional president, at least it would be a political move rather than
a revolutionary overthrow. These negotiations also gave the Huerta regime hope (ultimately unrealized)
that it could "co-determine” the political future of Mexico.158
Huerta also faced pressure domestically, as Constitutionalist and Zapatista forces defeated the
Federal Army across Mexico. The dictator resigned on July 15, and Minister of Foreign Relations
Francisco S. Carvajal became the acting interim president. Carvajal resigned in August, and Carranza
(the “First Chief” of the Constitutionalists) established a provisional government in Mexico City.
Huerta and his cabinet understood that their lives were in danger, and they fled Mexico along with
hundreds of others threatened with death for collaborating with Huerta or Porfirio Díaz.

The Porfirista Press Develops Anti-Revolutionary Ideologies
According to Pablo Piccato, by 1880 “more than 20 percent of Mexico City’s population, which
totaled approximately a quarter of a million” read newspapers. Because of the popularity of these
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publications, male journalists became the opinion leaders in late nineteenth-century Mexico, particularly
in the capital. Piccato suggests that these men did not see news reporting as their top priority; instead,
they used the press to negotiate public and personal honor. Newspaper readers witnessed “disputes over
public matters [that] were authentic precisely because they involved both common interests and personal
reputations, giving each debate greater intensity and deeper meaning.”159 These editors and reporters,
whom Piccato calls “combat journalists,” were not always supportive of Díaz. Ireneo Paz, for example,
was “briefly incarcerated in the latter years of the Porfirian regime because [La Patria] upset President
Díaz and members of his inner circle” (though Paz expressed his respect for Díaz by 1910).160
These journalists used their publications to criticize and/or insult their peers, to use the
framework of masculinity and honor to make personal and political statements about society, and to
challenge each other to duels. In 1879, Santiago Sierra, brother of Justo Sierra, used his newspaper La
Libertad to criticize journalists who exhibited the “feminine defect” of vanity by wasting their energy on
petty arguments in the press. When “serious matters [needed] to be addressed,” these vain journalists
did so with a “noticeable lack of virile backbone.”161 These comments were directed at Paz, leading to
the most famous duel between journalists. After months of dispute between Paz and Sierra, the two met
on April 27, 1880. Paz shot and killed his adversary, and this event contributed to the tensions between
Paz and the científicos.
Piccato adds that journalists were generally not rich since their businesses rarely generated
profits. They were, however, socially wealthy; men such as Gamboa (who began his writing career as a
journalist) frequently interacted at restaurants, cafés, and bars, and attended the theatre, and engaged in
other cultural activities that enhanced their status. These interactions, both positive and negative,
elevated the social position of journalists during the Porfiriato, particularly in the capital. They were
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seen as the purveyors of public opinion, men who could be trusted because they were honorable (or vice
versa).
When the revolution began in 1910, Porfirista newspapers attempted to use this same rhetoric of
honor to attack the rebellion, deal with the fall of the Díaz regime, and criticize the Madero
administration. For example, in an editorial entitled “Madero is a Fraud,” El Imparcial called the rebel
an
imposter who sought legitimacy through the fraudulent manipulation of literature, oratory,
intelligence, bravery…and even revolution…we all know he signs books that he did not write;
copies the speeches he shouts; hires scatterbrains who enlarge his mental vacuity; invites danger
only to hide from it…since his small sanchopansesque body includes all impotencies and
inabilities.162
The newspaper added that Madero, a “ghost, from the darkest limbo of spiritism, surged…to resurrect
the era of barbarism,” and his revolt would “never be forgiven” for resorting to violence and sacrificing
honorable men as a means of promoting democracy.163
La Patria took a different approach by paying little attention to the revolt in its early phase.
Then in January 1911, Paz wrote an analysis of the “uprisings” after realizing that despite their
“insignificance” they would not end soon. Paz lamented that after three decades of peace, the Díaz
regime now had to deal with “unjustified” acts of violence. According to the editor, Díaz, “beloved,
always acclaimed, and always popular,” did not provide any reason for the current “disorders that deeply
sadden us.”164 Paz believed that even though the reasons for the rebellion were unclear, the uprisings
were not directed at Díaz, and that even the rebels respected the dictator. The author seemingly could
not fathom why the revolutionaries would fight against the man he considered one of Mexico’s most
respected war heroes.
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La Patria expressed its disdain for revolutionary leaders such as Villa, Orozco, and Zapata, but
applauded Madero in early 1911 for fighting for democracy. The newspaper even compared Madero to
Jesus Christ the Messiah.165 As the months progressed, however, La Patria became increasingly
disenchanted with Madero as he became seemingly corrupted by his advisers.166 By late 1911, La
Patria wrote that the “leader of the revolution, who should be modest, cautious, prudent, and astute”
now acted “like a schoolboy…[and] the most trivial politician…throwing tantrums and lashing out
against his competitors like a spoiled child.”167
Although El Imparcial and La Patria agreed in calling into question the honor and masculinity
of Madero and those involved in the revolution, the two newspapers also reflected the growing rift
between científicos (represented by El Imparcial) and the urban professional Porfiristas (represented by
La Patria). In one piece, La Patria condemned El Imparcial for referring to the rebels as bandits and
murderers who only sought loot. La Patria made it clear that it did not justify the revolutionary activity,
but the rebels were Mexican and still members of the national family. Therefore, “out of respect for our
leaders, who are making efforts and sacrifices in order to restore peace, and also out of respect for our
country,” La Patria would not “consent” to El Imparcial’s harsh words against their compatriots. La
Patria also pointed out that Díaz and other national heroes were at one time considered rebels for acting
against the government. This critique demonstrates two different reactions to the revolution. El
Imparcial completely detached itself from the revolutionaries, stating that “on the northern border there
has always been an abundance of people of the worst kind, smugglers who are used to a life of
risks…and delinquents who dodge law enforcement and justice by crossing the border.” La Patria, on
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the other hand, reinforced the idea of Mexican nationalism and the need for all Mexicans to work for
peace, not “add fuel to the fire” as El Imparcial did by insulting a large sector of the population.168
La Patria became increasingly aggressive toward El Imparcial when the científicos fled Mexico
after Díaz’s resignation on May 25, 1911. Journalist Manuel J. Hernáiz criticized the científicos (whom
he referred to as mice) for taking advantage of Mexico while they were in power and for cowardly
running away and showing little empathy for the “rivers of Mexican blood” flowing across the nation.
He added that the “fallen hyena…in its imposing spite” wanted to “poison [the nation] with its fetid and
disgusting slobber.” The only way to restore peace and stability in Mexico was to “immediately expel
every last Científico mouse from the country.”169
That same day, La Patria published a much more radical attack on the científicos entitled “The
Gallows for the Científico-Traitor League.” In this piece, the author referred to the “Científico-Jew
League,” a “sinister association” whose victims included Díaz, Corral, and even Madero. The author
seemed to believe that this organization controlled Mexican politics (and even Díaz). He even accused
this league of an unsuccessful attempt to use bribery to convince the rebel leaders in Ciudad Juárez to
betray Madero. Since these plans failed, this group now wanted to assassinate Madero.170 The Jewish
allies of the científicos (the liga judía) had “suffered a large series of defeats in the last year…its vile
medium, El Imparcial, has come close to dissolving itself…yet they persist in larceny and
assassinations…they conserve their jars of poison, their newspapers full of lies, their expensive suits,
and their collections of daggers.” The author classified the Madero government as naïve for being
merciful to the traitors, adding that the leaders of these leagues “needed to die.”171 These anti-Semitic
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accusations were certainly outlandish, but they reflected the resentment and hatred against the
científicos.
El Imparcial, on the other hand, turned its attention to the Mexican population, holding the
public accountable for the present state of the nation. The newspaper questioned why Mexicans were
suddenly opposed to Díaz, after supporting him and his policies for decades. One editorial stated that
“nobody with their heart in the right place [could] accuse the President of the Republic of any errors he
committed, since the majority of Mexicans accompanied him in those errors and even induced him to
commit them.” The author witnessed “a scene of ingratitude” as people who proclaimed their loyalty to
Díaz (usually in exchange for a job or government post) now spoke out against the dictator in order to
“save themselves from any potential danger.”172
Porfiristas struggled with the collapse of the Díaz regime and they remained indignant, blaming
everyone but themselves for the dictator’s fall. During the De la Barra and Madero presidencies, El
Imparcial and La Patria voiced the sentiments of conflicting factions of Porfiristas, and they continued
to comment on national politics and the honor (or lack thereof) of the nation’s leaders. Despite the
differences among Porfirstas, they agreed on the need for an authoritarian leader to restore order and
peace in Mexico. In 1913 they found two possible alternatives to Don Porfirio—Victoriano Huerta and
Félix Díaz. El Imparcial and La Patria took on the task of supporting one (or both) of these men in an
effort to counteract the revolution.

Media and the Formation of Counter-Revolutionary Heroes: Victoriano Huerta
When Victoriano Huerta assumed the presidency in February 1913, he received the support of
the majority of state governors and was formally recognized by foreign nations across the globe.
Scholars including Cristina Urrutia Martínez, Mario Ramírez Rancaño, and Alan Knight argue that this
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demonstrated widespread approval of the general by the upper classes. Huerta’s close friend Nemesio
García Naranjo pointed out that Porfirio Díaz, Bernardo Reyes, and Francisco I. Madero had all at some
point placed their trust in General Huerta. However, by July 1914, Huerta resigned from the presidency
in disgrace, and all who had participated in his dictatorship were cast as the villains of the revolution,
unpatriotic murderers, traitors, and monsters. Huerta became known as “the usurper,” and his opponents
(including the U.S. government) appropriated this image and made Huerta the “common enemy” and
primary threat against Mexico in 1914. Mexico’s leaders, particularly Carranza, decided that the villains
of the Huerta regime needed to be purged from the nation, through execution or exile.
The image of the treacherous Huerta dictatorship remains pervasive in Mexican popular memory
and the scholarship on the revolution. The members of the regime were fully aware of the negative
views of them even before their exile, and they spent the rest of their lives attempting to rectify what
they perceived as an unfair characterization. Their memoirs served this purpose in retrospect (none were
published until the 1920s), but in the midst of the political chaos of 1913 and 1914, news media were the
primary instruments through which the Huerta regime constructed and negotiated its position in
revolutionary Mexico. El Imparcial and La Patria supported Huerta and praised him throughout his
administration (and most importantly, during the U.S. intervention) for being a patriot serving the
nation’s best interests. These media also created an idealized image of the dictator and used it to justify
Huerta’s actions.
The two Porfirista newspapers embodied different visions for Mexico. El Imparcial continued to
be widely regarded as a remnant of cientifiquismo. La Patria represented a segment of Porfiristas who,
while they never wavered in their support of Don Porfirio, believed in progress and democracy and
understood that the científicos represented political and cultural stagnation. Perhaps the principal
commonality between the two was a disdain for the revolution. Both newspapers criticized Madero and
other revolutionary leaders for creating an unnecessary civil war. While Zapata, Villa, and Carranza
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fought for specific political and social reforms, those who opposed the revolution wanted a restoration of
peace and stability, even at the expense of living under an authoritarian government. Porfirista media
expressed nostalgia for the era of prosperity under Porfirio Díaz. Knight argues that the sectors of the
population who benefitted the most during the Porfiriato welcomed the coup against Madero. He adds
that for most Porfiristas, Huerta was the ideal choice for president because the other viable option
(Bernardo Reyes) was dead, and Félix Díaz could not even launch a successful rebellion on his own.
According to Knight, Huerta “pandered to the hopes of those many Mexicans – and foreigners – who
believed that a ‘strong man’, a new Díaz, could restore peace through authoritarian means.”173 Huerta
relieved Porfirista nostalgia by promising a return to better times.
After the Decena Trágica, El Imparcial published an article entitled “Pro-Patria!,” which called
upon Mexicans to fight their passions and lack of obedience and discipline, “those germs of disunion
that have separated us.”174 The following week, it expressed its support for the interim government set
up through the Pact of the Embassy, and encouraged the new administration to work for peace and
stability regardless of any opponents who sought to sacrifice the nation for their own personal
interests.175 La Patria was clearer about its sentiments after the Decena Trágica. On February 24, 1913,
an editorial entitled “Problem Solved” reflected a sense of relief after the assassinations of Madero and
Pino Suárez. The author stated that as long as the two men lived (in exile or otherwise) they would be a
“nuisance, a threat, and a difficulty for the pacific organization of the new government” because they
would never fully accept defeat. Their deaths were unfortunate, but necessary in order to end the chaos
of the Madero administration and prevent more deaths through continued civil war. The author ended
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by expressing his hope that “no more Mexican blood be shed.”176 These media considered that the ends
justified the means, and that the new government would finally end the revolution. Thus, the rebels
involved in the cuartelazo were Mexico’s true heroes and patriots, while Zapatistas and the
revolutionary factions in the north remained “bandits and criminals” who continuously threatened the
well-being of the nation.177
Both newspapers also accepted Huerta’s ascent to the presidency as constitutionally legitimate.
Throughout 1913, they continually emphasized Huerta’s good intentions to step down after the
presidential race in October, for which he was ineligible because he was the interim president.
According to El Imparcial, Huerta declared that he had met with each candidate for the October
presidential elections, including Díaz, and they all agreed to peacefully acquiesce to the election results,
whatever they might be.178 But when on election day no candidate won the majority of the popular
votes--which according to the constitution, nullified the election—the Huerta government declared that
it would schedule new elections. According to El Imparcial, the dictator “nobly and persuasively…with
sincerity and loftiness” demonstrated an “elevated concept of civility, and plausible reverence for the
law.” Of course, the presidential elections were never rescheduled.
By November, Huerta had dissolved congress and begun ruling as a dictator. El Imparcial stated
that most people believed that Huerta was the only man who “[possessed] enough grandeur of spirit,
necessary splendor and prestige, and sufficient force of character” to restore peace.179 The newspaper
admitted that he was what Mexico needed at the moment, “an energetic man…of indomitable character,
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an iron fist, and of frank and quick resolve.” It seemed that Huerta was taking a position similar to that
of Porfirio Díaz, that once he established peace, the nation could then move towards more progressive
politics.180
On November 20, El Imparcial published Huerta’s explanation for dissolving the twenty-sixth
legislature. He spoke of the three branches of government and the need to maintain equilibrium between
them. When one branch disrupts this equilibrium, “disturbing the workings of the constitution, [and]
putting the life of the political State in danger,” the other branches must act to restore balance within the
government. The dictator called the twenty-sixth legislature an unpatriotic entity with ties to the
rebellious factions in northern Mexico. This congress was attempting to “strangle” the executive and
judicial branches in order to give power to the northern rebels. Huerta argued that he did not disrupt the
“constitutional order” by dissolving the legislature; on the contrary, his patriotic actions prevented a
state of anarchy. 181 This article exemplified the ways in which Huerta manipulated the media to
emphasize his adherence to the Constitution of 1857 and promise to restore peace, thus pandering to
Porfirista identity.
Porfirista media overlooked the brutality of the regime. On December 23, El Imparcial
published an image of the dictator, and the caption read, “We ask God to conserve this great man, to
whom the hopes of the Nation are linked. We present these lines, assured that we express the sentiments
of all good patriots, who have the conviction that only the current President of the Republic can, due to
his grandness of spirit and heart, and to his effectiveness of prestige and strength, save the country, and
restore order and prosperity.182
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As diplomatic relations with the United States deteriorated in 1914, El Imparcial and La Patria
went to Huerta’s defense and urged Mexicans to unite in support of their president. On April 22, after
the U.S. military occupation of Veracruz, El Imparcial published an illustration of the dictator standing
before the national symbol of the eagle and the serpent. Huerta stood with one arm raised and a banner
with the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe in the other. At his feet was a woman, seemingly imploring
his help. Huerta’s stance in this drawing was reminiscent of popular images of Father Miguel Hidalgo
going into battle while carrying an image of the Guadalupana. The illustration also reminded readers of
the religious devotion expressed by Huerta, who was Catholic.183
From April until July, both newspapers carefully chronicled the details of the confrontation
against U.S. forces and the subsequent negotiations in Niagara Falls. They drew upon nationalist and
patriotic sentiments, and never wavered in their support of the dictator. However, the writing was on the
wall for the Huerta regime. On July 15, El Imparcial published an extra edition which announced
Huerta’s resignation. Two weeks later, Salvador Díaz Mirón, director of El Imparcial, also resigned.184
Carrancista Félix F. Palavicini took control of the newspaper on August 13, and he replaced the staff and
changed the tone of the publication in favor of Carranza.
As Carranza entered Mexico City on August 14, 1914, El Imparcial likened it to Juárez’s
triumphant entry into the capital after the defeat of Maximilian’s forces in 1867. El Imparcial
celebrated Carranza as “another Juárez” who was carrying on the principles of the 1910 revolution
launched by the “apostle” Madero.185 However, El Imparcial lasted only three more days. On August
17, the article entitled “R.I.P.” signaled the end of the publication. The author stated that “the
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Revolution, strong and implacable like the sword of Justice” had finally taken control of the
government, and it was time to eradicate all vestiges of the old regime, including El Imparcial, which its
new staff would “bury…with [their] own hands, in the pantheon of journalistic history.” He added that
“the death of El Imparcial would serve as a great lesson for all…conservatives and reactionaries, for all
creators of obstacles…that the intentions of the constitutionalists to heal Mexico’s Public Administration
would not be deterred by any obstacle.”186 With this message, the largest-selling newspaper of the Díaz
and Huerta administrations was killed by the new Carranza regime. Nine days later on August 26, the
Carranza regime would also shut down La Patria. The public expression of pro-Díaz or Pro-Huerta
sentiments was effectively silenced.

Media and the Formation of Counter-Revolutionary Heroes: Félix Díaz
Knight argues that the Huerta regime was wholly counter-revolutionary, but he downplays the
symbolic importance of Félix Díaz during this period. Information from Oaxaca complicates Knight’s
assessment by revealing that Díaz was more popular in his native state. His followers believed he would
come closest to restoring the glory of the Porfiriato. More importantly, Félix catered to a sense of
nostalgia for his uncle Porfirio and Benito Juárez, who were the primary symbols of Oaxacan regional
and national identity.
Díaz supporters belonged to various classes. According to La Patria, a delegation from the state
of Oaxaca traveled to Mexico City on March 17, 1913, to congratulate Félix Díaz for his triumph in the
coup against Madero. This group consisted of a commission “representing industry and commerce” in
Oaxaca.187
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Furthermore, according to Patrick J. McNamara, the Zapotec community in Ixtlán supported
Félix as early as 1902, believing he was a better alternative for governor than the científico incumbent
Emilio Pimentel. The indigenous community and more radical liberals believed that Pimentel embodied
the stagnant, elitist científico policies. Worst of all, Pimentel and the científicos were perceived as
traitors to the memory of Benito Juárez, the authentic liberal and champion of liberty and democracy.188
On the other hand, Félix was a member of the Díaz family. McNamara states that “Félix Díaz’s father
had led many of [the Zapotecs] in battle against the French. They assumed that the son of this illustrious
general would maintain the bonds of patriarchal reciprocity.”189 The Zapotecs believed that Félix would
serve their interests, unlike the científicos.
In Oaxaca, the images of Juárez and Porfirio Díaz were appropriated in contradictory ways.
Porfirio Díaz commemorated the centennial of Juárez’s birth in 1906 with a lavish ceremony, and he
positioned himself as the legitimate descendant of Juárez, despite having rebelled against him in 1871.190
The dictator’s opponents in Oaxaca, including the Flores Magón brothers, formed liberal clubs such as
the Asociación Juárez, and they pointed out the failure of the Díaz regime in fulfilling the promises of
the 1857 Constitution. However, as McNamara points out, attacks against the científicos did not
necessarily equate to attacks against the dictator. Díaz was considered a paternalistic figure among the
poor classes, and they often believed the dictator and his family would protect them. As the Zapotecs
worked to convince Don Porfirio to back his nephew instead of Pimentel, they wrote a letter to the
dictator signed by “the Felixistas and the Serranos,” demonstrating organized support for Félix.191 The

188

Patrick J. McNamara, Sons of the Sierra: Juárez, Díaz, and the People of Ixtlán, Oaxaca, 1855-1920 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 168-169.
189

Ibid., 170.

190

Héctor Cuauhtémoc Hernández Silva, “Benito Juárez y los Festejos Centenarios en su Honor,” in Los Mil Rostros de
Juárez y del Liberalismo Mexicano), 19.
191

McNamara, 173.

83

Felicistas addressed the dictator as an equal in an effort to remind him of his humble origins. More
importantly, they asserted their position as legitimate political actors. However, the dictator backed
Pimentel in 1906 and again in 1910, when Pimentel defeated Benito Juárez Maza (son of President
Juárez).
McNamara and Francie Chassen de López point out that despite Porfirio Díaz’s inconsistencies
in the latter part of his regime, “Oaxacans’ first loyalties were to Juárez and Díaz.”192 This also ensured
the popularity of family members, and helps to explain why the Zapotec community supported Félix for
governor in 1906 and Juárez Maza in 1910. When Juárez Maza passed away in 1912, Félix became the
symbolic purveyor of the legacies of Júarez and Porfirio. During the revolution, many Oaxacans
maintained a fierce loyalty to Félix. In July 1914, Felicista Guillermo Meixueiro launched the Plan de la
Sierra, which denounced “tax increases…the graft [and] political murders.”193 This Felicista rebellion
succeeded in gaining control over state politics despite Carrancista efforts against them.
Like his uncle, Félix embodied the complexities of memory and myth in Mexico. He
represented not only a return to Porfirismo, but a symbolic return to Juarismo, especially for his
Oaxacan supporters. Moreover, Félix appealed to the anti-científico faction comprised of a younger
generation of political hopefuls frustrated because of Porfirio’s insistence on keeping the científicos in
power. According to Henderson, these anti-científicos were usually liberals who believed that the
científicos “defiled the sacred tenets of nineteenth-century liberalism.”194 For them, Félix represented a
move away from the stagnation of the late Porfiriato and a return to its liberal, Juarista roots. Anticientíficos seemingly forgot about the historic conflicts between Porfiristas, Juaristas, and Felicistas (as
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even Don Porfirio chose to do when he commemorated Juárez’s birthday), demonstrating one way in
which these figures were reconstructed to fit certain ideals and political agendas.
Félix was aware of what and who he represented, and he did not hesitate to use this in his favor.
As a presidential candidate in April 1913, he relied on liberal rhetoric to appeal to his supporters. In a
speech delivered to the Felicista National Party (Partido Nacional Felicista), Díaz stated that he “could
not accept the radicalisms that transformed liberal theory,” and that he planned to restore liberty, the
essence of liberalism and the Constitution of 1857. His goals were broad and included the restoration of
peace, increasing the effectiveness of the justice system, enhancing the public education system,
especially in rural areas, and having accountability between the nation’s leaders and the public. Díaz did
address the problem of agrarian reform, stating that he and Huerta were in the process of developing a
Ministry of Agriculture. He also called for freedom of religion, in a politically conciliatory move
similar to the one made by his uncle.195
La Patria closely followed the elections, and it showed excitement for the democratic process,
unlike El Imparcial.196 During October 1913, La Patria analyzed each of the presidential and vicepresidential candidates. The newspaper criticized the Catholic Party (which Paz opposed) for backing
the liberal duo Gamboa and General Eugenio Rascón, suggesting that the party was taking advantage of
these “two honorable, intelligent, and patriotic Mexicans” in an effort to gain the sympathy of liberals.197
Next, La Patria examined Manuel Calero and Jesús Flores Magón, the candidates for the Mexican
Liberal Party. The newspaper stated that Calero and Flores Magón were good candidates because of
their pure liberalism.198 However, La Patria placed its full support behind Díaz and his running mate
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José Luis Resquena. The newspaper described Díaz as the ideal president, “a prudent, reflective man,
justified in his actions and capable in his determinations.”
Díaz’s actions immediately following the nullified elections alienated many of his followers,
including Paz. Henderson states that Díaz mistakenly believed that Huerta had ordered his assassination
in late October. Consequently, he asked for protection from William Canada and John Lind at the
American Consulate, and Díaz fled Mexico with Cecilio Ocón (who was complicit in Madero’s
assassination) and José Bonales Sandoval aboard an American vessel. Díaz “guaranteed American
authorities that he would not engage in political activity while in protective custody” in return for safe
passage to Cuba.199 El Imparcial mocked Díaz, pointing out that he was so inexplicably frightened and
in a rush to leave the country that he did not even pay the bill at the Hotel Alemán where he stayed.200
La Patria was more damning, proclaiming that Díaz “would never be forgiven” for collaborating with
U.S. authorities, especially Lind, and for fleeing Mexico like a coward aboard an American ship. The
newspaper added that Díaz proved all of his critics correct.201 From that point forward, La Patria
supported Huerta, which is what many Felicistas did after Díaz’s self-imposed exile.
During the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, La Patria followed a similar trajectory as El Imparcial,
but the two newspapers differed after Huerta’s resignation. La Patria was initially skeptical of
Carranza, but throughout July and August 1914, it quickly accepted the new Constitutionalist regime.
On August 17, the newspaper expressed that it was founded in 1877 “to sustain…the liberal creed
supported in the Constitution” and advanced by Juárez. The new La Patria would support Carranza,
“who valiantly threw a glove at militarism, and raised the banner that should be the most appealing for
young patriots: that of the Constitution, and who…knew how to defeat the formidable usurper’s power,
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a victory which must be applauded by those of us in the liberal community.”202 Considering the Huerta
regime’s hatred of Carranza, especially after its exile, it might seem odd that Paz, a Huerta supporter and
opponent of the revolution, would suddenly (and gladly) accept the Constitutionalists. Supporting the
winner might benefit Paz and his business, but he justified his adherence to Carranza by drawing upon
his liberal ideology.
Paz denounced anyone who threatened the Constitution of 1857, order, and peace, for which
Juárez, Porfirio Díaz and the liberals valiantly fought. He understood the realities of the civil war, and
had backed the Huerta regime since he perceived the dictator as the only man who could restore order.
But his disappointment in Mexican politics was evident, especially after Félix Díaz’s debacle in October
1913. Carranza seemed to have the qualities Paz admired; he was a strongman who courageously
upheld the constitution. More importantly, now that a revolutionary government was in place, the
various factions across Mexico would have no excuse to continue fighting a civil war. In its final issue,
La Patria challenged the Carranza government to prove itself capable of acting in Mexico’s best
interests.203 Despite its positive reactions to the new regime, Paz’s newspaper suffered the same fate as
El Imparcial. La Patria abruptly ended its circulation on August 26, when Carrancista General Pablo
González ordered the closing of the newspaper’s offices. Another Porfirista medium was silenced by
the Constitutionalist regime.
The revolutionaries claimed Juárez for themselves, casting Félix Díaz, Huerta, and all of their
supporters as traitors to the ideals of liberty set forth by Juárez and then Madero (not Porfirio Díaz). In
terms of Mexican national and political identity, Juárez had become an instrument for hegemony. The
various factions would continue to proclaim their adherence to Juarista principles in order to gain
legitimacy, especially when the Carranza government decided to draft a new constitution. Members of
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the now exiled Huerta regime united against Carranza in defense of their vision for Mexico, but as the
decade progressed and the exiles faced military and political defeats, they were forced to confront their
position as Mexico’s vilified “old guard.”

Loyalty, Honor, and Patriotism in the Exile Memoirs
From the end of the Madero administration beginning in late 1912, to the resignation of
Victoriano Huerta in July 1914, massacres, assassinations, a military coup, an oppressive dictatorship,
and U.S. military intervention shaped politics in Mexico City. Many of the political actors of this period
wrote memoirs in which they discussed their actions and decisions during this time, and all of these men
defended themselves by proclaiming their love and concern for the homeland. Like El Imparcial and La
Patria, the memoirs account for different anti-revolutionary ideologies among Porfiristas. However, the
newspapers expressed opposition to the revolution and support for Huerta and Félix Díaz in a public
forum, constructing heroes and symbols of Mexican masculinity and patriotism for public consumption.
The memoirs, on the other hand, revealed the public and private struggles among the members of the
Huerta regime. The authors had much at stake personally, and they used their memoirs to defend their
personal honor and that of their family and close friends. Though they all shared disdain for the
revolution, they differed significantly on their reasons for participating in the Huerta administration.
Nevertheless, the authors argued that they always acted for the benefit of the patria, regardless of the
moral and ethical implications, and they relied on loyalty, honor, and patriotism as rhetorical tools to
justify their actions between February 1913 and July 1914.
John Kleinig argues that loyalty is the basis for patriotism, and loyalty to the patria is “morally
legitimate.” The scholar defines loyalty as a “virtue…of our relationships and associations.” It is
generally a “default” virtue and an “executive” virtue which “helps us do what we ought, or want, to
do.” The patria is a “political, rather than merely geographical entity,” making loyalty to the homeland
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a political act.204 Moreover, patriotism is an expression of self. According to Kleinig, “patriae provide
the conditions for our flourishing [and] that for many of us, our individual patria is partially constitutive
of our flourishing.”205 When a patria (which could be a nation) becomes a part of a person’s being,
she/he develops a loyalty which requires certain obligations, which “depend on the merits and demerits
of the country and polity, on the one hand, and on the character, plans and aspirations, and
circumstances of the patriot, on the other.” A person could potentially express patriotism through what
some might consider questionable means, but be morally justified if this was done on the basis of
personal loyalty. Kleinig considers this problem and clarifies that patriotic duties may also “be
overridden by another moral consideration.”206
Aleksandar Pavković further examines the relationship between morality and a patriot’s desire to
kill for his/her country, suggesting that for a patriot, a “conception of justice” exists “that is tacitly
incorporated in the patriotic conception of one’s patria…a patria should be ruled only by patriots: any
other political arrangement is unjust…[and] rectification of an injustice is a morally right act.” Some
patriots also have a sense of “radical altruism…[a] readiness to sacrifice their lives in the liberation of
their country.”207 However, Pavković notes that there are instances in which willingness to kill for the
patria is not considered morally acceptable. If a patriot is part of a force invading another country, for
example, this radical altruism “does not appear [to be]…a universal moral value or morally praiseworthy
quality,” because there is no rectification involved.208 The memoirs of middle class Porfiristas show that
the members of the Huerta regime were constantly negotiating patriotism and morality. These texts
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provided a space for the men to sort through these issues while depicting themselves as honorable,
moral, always patriotic, and justified in their actions as a result.
The memoirs offer a variety of personal and chronological perspectives that complicate the
narrative of this period. Gamboa kept a diary beginning in 1892, and he published it every few years.
This text is important because it chronicled the author’s reactions as the revolution began and then
spread across Mexico. It also provides an outsider perspective, since Gamboa worked as a diplomat in
Belgium from 1910 until August 1913, when he accepted an invitation from Huerta to join his cabinet as
Minister of Foreign Relations. However, the diary offers no evidence about Gamboa’s time in the
Huerta administration. According to his son Miguel, the diary manuscripts from August 1913 to April
1914 disappeared, and there is no way of verifying what happened to these texts.209 Perhaps it is no
coincidence that what is not missing is a brief discussion of Gamboa’s thoughts about Huerta as he
debated whether or not to accept the cabinet position. Gamboa disliked Huerta and “condemned” the
way he came to power. Nevertheless, he accepted, basing this act on a “devotion to Mexico, desire to
contribute to its relief, a great sense of vanity over being offered a high position…[and] jubilation for
returning [to Mexico].” Gamboa was patriotic but not naïve, and he understood what type of regime he
would be participating in; he entrusted himself to “the will of God,” adding that “if [God] takes me to
that hell, only He knows why, and He will provide, as He always has.”210
Moheno wrote Mi Actuación Política Después de la Decena Trágica in mid-1914. His narrative
began as he went into hiding during the Decena Trágica and ended as he went into exile. The author
wrote his memoirs as soon as he resigned from Huerta’s cabinet in order to set the record straight about
his involvement in the regime. Because the section from this time period is missing from Gamboa’s
diary, Moheno’s account is the closest to chronicling the events as they took place. Furthermore, this
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memoir provides a sense of the chaos of the late Huerta period, since Moheno compiled this text as he
and his colleagues fled Mexico.
The author clarified the misconception that the members of the Huerta regime joined because of
personal connections with the general or because they supported him. For example, the author
explained that when Huerta invited the Cuadrilátero to join his cabinet, the four men had to decide
between an alliance with Huerta or Díaz.211 García Naranjo corroborated this story. None of the
members of the Cuadrilátero knew Huerta well (García Naranjo had only briefly encountered him once),
but they believed that Mexico would be worse off with Díaz. Moreover, García Naranjo could not
support Díaz because of his ties to Reyes. Olaguíbel disliked both Huerta and Díaz, but Lozano and
Moheno told him that he could not “vacillate, because vacillation was equivalent to suicide.”212 Hence,
the group accepted Huerta’s invitation. Like Gamboa, these four men did not support Huerta, but they
nevertheless accepted to join the regime in spite of the risks. Moheno justified his actions as patriotic,
but he also accepted a level of agency and did not claim to act on behalf of anyone else.
Rodolfo Reyes, on the other hand, expressed his lack of agency throughout his memoirs, which
he wrote when he lived in exile in Madrid in the 1920s. The first volume of memoirs served to tell the
story of Bernardo. The father/son relationship is an important theme throughout the text, and Rodolfo
wrote as a son who completely venerated his father. When he discussed Bernardo’s conspiracies against
Madero, Rodolfo characterized the general as a patriot whose actions were completely motivated by his
love for Mexico and his belief that Madero was an inadequate leader. The second volume began
immediately after Bernardo’s death during the Decena Trágica, and traced Rodolfo’s experience in the
Huerta regime. Rodolfo presented himself as a patriot like his father, and claimed loyalty to his father
and then to Félix Díaz as a justification for all of his decisions. However, Rodolfo did not consider this

211

Moheno, 18-19.

212

García Naranjo, 7: 50.

91

as having agency. On the contrary, he described how he constantly denied himself in order to carry out
his father’s plans and then to support Díaz. These contradictions complicate Rodolfo’s story and call
into question his honesty. Nevertheless, Rodolfo’s perspective is valid because it demonstrates his
attempts to use memory to repair his and Bernardo’s reputations. It also reveals one way in which
Rodolfo projected his masculinity. He was not a general like his father, nor had he achieved (former
Minister of War) Bernardo’s political status. Yet Rodolfo could attempt to defend his father’s legacy
and thus bring honor to their family.
García Naranjo was the last to share his experiences, writing his autobiography beginning in
1951. Like his peers, he also wanted to share his perceptions of the Huerta regime. However, García
Naranjo’s text was different because the author now had forty years of hindsight; he was older,
admittedly less “belligerent,” and not as angry about the revolution as he had been in the 1910s.213
García Naranjo was also unapologetic about his friendship with Huerta. He had never denied this bond,
but writing about Huerta in the 1950s had different political ramifications. Gamboa, Moheno, and
Reyes wrote their memoirs when they still had much at stake personally and politically, and they wrote
to defend themselves against the Mexican government that labeled them as traitors. García Naranjo
made peace with the government under Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s, and he was given the right to
freely express himself. By the 1950s, his project was more about setting the historical record straight
than defending himself. His recollections about this period were often broader commentaries on how
the official history unfairly treated the Huerta regime.
Patriotism serves as the overarching theme within all of these memoirs, but the authors often
presented their accounts in contradictory ways. This section will focus on four historical moments—the
cuartelazo, the struggle for power between Huerta and the Felicistas, Huerta’s dissolution of Congress,
and U.S. occupation of Veracruz. I will examine ways in which the Huerta regime remembered these
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events and how they used the rhetoric of patriotism to prove that opposing the revolution did not
diminish their patriotism.
Rodolfo Reyes wrote that his father fell into a deep state of depression when he was imprisoned
in 1912. Bernardo would say “’I want to leave [prison] and fight’; this was his only phrase and his
obsession.” Bernardo’s patriotism was paradoxical. This obsessive need to fight for his country (likely
motivated by a desire to become president) led him to violent measures in his efforts to restore order and
stability in Mexico. Rodolfo, the loyal son, stated that after exhausting all legal options, he saw the
“terrible convulsion” of the cuartelazo as the only way to free his father from prison.214 Rodolfo
declined to explain his role in planning the cuartelazo, despite being one of the primary conspirators. He
wrote that he was a “simple channel and cooperator” (though he balanced at least eight different plans
simultaneously), and that he was only a go-between between the military men and the civilian
conspirators.215 Rodolfo also wrote that he and Bernardo accepted the possibility that this coup could
cost them their lives. These details are contradictory because Rodolfo described himself as both an
insignificant go-between and willing martyr. Also, these assertions, written in retrospect, downplayed
the embarrassment of Bernardo’s failed attempt to storm the National Palace by suggesting that the
general wanted to die for Mexico.
The cuartelazo was set for the early hours of Sunday, February 9. Bernardo asked his son to
write down his plans for Mexico on the night of February 8, “categorically declaring that the movement
was not a reaction, but went against the personal orientation of the Government.” A committee would
be “in charge of the Executive Power in order to call together an Assembly of all of the revolutionary
elements and leaders who would then organize a provisional Government.” Furthermore, “the lives of
the deposed functionaries were guaranteed, all disorder would be repressed, and [Bernardo] would fulfill
214

Ibid., 201.

215

Ibid., 198. The conspirators also included Generals Manuel Mondragón, Manuel Velázquez, and Gregorio Ruiz, and
civilians Cecilio Ocón, Luis Liceaga, Miguel Othón de Mendizábal, and Rafael Zayas Enríquez.

93

some of the serious promises of the revolution of 1910.”216 The plan also stated that none of the
members of the committee could act as provisional president.
The existence of this written plan is questionable—Rodolfo claimed he could not gain access to
the one existing copy. In retrospect, Rodolfo made sure to emphasize that the cuartelazo was not a
counter-revolution or a reaction. He also made no mention of any personal resentment his father may
have had against Madero, which might explain why Bernardo rebelled against him and not Porfirio Díaz
(who sent him into exile), as well as the possible influence of personal grudges on anti-revolutionary
ideology. Throughout his memoirs, Rodolfo exalted his father and all of his actions: Bernardo sought
glory by fighting against Madero, and Rodolfo sought his father’s glory within the historical memory.
Thus, Rodolfo constructed a narrative in which both men believed that Madero betrayed the ideals of the
revolution, and it was their duty to bring the revolution to fruition. They knew their conspiracy was
illegal, but their patriotism would not allow them to desist in their efforts. In essence, they were more
revolutionary than the revolutionary regime, and though the cuartelazo would be violent, it would
benefit the nation in the long-run. As Rodolfo described the storming of the National Palace on
February 9, he told the story of father and son riding side-by-side into battle. Bernardo was killed
almost immediately by Madero’s forces. He and Rodolfo fell off their horses, and the general died in his
son’s arms.217
The nation’s capital fell into a state of chaos and constant bombardment, businesses and
communication lines shut down, and residents hid in their homes or fled the city in fear. García Naranjo
and Moheno explained that the members of the Cuadrilátero were forced into hiding because they were
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considered complicit in the coup, but in reality they took no part in the cuartelazo. García Naranjo
recounted how he published an editorial in La Tribuna on February 8 in which he satirized the various
rumors about Madero’s impending overthrow. Because an actual coup began the following morning,
readers assumed that García Naranjo was involved in the cuartelazo. The deputy denied this in
retrospect, arguing that “one did not need to be a prophet to know that the government was in agony.”218
On February 8, as a result of this editorial, General Samuel García Cuéllar called him, asking if it was
true that “a fire would be lit” that night. García Naranjo responded by saying he did not know.219 Later
that night, Lozano mentioned that several deputies also assumed that García Naranjo was involved in a
plot against Madero. The following morning, as they began hearing cannon shots, the two members of
the Cuadrilátero went to the home of their friend Dr. Manuel Olea, where they were informed about
Bernardo Reyes’s death and the attack on the National Palace. Moheno arrived shortly thereafter with
news about the Felicista takeover of the Ciudadela and Madero naming Huerta leader of the federal
forces. From that point, the Cuadrilátero went into hiding until the end of the Decena Trágica on
February 18.
Meanwhile, Reyes, Díaz, Mondragón, Huerta, and Henry Lane Wilson helped to form the Pact of
the Embassy. In his memoirs, Reyes immediately disassociated himself from Huerta, stating that he
always had misgivings about the general. Reyes also used honor to differentiate himself from Huerta.
He stated that he and his father had rebelled against Madero for the sake of the nation, but Huerta
betrayed Madero for personal gain. Reyes wrote that even during the formulation of the pact, he
believed that it was a serious mistake for the soon-to-be president to be a man capable of treachery.220 I
suggest that there was an underlying dynamic here that Rodolfo never explicitly stated in his memoirs.
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Bernardo was supposed to be president of Mexico, and after his death, the position should have gone to
Díaz. Now Huerta (who did not take the same risks as Bernardo and his co-conspirators) was president,
and Rodolfo clearly resented him for it.
Once the conspirators agreed to the Pact of the Embassy, they had to decide the fate of Madero
and Pino Suárez. The memoirs present different versions of the assassinations, and the authors blamed
each other while simultaneously taking credit for attempting to spare the president and vice president.
Furthermore, this moment represented a turning point for Gamboa and Moheno. The assassinations of
Madero and Pino Suárez showed them that participating in the Huerta administration could be a
dangerous and possibly deadly endeavor, a point they kept in mind when they agreed to join the regime.
Gamboa had a particularly strong reaction to the Decena Trágica, stating that the news he
received from Mexico had a profound effect on his mental and physical state. On February 19, he wrote
in his diary
I feel ashamed, unhappy, like an accomplice, guilty, impotent…I do not know what I feel!...I
have a fever and my heart jumps out of my chest…The possibility that the
government…DESTROYED FOUR OR FIVE BLOCKS OF OUR CAPITAL! has wounded me
physically, has destroyed my spirit…Matricides! The doctor came in the afternoon…his
diagnosis [was] cardiac neurosis and nervous fever, produced by deep moral shock…And when
he asked me about the news from my homeland, I broke into tears like a woman.221
Less than three years prior, Gamboa had taken part in commemorating Mexico’s modernity and civility,
but Mexicans in the capital were now destroying the city, assassinating government officials, and the
country was on the brink of anarchy. By using the term “matricide” Gamboa likened the participants in
the Decena Trágica to children capable of assassinating their own mother. He also used gendered
rhetoric to demonstrate how events in Mexico produced his feminized display of emotions resulting
from a weakened physical condition. Gamboa placed all blame on Huerta, whom he considered a “dark,
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very dark” figure, and days later the author implied that Huerta was responsible for the assassinations of
Madero and Pino Suárez.222 From this point forward, Gamboa perceived Huerta as a dangerous man.
Moheno claimed having a similar epiphany. The night of February 18, Moheno retuned to his
home after the announcement of a cease fire. He wrote that as he ate dinner with his family, a number
of deputies arrived and ordered him to follow them to the home of Deputy Thomas Braniff in order to
discuss Mexico’s political situation. At Braniff’s home, the deputies formed two groups: one would
speak with Huerta and the other with Díaz in order to assess Mexico’s political situation. Moheno,
Braniff, and the other members of their group set out to find Díaz at two in the morning on February 19.
Although peace had seemingly been restored, their journey to the Ciudadela was dangerous because of
the “profound darkness…torn power lines and the drunk soldiers who blocked [their] path every few
blocks and threatened [them] with their rifles.” The group met with Díaz’s cousin, Colonel Ignacio
Muñoz, who led them by foot to the Ciudadela. When they arrived at the front of the plaza, they saw the
statue of José María Morelos and the tortured remains of Gustavo A. Madero, whose only eye had been
taken out by a bayonet. According to Moheno, Cecilio Ocón, the man in charge of the assassination,
exclaimed that Francisco I. Madero and Pino Suárez were next.223
Moheno recalled having a moment of clarity in which he understood the delicate situation he and
his colleagues faced. He and Braniff fled the Ciudadela as quickly as possible, unsure as to whether
they had been sent there to be tortured and executed. Moheno claimed that afterward, the two worked to
spare the lives of the former president and vice-president, and in his memoirs, he included transcripts in
which he and Braniff testified to this before congress in October 1913.224 Moheno stated that he did not
know the conspirators involved in the cuartelazo well or at all, but Braniff did. Moheno and Braniff
222

Ibid., 67-68.

223

Ocón, a friend of Félix Díaz, carried out Huerta’s orders to assassinate Gustavo A. Madero and Adolfo Bassó, the
superintendent of the National Palace.
224

Moheno, 56-60.

97

attempted to convince the conspirators to exile Madero, who would continue to alienate supporters “with
his uncontainable verbosity and terrible oratory.” Assassinating Madero would make him a martyr.225
Reyes also described his attempts to spare Madero. The author wrote that Huerta held a meeting
with his cabinet on February 21. The cabinet (consisting mostly of lawyers) decided that a trial against
Madero and Pino Suárez would be more effective in neutralizing them than exile or incarceration in a
prison or an insane asylum. Alberto García Granados and Reyes were put in charge of exploring legal
options, and the cabinet agreed that the former president and vice-president would not be executed.226
However, their efforts were in vain, and Madero and Pino Suárez were executed on the night of
February 22.
The Pact of the Embassy established momentary peace in Mexico City, but subsequent
accusations surrounding these murders split this group between the supporters of Díaz and Huerta. No
one in the Huerta cabinet took responsibility for the assassination orders against Madero and Pino
Suárez, and in retrospect they all blamed each other. In his memoirs, Reyes accepted a measure of
accountability because the conspirators actively worked against Madero, but they were “rebels, not
traitors,” and their goal had been to establish a new government through legal means.227 Moreover, they
knew that Madero’s assassination would turn him into a martyr. García Naranjo, for instance, stated
that though it was an “unnecessary holocaust” that “wounded the most rudimentary moral sentiments,” it
represented an even worse “offense against common sense.”228 Huerta provided an official version of
the murders in which Maderistas stopped the vehicles in an effort to save the prisoners, and Madero and
Pino Suárez were “accidentally shot” in the ensuing scuffle. Nobody believed this version, and popular
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blame was placed on all members of the Huerta regime (including Díaz), despite the fact that members
of the cabinet and other prominent government officials were seemingly unsure of the actual details
surrounding the assassinations.
Other sources corroborated that to some degree. In 1926, the Mexico City newspaper Excélsior
published testimonies from members of the Madero and Huerta administrations, in which they presented
their theories regarding the Madero and Pino Suárez assassinations. Gamboa stated that the public
would never know for sure, but he believed the perpetrators were “on the other side of the grave” (likely
alluding to Huerta), and those indirectly responsible “naturally” blamed the dead.229 According to
Reyes’s memoirs, Rafael L. Hernández, Madero’s cousin, and Juan Sánchez Azcona, Madero’s personal
secretary, both expressed their belief in Reyes’s innocence. Azcona also cleared Díaz of all
responsibility.230 Ricardo García Granados also wrote to El Universal on March 4, 1926, in defense of
Reyes. His brother Alberto had been executed on October 9, 1915 by the Carranza government for his
participation in the Huerta regime and supposed complicity in the Madero assassination. Ricardo named
Huerta as the mastermind behind the murders (Alberto had also named Mondragón), and he argued that
Huerta shrewdly manipulated the circumstances to make the cabinet (all Felicistas) appear guilty. Reyes
agreed with this assessment, and throughout his memoirs, used this argument to justify his actions and
those of his friend Díaz.
In contrast, Congressional Deputy Luis Manuel Rojas, Lozano, Moheno, and García Naranjo
defended Huerta, suggesting that he had no direct knowledge of the plans to assassinate Madero and
Pino Suárez. Rojas, who voted against Madero’s resignation, asserted that Huerta could not have
ordered the executions without the approval of Henry Lane Wilson. Rojas also suggested that Díaz and
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Mondragón were complicit, since they “were the principal men on whom Madero’s luck depended.”231
Lozano stated in Excélsior that during his time as Huerta’s Minister of Communication, he asked the
president to publicly clarify his role in the assassinations. Huerta said that “he was not guilty,” but
members of his administration were, and he did not “want to hurt them through any categorical
declarations.”232 Lozano offered his own opinion, and without mentioning any names, accused the
military command (headed by Blanquet) and Ministry of War (led by Mondragón).
Moheno stated in his memoirs that it was “absurd to attribute President Madero’s assassination to
General Huerta,” since he was a pawn controlled by the Felicista cabinet, especially Reyes. In an
addendum to his memoirs written in the 1930s, Moheno suggested that Reyes’s memoirs inadvertently
“absolved” Huerta. Moheno was correct to a certain degree. He pointed out that Reyes consistently
used the word “impose” to describe the way in which Díaz and his colleagues acted towards Huerta in
February 1913. Díaz “imposed” his own cabinet, opposed any suggestions from Huerta, and gave Reyes
and Mondragón political authority in his name.233 Moheno also noted that the key participants in the
cuartelazo and the political assassinations were Felicistas. Ocón was a close friend to Díaz and
Mondragón, and even Reyes expressed his belief that Mondragón was directly involved in the deaths of
Madero and Pino Suárez. Moheno argued that by attempting to explain his loyalty to Díaz, Reyes
demonstrated that he and the Felicistas had more power than he admitted in his memoirs. This claim
was valid but problematic because Moheno essentialized the participants as victims or villains, either
completely powerless and lacking agency, or in full control of Mexico’s destiny. Reyes constructed his
narrative in a similar manner, claiming that he and Díaz had no power against Huerta, who seemed to
outsmart them both using Machiavellian maneuvers to take over the presidency.
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García Naranjo went a step further in his memoirs and castigated society for placing the entire
burden of the evils within Mexican politics on Huerta. The author used religious metaphors to described
how members of the regime “washed their hands, and it was their right to do so, but they forgot Christ’s
warning, and without being pure or clean, they cast stones.” He added “of course it was more
comfortable and easier for everyone to make firewood of that fallen tree. As if one devil could reign for
seventeen months in a country full of angels.”234
The quarrels among these men continued after the assassinations, and the Huerta cabinet became
characterized by internal division, betrayal, and questions about loyalty. Even with another strongman
in power, the regime was unable to unite the opponents of the revolution under on cohesive ideology.
The division between the supporters of Huerta and Díaz proved to be a fundamental problem, and the
cabinet members chose to support one faction or the other based on ideological, personal, and political
motivations. These men also confronted the question of patriotism versus morality. Regardless of
which of these two factions each man supported, they all understood that they would become associated
with political assassinations and other morally objectionable actions. Yet they agreed to participate in
the Huerta regime and justified it by declaring their patriotism and a desire to improve Mexico.
Furthermore, though Pavković focuses on a patriot’s actions against foreign intervention in his
discussion of morality, his notion of justice is important in the case of supporters of Huerta and Díaz.
Bernardo Reyes fought against the perceived injustices of the Madero administration, and he and his son
rebelled in order to replace Madero with a more “just” government. The conspirators of the cuartelazo
agreed that their actions were morally justified because they rectified the blunder of the Madero
presidency. Moheno, García Naranjo, and others who joined the Huerta regime after the cuartelazo did
so because they viewed it as an opportunity to correct the problems created by Madero. In this sense,
these men were acting as patriots, replacing a failed administration for Mexico’s benefit. However,
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Huerta would become increasingly unstable in the months that followed, forcing his supporters and the
members of his cabinet to redefine patriotism and decide how far they would compromise their morality
in support of this violent regime.
Tensions between the Huerta and Díaz factions intensified almost immediately, and Huerta’s
reputation worsened in the months following the Decena Trágica. The memoirs as a whole become more
difficult to follow at this point because the authors began accusing each other and presenting different
versions of the events that took place during the Huerta administration. This is useful because it
challenges the homogenous official history of the period while also humanizing the regime. These men
were not simply puppets blindly following Huerta’s orders. The memoirs demonstrate that they had
their own aspirations, political inclinations, resentments, and reasons for participating in and/or leaving
the regime as it descended further into chaos.
Throughout his memoirs, Reyes asserted that Huerta did everything he could to sabotage the
Felicistas. Moheno agreed, stating that Huerta embarked on an obsessive campaign to destroy
Felicismo.235 García Granados (Minister of the Interior) was the first to “become desperate,” and he
resigned in April.236 On June 11, 1913, Huerta replaced him with Urrutia. Although the Felicistas
respected Urrutia as a medical professional, they questioned his political ability. Jorge Vera Estañol
(Minister of Public Instruction) resigned next, and was replaced by Manuel Garza Aldape. Reyes
explained that by June 1913, it was clear that Huerta would not hand power to Díaz. Consequently,
Díaz and Reyes officially dissolved the pact in order to sever ties with Huerta and keep him from
deflecting responsibility for his actions onto the remaining Felicistas in the cabinet. This break with
Huerta had immediate ramifications. Huerta exiled Díaz through a position as ambassador to Japan, and
he removed Mondragón from the Ministry of War and exiled him to Europe. This allowed Huerta to
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effectively gain political control over the federal government and military. Reyes claimed that he
presented his resignation at this moment, but it was denied.237 It would seem that Huerta would have
gladly accepted it, or that Reyes would have resigned anyway if he could not tolerate his position
anymore. Reyes did not offer a clear explanation in his memoirs as to why he remained in the cabinet.
Huerta exiled Díaz and Mondragón, and it is likely that he would have done the same with Reyes.
Perhaps he was being dishonest in his memoirs about his attempt to resign in order to explain why he
was not removed from his post.
According to Moheno, once the Pact of the Embassy was broken, “the administration, which for
one moment seemed to have the support of the grand majority of Mexican society, anxious to return to
peace, fatally advanced down a road to ruin…a dictatorship.”238 Urrutia Martinez argues that Huerta, a
military man whose nature was to use force rather than persuasion, quickly alienated his allies and
consistently changed cabinet members (most only lasted one or two months). In their memoirs, all
members of the Huerta regime attested to this. Furthermore, Huerta’s enemies now faced the possibility
of political assassination, and various deputies began to “disappear.” Because he was personally close
to Huerta and positioned as Minister of the Interior, Urrutia became the primary suspect for the
disappearances that took place during his three-month tenure, and even after. Between June and
October 1913, deputies Edmundo Pastelín, Serapio Rendón, and Belisario Domínguez disappeared, and
the evidence (some of which was fabricated by Carrancistas) pointed to Urrutia.239 These murders
became symbolic of what Reyes called the “reign of terror” of the Huerta dictatorship, since they
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represented the silencing of the parliamentary opposition. Reyes, the only remaining Felicista in the
cabinet, resigned in September after the disappearances. He stated that as Minister of Justice, he
attempted to save as many lives as possible during the “reign of terror.” Consequently, he was “spied on
and encircled,” and all his phone calls, conferences, and mail were closely monitored. Reyes described
his life during this period as a “horrific calvary,” and when he told Huerta that he would work with
congress to investigate the disappearances, Huerta responded by telling Reyes that he was better off not
becoming involved and asked for the minister’s resignation.240
The members of the cabinet could not stop the administration’s decline into anarchy after Huerta
nullified the presidential elections and dissolved the federal legislature.241 On October 9, the dictator
explained to his ministers his plans to close congress, and Moheno claimed to have vehemently opposed
it, arguing that it would “cause a scandal across the world.”242 García Naranjo and Lozano also later
claimed to have opposed Huerta. They had devoted years of service to the legislature, and perceived it
as a sign of democracy. They stated that the dissolution of congress ended the Cuadrilátero’s plan for
“social transformation through government action.”243 Huerta ordered the arrest of 110 members of
congress, along with Reyes and other political enemies. Moheno recalled feeling “profound disgust”
over the situation, especially since he was Mexico’s unofficial vice-president. He also acted against
Huerta’s order by working to liberate as many deputies and senators as possible, resulting in a formal
complaint by Garza Aldape. Moheno stated that he wrote numerous drafts of his resignation during this
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period, but close friends convinced him to remain in office because “he was the best shield” against the
dictator.244
This second coup made it clear that Huerta’s cabinet had no authority and that the dictator was
willing to use any necessary measures to gain total control of Mexico. The memoirs also present a
different version of this period than El Imparcial, which continued to praise Huerta. Moheno and Reyes
reflected a sense of helplessness from the cabinet. From their perspective, this was the moment in which
Huerta attempted to make them puppets in spite of their resistance, and they lost hope for reestablishing
order in Mexico. These accounts differ significantly from García Naranjo’s, which emphasized the
progressive policies implemented by the regime. This was possibly due to the time in which he wrote
his memoirs. Moheno and Reyes reflected upon their experiences while they suffered the political and
personal consequences of participating in the Huerta regime. They had reason for expressing bitterness
against the dictator. García Naranjo, on the other hand, defended his friend Huerta decades after the
events took place. In his memoirs, he wrote that he knew that Huerta made many errors, as any other
human did.245 But instead of offering specific examples, he drew attention to the positive aspects of the
administration.
García Naranjo claimed that in spite of the growing problems with the dictatorship in late 1913,
the Huerta cabinet attempted to work for peace and reform—a stark contrast from the “reign of terror”
presented by Reyes. Meyer supports this assertion, noting that Toribio Esquivel Obregón presented a
plan to congress for land redistribution, in which the government would “create a proper set of
circumstances so that a major subdivision of land could occur on the basis of individual initiative.”
Eduardo Tamariz also suggested that the legislature raise taxes on large estates while lowering or
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eliminating taxes on small farms. Meyer states that these plans were rejected by congress, but they
demonstrated the cabinet’s attempt to implement agrarian reform.246
Moreover, Urrutia, the former Director of the Faculty of Medicine at the National University,
focused on public health. He frequently canvassed the city with Dr. Eduardo Liceaga, director of the
Consejo Superior de Salubridad. Urrutia addressed the growth in prostitution by passing a health code
calling for weekly and free medical checkups for prostitutes. Furthermore, the surgeon suspended the
sale of fish in unsanitary markets, and he worked to develop regulations for meat sales. He and Liceaga
also prompted corn vendors to have tiled, rather than dirt, floors in their businesses. They also targeted
pulquerías and bars, popular locations for socializing, but also prone to outbreaks of tuberculosis
because of the prevalence of flies, dirt, unsanitary cleaning rags, and milk handled by workers who did
not bathe or wash their hands. Urrutia decreed that pulquerías be tiled and thoroughly disinfected, that
pulque be sold in clean, closed bottles, and that employees needed to dress in white and wash their
hands. Also, in a controversial move, Urrutia closed these and all other businesses on Sundays, in order
to promote worker productivity on Mondays.247 In an effort to enhance cultural development among the
masses, he promoted social activities for Sundays, including sports and theatrical events.
The cabinet also focused on education. Jorge Vera Estañol proposed a plan approved by the
legislature to build 5,000 schools in rural regions in Mexico.248 García Naranjo worked with Genaro
García, the Director of the National Preparatory School, to modify the curriculum by incorporating
“moral culture” that moved students to consider “love and virtue” and aesthetics.249 This represented a
stark move away from positivism, which was precisely García Naranjo’s goal, since he wanted to
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expand the curriculum rather than limit it to the sciences. In retrospect, he used this example to
demonstrate that he (and the Huerta cabinet on a broader scale) did not “defend the banner of stagnation
and backwardness.”250 Although Huerta focused on military pacification, his cabinet had concrete goals
for Mexico’s development and improvement. The regime has often been accused of setting Mexico
back to conditions and policies prevalent during the Porfiriato—in essence, labeled a counter-revolution.
The reality was more complex. The Huerta regime reacted to Madero’s inadequacies; its members
believed they were more capable of running the country, and that is what they set out to do. Men such
as García Naranjo and Urrutia represented what might be characterized as the beginning of a postrevolutionary ideology. They were Porfiristas who believed that Madero’s revolution had failed, and
they implemented policies that they believed would move Mexico further into modernity. The concept
of a post-revolutionary ideology in 1914 is problematic because the revolution was still underway across
Mexico. Nevertheless, it provides a framework for examining how Porfiristas conceptualized Mexico’s
development in a way that continued the process of “order and progress” without returning to the status
quo of the Porfiriato.
In his attempts to highlight the positive actions of the Huerta cabinet, García Naranjo
demonstrated an overall tendency to be apologetic for the regime, unlike Reyes and Moheno, who were
at least able to admit to the severity of the problems within the administration. Furthermore, Moheno
discussed the role of the United States in the regime’s collapse, but García Naranjo blamed Huerta’s fall
entirely on the U.S. government. By late 1913, Huerta’s inability to gain recognition from the U.S.
government had become a significant problem for the administration. In the final entries of 1913,
Gamboa described his confrontation in August with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and his envoy
John Lind, both of whom had called for Huerta’s resignation. Gamboa expressed that Mexico would not
allow the United States to continue to intervene in its affairs, as it had clearly done during the Decena
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Trágica. He was applauded throughout Mexico for his patriotic stance, and though he had a promising
career ahead of him as minister, he resigned the following month in order to pursue his presidential
candidacy with the Catholic Party.251
The hostility between Huerta and Wilson increased over the next eight months. Though certain
ministers felt antagonism against the dictator, the cabinet defended his stance against the U.S.
government and applauded Huerta’s patriotism in the final months of the regime. Moheno argued that
the Wilson administration had imperialistic tendencies which the U.S. president made clear through his
consistent threats of military intervention through the beginning of 1914. When U.S. forces invaded
Veracruz on April 21, Huerta met with his cabinet for the final time. García Naranjo recalled speaking
privately with Huerta, and the dictator “maintained [his] serenity and completely dominated his nerves.
With the asiatic fatalism that seemed to invade his spirit in the transcendental moments, he said to
[García Naranjo] calmly: ‘What was supposed to happen has happened.’”252 Huerta announced to the
cabinet that he had ordered a retreat in Veracruz because it was not sufficiently fortified to fight U.S.
forces, but that two armed military divisions were being organized through the Ministry of War. The
dictator asked each respective cabinet member to do whatever he could within his own ministry. Huerta
had re-instated congress in November 1913, but a number of legislators remained imprisoned. Moheno
helped to pass a measure which granted amnesty to these men in order to improve relations between
Huerta and the legislature while promoting unity within the government. García Naranjo began working
with schools to develop intensive basic training courses for nurses who wished to participate in sanitary
brigades in Veracruz. Despite their efforts, public opinion against the regime was at an all-time low,
especially since naval cadets and civilians ended up fighting the U.S. forces when Huerta ordered his
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forces to withdraw. Regardless, Huerta supporters believed he was doing his best to combat Wilson in
defense of the nation, and his staunchest allies, particularly García Naranjo, would blame Wilson
entirely for Huerta’s collapse.
Moheno recounted that the dictator became increasingly paranoid, and the government quickly
disintegrated, despite efforts by the cabinet to maintain some sort of unity.253 García Naranjo stated that
by May “it was clear that Huerta’s regime was experiencing a downfall, but worst of all, [we] could see
the inevitable defeat of the Federal Army.”254 When peace negotiations began in Niagara Falls, Huerta’s
opponents viewed this as an unpatriotic betrayal because he was negotiating with the United States.
Emilio Rabasa, Agustín Rodríguez, and Luis Elguero served as the delegates from Mexico. García
Naranjo noted that none of the delegates were Huerta’s friends or associates, but Minister of Finance
Adolfo De la Lama selected them because of their “intelligence, wisdom, and honorability.” Journalist
José Elguero (Luis Elguero’s brother) argued that the three delegates failed in the negotiations because
these three good men were asked to negotiate with unscrupulous “tramps.”255 With mounting
diplomatic and military pressure, Huerta resigned on July 15.256
Moheno expressed that for the members of the regime, “their condition could not have been
more pitiful and dangerous.”257 Like De la Barra, Carvajal was an intelligent man, but not politically
adept. Huerta met with García Naranjo on July 10, and the dictator told his friend that he forced
Carvajal to wait several days for a final decision regarding whether or not he would be named minister.
“With his Indian malice,” García Naranjo wrote, Huerta explained that he did this because “he wanted
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his successor to meditate profoundly on the adventure he was about to undertake.” The dictator made it
clear that Carvajal freely agreed to enter “the storm.”258 The members of the regime (including former
ministers) understood that the government would have a catastrophic end, and García Naranjo recalled
that he “could not imagine Mexico burning like Troy, but did suppose that the ending would be
tragic.”259 They did not believe Carvajal had the power to act against the revolutionaries, and an
alliance with them, particularly Carranza, could be disastrous, if not deadly. Thus, in July 1914, most of
the remaining members of the Huerta regime began their exile, fleeing Mexico in shame as villains and
traitors.
The newspapers and memoirs recount the narrative of the Huerta regime, from the perspective of
its participants, as the events took place and in hindsight. An analysis of these sources reveals these
men’s contradictory motivations, and the influence of honor, loyalty, and patriotism in their public and
private decisions and struggles. When the members of the Huerta regime accepted their positions, they
understood the risks of acting against the revolution. However, the memoirs seem to indicate that the
cabinet members did not anticipate the levels of chaos, violence, and anarchy brought on as Huerta
became increasingly authoritarian. The participants in the regime initially united under an anti-Madero
stance, but the divisions among this group (beginning with the conflict between the urban professional
Porfiristas and the científicos) made it impossible to sustain any cohesive anti-revolutionary ideology.
El Imparcial and La Patria attempted to unite the opponents of the revolution by substituting Porfirio
Díaz with Huerta and Félix Díaz, but even these newspapers clashed ideologically.
In hindsight, because of Madero’s declining popularity, February 1913 proved to be an ideal time
for Porfiristas to attempt to defeat the revolution and establish any sort of post-revolutionary
government. However, personal ambitions, miscalculations (particularly Madero’s assassination),
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resentments, conflicting visions for Mexico, and lack of U.S. support under Wilson impeded any
possible success. Although the revolution was also ideologically and politically fragmented during this
period, its military leaders proved to be stronger than Huerta and the federal army.
The Huerta regime went into exile along with others who were considered threats by the provisional
Carranza government; almost immediately, they attempted to organize a counter-revolutionary
movement against the First Chief. The exiles continued to oppose the revolution and now had a
common enemy in Carranza, but their efforts were hindered by the same political, class, and ideological
conflicts they dealt with in 1913 and early 1914. After Huerta’s death in 1916, there was no Porfirista
military leader strong enough to launch a successful counter-revolution in Mexico. These men used
media to construct Porfirio Díaz and Huerta as heroes and martyrs for their cause, and they briefly set
aside their differences to collectively protest the ratification of the Constitution of 1917. However, their
efforts were not enough to avoid definitive defeat when the military phase of the revolution ended in
1920.
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Chapter 3: The Porfirista Diaspora and Attempts at Counter-revolution, 1914-1920

In July 1914, the members of the Huerta regime fled Mexico and settled across the United States,
Havana, and Europe. The exile community included Porfiristas and other factions opposed to Carranza.
Almost immediately, they began to discuss the possibility for a counterrevolution, but their efforts were
disorganized and poorly funded. The exiles also faced significant political setbacks after the death of
Huerta in 1916, the ratification of the Constitution of 1917, the death of Aureliano Blanquet in 1919, and
Félix Díaz’s definitive military defeat in 1920. Although displacement affected the exiles personally
and professionally, this chapter will address the political ramifications of their banishment from Mexico.
Primarily, I will examine the complex exile politics of the period, relying on the memoirs, government
documents, and the San Antonio Porfirista publications La Prensa and Revista Mexicana.
When the Carranza regime officially threatened the exiles with execution for treason in late
1914, it was a way of negating the political legitimacy of all who had participated in the Huerta regime,
regardless of whether or not they were Porfiristas. The exiles faced an even greater challenge with the
ratification of the Constitution of 1917, which put their vision for Mexico at stake. An analysis of the
counter-revolutionary efforts after the fall of the Huerta regime reveals the various ways in which the
exiles defined Mexico, challenging the notion that all those who opposed the revolution wished to return
to the Porfirian status quo. It also shows how the exiles continued to use patriotism as a political and
rhetorical tool to justify their actions.

The Politics of Exile, 1914-1916
The first significant wave of exile during the revolution took place in 1911, when Díaz, the
científicos, and much of the aristocracy fled Mexico. The second wave took place after the fall of the
Huerta regime in 1914, and included members of the military, the Catholic Church, artists, intellectuals,
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and politicians. In La Reacción Mexicana y Su Exilio durante la Revolución de 1910, Ramírez Rancaño
provides a detailed study of the prominent exiles, where they settled, and their political activity after
1914. Therefore, I will offer only a broad overview in the first part of this section. Secondly, I will
examine the first attempts to organize a counterrevolution, particularly in San Antonio. Ramírez
Rancaño correctly asserts that the exiles from the various political factions had a common enemy in
Carranza. However, he also argues that “all of Mexico was Huertista” when the dictator was in power,
suggesting that Huerta had broad support when he was in office, then in exile. This section will
problematize the definition of “Huertista” while demonstrating the complex ideological and political
dynamics that the exiles faced between late 1914 and 1916.260
The Carranza government worked to curb the power of the institutions that had been loyal to
Huerta. The First Chief dissolved the federal army, but in exile many former military leaders still
looked to Huerta, Mondragón, and Blanquet for direction. According to Ramírez Rancaño, many
members of the military lived in El Paso, New Orleans, Havana, and New York.
The Catholic Church was also considered an anti-revolutionary institution. García Naranjo
offers the simplistic explanation that Carranza turned against the church because of Huerta’s personal
relationship with José Mora y del Río, the archbishop of Mexico. Mora y del Río loaned fifty-thousand
pesos to the dictator, “sealing the fate” of the Catholic Church and intensifying the anti-clerical position
of the revolutionaries.261 Manuel Calero, Minister of Foreign Relations under Madero, argued that
Huerta did attempt to garner political support from the Catholic Church by presenting himself as a pious
man and appointing Catholic Party member Eduardo Tamariz president of the legislature.262 Ramírez
Rancaño and Knight suggest that the relationship between Huerta and the Catholic Church was complex,
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and that there were several possible reasons for Constitutionalist anti-clericalism. A number of political
Catholics, including Gamboa and De la Barra, joined the Huerta administration. The federal
government also allowed the Catholic Church to consecrate Mexico to the Sacred Heart of Jesus in
January 1914. Knight argues that although these examples demonstrate favorable relations between the
church and the government, the “Catholic constituency” across Mexico “was heterogeneous,” and its
response to Huerta and to the revolutionary factions was often influenced by local conditions.263
Nevertheless, the Constitutionalists embarked on an anti-clerical campaign that forced Catholic
leaders into exile. According to Jesús María Echavarría y Aguirre, Bishop of the Diocese of Saltillo,
Coahuila (Carranza’s home state), Bishop John Shaw sent a telegram in July 1914 offering all Mexican
bishops refuge in San Antonio. At least thirty-five bishops, including Echavarría y Aguirre, accepted
the offer and crossed into Texas by August 1914.264 The Catholic Church in the United States
responded to what it perceived as the violent persecution of Mexican Catholics. In 1916, an American
priest named Francis Clement Kelley wrote The Book of Red and Yellow, a harsh critique of the abuses
of the revolutionary forces (specifically, the Carrancistas) of Catholics in Mexico. Kelley was known
for establishing the Catholic Church Extension Society in 1905, a charity organization designed to reach
out to isolated (often rural) communities, and he was important in the efforts by the U.S. Catholic
Church to help Mexican refugees during the revolution. The Book of Red and Yellow contains testimony
from “lay and clerical” refugees about “the murder, exile, imprisonment, rape, and robbery of the
innocent” across Mexico.265 Kelley also defended the exiled clergy from the Carrancistas, and
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condemned the Wilson administration’s support for the Mexican government.266 Moreover, he stated
that “if the United States [was] to be a friend and sister of Mexico,” U.S. citizens needed to “rid
themselves of a multitude of inherited prejudices, and substitute a spirit of understanding for a spirit of
greed.”267 The exile memoirs focus almost exclusively on the efforts of Mexican exiles against the
Carranza and Wilson administration, but Kelley’s text exemplifies one way in which U.S. leaders
worked to counteract the Constitutionalists.
In addition to members of the military and clergy, artists with Huertista sympathies were
expelled from Mexico. Actors Leopoldo Beristáin and Emilia Trujillo, playwright José F. Elizondo, and
musicians Rafael Galindo, Manuel M. Ponce, and Julián Carrillo were among the artists who fled to the
United States or Havana.268 García Naranjo recounted that the slightest attachment to the regime could
be cause for banishment. For example, Huerta’s Minister of War Miguel Lerdo de Tejada selected
Galindo (Mexico’s premier cellist) to organize an official musical ensemble for the Rurales, or Rural
Corps. The orchestra serenaded Huerta on his birthday, and the dictator thanked Galindo and shook his
hand while photographers captured the moment on film. Galindo “paid for that handshake with seven
years in exile.”269
The intellectuals such as García Naranjo posed the most significant threat to the Carranza regime
and to the revolution. They were educated in the Porfirista traditions of Justo Sierra and positivism, and
Urrutia and Gamboa achieved global renown in their respective fields. The intellectuals constituted
Mexico’s urban professional class of doctors, journalists, lawyers, and writers, and they fervently
expressed their critiques of the Carranza regime. Though the “reaction” primarily referred to the
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supporters of Porfirio Díaz and Huerta, it also included the exiled members of the Madero government,
and they were also targeted in Carranza’s efforts to purge his opposition from Mexico.
Ramírez Rancaño makes an important connection between the Madero and Huerta regimes, since
many Maderistas (including Pedro Lascuráin, Calero, and Jesús Flores Magón) aligned with Huerta, or
at least contributed to Madero’s fall. Calero, for example, did not have a position in the Huerta
government. Yet he felt complicit because he claimed to have convinced Madero to place Huerta in
charge of the forces fighting Orozco in Chihuahua in 1912. Without this opportunity, Huerta might not
have gained Madero’s trust enough to lead the federal army during the Decena Trágica.270 These
connections help to explain the difficulty in defining Huertismo and Huertistas. Calero, for example,
wrote about his connections to Huerta in hindsight. There was no way for him to know the long-term
consequences for backing Huerta in 1912. Even though he did not consider himself a Porfirista or
Huertista, he was forced into exile like self-proclaimed Porfiristas who joined the Huerta cabinet,
including García Naranjo, Gamboa, and Urrutia.271 Furthermore, men such as Flores Magón seemingly
acted according to the political climate, not through an adherence to a particular ideology. Flores
Magón may have served in Huerta’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 1913, but then ran as a PLM
candidate (alongside Calero) against Huerta in the presidential elections of October 1913. Gamboa
acted in a similar manner. He did not support Madero or Huerta, but he accepted diplomatic and cabinet
positions under their administrations for the prestige and the opportunity to serve Mexico.
The politics of the exile community were further complicated by the presence of Villistas in the
United States, particularly in El Paso, across the border from Villas’s base in the state of Chihuahua.
270 Calero, 132. Knight suggests that Jesús Flores Magón participated as a member of the Huerta cabinet. However, the
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The primary source with the most detailed information on the exiles is a book written in 1916 by
“Antimaco Sax,” entitled Los Mexicanos en el Destierro. García Naranjo stated in his memoir that Sax
was a pseudonym used by José Elguero, the exiled director of the pro-Huerta newspaper El País. Sax
wrote this text in an effort to “provide an account of what [had] been done in exile [by] the Mexican
émigrés expelled from their country by the “constitutionalist” revolution.” He added that he wanted to
focus on a select few exiles who had been “victims of false characterizations” by the Carranza regime.
Sax discussed the Huerta cabinet and men belonging to other factions, including Francisco and Emilio
Vázquez Gómez, brothers who supported Madero in the early stages of the revolution but broke ties
with him in 1912 and moved to San Antonio. Sax believed that these prominent intellectuals would use
their skills to “reconstruct” Mexico.272 Sax also included pieces critiquing Villistas such as General
Felipe Ángeles, who lived in exile in El Paso. Sax made it clear that these exiles were wrong for
supporting the “bandit” Villa, but he nevertheless included them in his work because they belonged to
the exile community.273 Ramírez Rancaño argues that Villistas and Huerta supporters “numbered in the
thousands” in El Paso and “hated” each other.274
Regardless of these complex political dynamics, the Carranza regime labeled these men la
reacción (or “the reaction”) and cast them as a homogenous group of traitors. On December 12, 1914,
Carrancista General Salvador Alvarado compiled a list with the names of people who could be
prosecuted as traitors under the Juarista law of January 25, 1862, which “punished those who disturbed
public order with the death penalty.”275 The list contained 364 names, including all of the members of
the Huerta cabinet, surviving científicos, ex-presidents Díaz, De la Barra, and Lascuráin, members of the
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military, and prominent intellectuals. In theory, anyone who helped Huerta in any way, however
minimal, could be prosecuted as a traitor. In their memoirs, the exiles depicted the First Chief as a
vindictive man set on removing any possible threat to himself from Mexico. García Naranjo noted that
many innocent people (such as himself) were persecuted unjustly and sent into exile.276 Those who
remained in Mexico seemed to fare just as badly, if not worse. Alberto García Granados, Huerta’s first
Minister of the Interior, was implicated in the murders of Madero and Pino Suárez and executed in
October 1915. According to Ramírez Rancaño, the Carranza regime used this as an example of what
could happen to traitors, but the exiles viewed García Granados as a “victim,” and his execution seemed
to strengthen their resolve against the Mexican government.277
In their memoirs, Gamboa, Moheno, Reyes, and García Naranjo indicated that during the final
months of 1914, their priorities were to settle down, find employment, and carry on with their lives.
García Naranjo explained that the Cuadrilátero and other members of the Huerta cabinet (including
Huerta himself) did not flee with an excessive amount of money, as it was widely believed; after losing
their homes, jobs, property, and other assets, they faced the difficulty of finding a safe place to live and
gainful employment to support their families. Nevertheless, the exiles maintained their connections
through friendly visits, chance encounters, and political action.278 Gamboa initially settled in Galveston,
Texas, Moheno in New Orleans, García Naranjo in New York, and Reyes in Madrid. Ramírez Rancaño
states that the vast majority of exiles lived in these cities, as well as in San Antonio, El Paso, Havana,
and Los Angeles (to a lesser extent). I argue that these areas formed “borderlands,” spaces where the
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exiles converged, dealt with their displacement, and simultaneously challenged the revolution’s efforts
to become hegemonic.
All of these cities were important for the exile network, but San Antonio continued to be the
center of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary activity in the United States. It was a strategic
location because of its proximity to the U.S./Mexico border, but it also had a strong Mexican presence
and large immigrant community. Between 1900 and 1930, the city’s population increased from 51,321
to 231,542, and the Mexican immigrant community rose from 25.7% to 37.2% of the total population
during this period.279 In San Antonio, the Flores Magón brothers launched the U.S. version of
Regeneración in 1904, Madero drafted and published the Plan de San Luis Potosí in 1910, Bernardo and
Rodolfo Reyes conspired against Madero in 1912, and Carranza conspired against Huerta in 1914.
Porfiristas also lived in San Antonio, and two of the most prominent were Ignacio E. Lozano and
Leonides González. Lozano, born in Nuevo León, had worked as a journalist in the mining town of
Mapimí, Durango. He moved to San Antonio with his mother and sisters in 1908, following the death of
his father. In 1913, he launched the Porfirista newspaper La Prensa, which circulated throughout the
United States. González was the mayor of Mapimí and had close ties to the Díaz regime. With the
onset of the revolution, he and his family were forced to flee in order to avoid execution. They settled in
San Antonio, and González became the business manager for La Prensa.
Ramírez Rancaño argues that the exiles did not collectively discuss plans for a counterrevolution until late 1914/early 1915, after the Carranza regime threatened them with execution for
treason. When they did, they chose San Antonio as their meeting place. Their first attempt at
organizing the exile community took place in January 1915, as members of “the reaction” gathered in
San Antonio to discuss the creation of the Asamblea Pacificadora Mexicana (Mexican Peace-Making
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Assembly), an organization whose goal was “to work for the reestablishment of order and harmony” in
Mexico. Though it was willing to negotiate with the revolutionaries, it would resort to counterrevolution if confronted with “intransigence” from Villista, Zapatista, and Carrancista leaders.280
Sax stated that Gamboa presided over the first meeting of the assembly on February 6, 1915,
which was attended by approximately forty men, including Emilio Vázquez Gómez, Jesús Flores
Magón, Miguel Bolaños Cacho (former Felicista governor of Oaxaca), Generals Ignacio Bravo and
Juvencio Robles, and former Huerta cabinet members Moheno, Enrique Gorostieta, and David de la
Fuente.281 At the meeting, Moheno gave a “sentimental, patriotic, and eloquent” speech that moved the
nostalgic audience to tears.282 Moheno considered it symbolic that they gathered in San Antonio, “the
piece of land that was once Mexican, where they could, for a moment, shake the hands of compatriots,
of all who were sincerely willing to work for the homeland and bear the fruit of peace and harmony for
[their] children.”283 The assembly agreed to reach out to the revolutionary factions in an effort towards
peace. Gamboa appealed to Villa, Zapata, Carranza, Álvaro Obregón, Felipe Ángeles, Eulalio
Gutiérrez, and José M. Maytorena, in a telegram stating that it was time to end the fratricide and set
aside their “mutual defects.” He added that “our children, all innocent…have a right to inherit an
honorable homeland…let us not leave them a land covered in skeletons and ruins, bathed in blood,
drenched in tears.” Only Villa, Obregón, and Ángeles responded; each denied Gamboa’s request and
blamed the exiles for fostering the civil war with the coup against Madero. The exiles had no one to
blame but themselves for their present situation.284
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Despite the assembly’s efforts, the “reaction” remained divided. Sax and Moheno cited class
differences as a major obstacle for the counter-revolution. In a letter to García Naranjo (who did not
attend the assembly), Moheno bitterly described how some of the participants, including himself, made
financial sacrifices to travel to San Antonio because they genuinely believed in the assembly’s goals. At
the meeting, however, Moheno found “egoists.” Despite the presence of millionaires, he and others
struggling financially “offered five or ten pesos of the miserable [amount of money saved] for the trip”
in order to fund Gamboa’s telegrams. Moheno added that after the assembly, members of the exiled
upper-classes expressed their solidarity with him, but that they could not become politically active for
fear of losing their property in Mexico. He exclaimed that “these rich men…sick from the fear that the
revolution would someday take their haciendas…do they not seem to you [García Naranjo] like
miserable rats grabbed by the tail who cannot even run away for fear of losing their entire tail?...our
selfish rich men and intellectuals are worthy of pity. They hate the revolution because it deprived them
of their comforts,” he continued, but then they acted like cowards unwilling to fight back.285
The internal division within this group weakened the short-lived Peace-Making Assembly. Sax
claimed that the organization was also weakened when U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan
declared Gamboa a “persona non grata” and expelled him from the United States in June 1915. Gamboa
was extremely vague about the assembly and his problems with the U.S. government in his diary,
understanding the danger it posed to write about these issues. He was also cautious when speaking to
the press. For example, as Gamboa arrived in San Antonio for the assembly in February 1915, he was
asked for an interview by a staff member of La Prensa. He hesitated since “feelings were running high”
and the city was full of “aggressive” spies for the revolutionary factions. It was best to keep quiet since
an open mouth “was the way through which fish were killed.”286 Gamboa correctly assessed the
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political climate in San Antonio. The Consuls and other Mexican government officials in the United
States tracked the decisions, movement, and mood among the exile community, which helped the
revolutionary forces to effectively counteract any organized opposition. Also, many of Huerta’s
political enemies took advantage of the opportunity to expose the injustices carried out by the Huerta
regime, either for genuine rectification or economic or political gain.
The information was often convoluted and contradictory. For instance, García Naranjo was
accused of ordering the execution of Mariano Duque, a staff member of Gustavo A. Madero’s
newspaper, El Defensor del Pueblo, during the Decena Trágica. The author asserted that García Naranjo
had escorted soldiers to arrest and execute Duque, which contradicted García Naranjo’s claim that he
was in hiding throughout the Decena Trágica.287 The Mexican government also received a letter stating
that Gamboa and Félix Díaz formed an alliance with Villa and Zapata, which was not true.288 Another
implicated Gamboa, Moheno, and writer José Vasconcelos in supporting Ángeles for the Mexican
presidency, even though Ángeles had dismissed the efforts of the Peace-Making Assembly. Despite the
inaccurate reports, the Carrancista surveillance system was so entrenched in the United States, the
Mexican and U.S. governments foresaw any major threat. In April 1915, the Carranza government
received a letter that accurately described a sense of excitement among the exiles for Huerta’s return to
the United States from Europe.289
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Enrique C. Creel (who lived in exile in Los Angeles) traveled to Spain in February 1915 to
personally invite Huerta to act as the military leader of the counter-revolution. Creel told Huerta that
“his participation was essential for the repatriation of all the Mexicans who helped him during his
regime.”290 The support of the exile community was crucial for Huerta, who was in the process of
negotiating an alliance with Germany. According to García Naranjo, Kaiser Wilhem II’s contact
Captain Franz von Rintelen offered Huerta financial support, hoping that war along the U.S./Mexico
border would divert Wilson’s attention away from the war in Europe. Friedrich Katz supports García
Naranjo’s account, stating that Carranza developed an “anti-German attitude…strengthened when the
conspiracies with Huerta became known, conspiracies whose discovery, according to American reports
was apparently made in part by Carranza’s secret agents.”291
This seemed to be the ideal moment for Huerta’s return to power. He traveled to the United
States in April, with plans to launch a counter-revolution from the state of Chihuahua. In New York
City, he called a meeting with García Naranjo in order to ask for his friend’s support as one of the most
influential exiles. García Naranjo described the meeting in his memoirs, claiming to have denied
Huerta’s request for support. He explained to Huerta that the plan was dangerous, reckless, and an
impossible task. Huerta did not accept this, so García Naranjo attempted to appeal to the general’s
vanity. He told Huerta that he would fail because he did not have the character of a revolutionary
caudillo, who would work through extralegal means to achieve his goals. In García Naranjo’s opinion,
Huerta “did not know how to impose forced loans, emit paper money, give up defenseless populations to
the excesses of the military…conceal abuses brought on by banditry…[nor] tolerate a violation of the
fundamental principles of social order.”292 Huerta would not gain a following similar to that of the
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rebels because he would not sacrifice civilians and the spoils of war the way his adversaries did.
Despite García Naranjo’s pleas, Huerta chose to move forward with his plan to invade Mexico.
Unfortunately for Huerta, by May 1915, the Mexican and U.S. governments were fully updated
on his plans, including his recent alliance with Orozco and an offer from Germany to supply money and
arms.293 Orozco was charged with violating U.S. Neutrality Laws in June and was murdered in his sleep
in August by the Texas Rangers in the deserts of West Texas. The official story was that Orozco and his
men were caught stealing horses, so the Texas Rangers shot them and dragged their corpses across cacti
and other “hostile plants.”294 Huerta was apprehended by U.S. officials outside of El Paso in June 1915
and also charged with violating U.S. Neutrality Laws. His incarceration and death in El Paso shortly
thereafter profoundly changed the counter-revolutionary efforts. Ramírez Rancaño and Henderson note
that before Huerta’s death, the Porfirista exiles were divided between choosing Huerta or Félix Díaz as
the supreme leader of the counter-revolution. In the United States, Díaz counted on the support of
Gamboa and only a few other friends. Most of the Porfirista exiles believed “in the efficient former
dictator rather than in the pusillanimous General Díaz.”295 After Huerta’s death, the Porfiristas “turned
to Díaz as a last resort.”296
According to Henderson, “as long as Huerta lived, he controlled Díaz’s essential core of
supporters, the…[Porfirista] anti-científico faction.”297 After Huerta’s death, Díaz had the opportunity
to spearhead the fight against the revolution. In March 1916, Félix launched a rebellion in Yucatán and
in his wife Isabella’s native state of Veracruz, where he had support among the wealthy landowning
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classes. He pronounced the Plan de Tierra Colorado, a liberal manifesto through which he promised a
restoration of ejidos, land for soldiers who sided with him, but also a respect for private property. The
manifesto also guaranteed freedom of religion.298 Through his manifesto, Díaz upheld the fundamental
facet of Porfirista political identity, the liberal constitution. Like his previous rebellions, the 1916
uprising failed due to lack of widespread support in Mexico and Díaz’s incapacities as a military leader.
Nevertheless, he earned him the reluctant trust of the Porfirista exiles. Henderson argues that this was
due in part to Díaz’s stubbornness and persistence for the Porfirista cause, but also because Díaz
capitalized on his name and gained sympathy after Don Porfirio’s death in July 1915.

Porfirismo after the Deaths of Porfirio Díaz and Victoriano Huerta
Huerta died in January 1916, six months after Porfirio Díaz passed away in Paris at the age of
eighty-four. These men, who both died outside of their homeland, subsequently became martyrs for the
Porfirista cause. Félix Díaz was not the only exile to benefit politically from this; other Porfirista exiles
used media and the images of Porfirio and Huerta to promote their agendas to the broader Mexican
immigrant community. Just as El Imparcial and La Patria constructed Huerta and Félix as counterrevolutionary heroes during the Huerta regime, La Prensa and García Naranjo’s Revista Mexicana took
on the role of crafting the posthumous images of Porfirio and Huerta for public consumption. Revista
Mexicana, in particular, attempted to promote a collective sense of nostalgia for the Porfiriato,
reminding its audience that they lived in peace under Díaz, and that Huerta had attempted to restore
order. These newspapers helped the Porfirista exiles to reaffirm their Porfirismo; they also attempted to
unite exiles from different factions under the banner of nationalism, while giving them a common sense
of purpose after the failure of the Peace-Making Assembly.
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By early 1915, Lozano’s La Prensa was the largest-selling Spanish-language newspaper in the
United States, and the most important Porfirista medium.299 Although it claimed to be politically
independent, its pro-Díaz stance was evident. The newspaper published articles celebrating important
milestones in Díaz’s military career, including the anniversaries of the battles against French forces on
May 5, 1862, and April 2, 1867. Cinco de Mayo was an important celebration of Mexican culture and
identity in San Antonio’s barrio, and La Prensa described the annual festivities. The newspaper also
described Díaz’s sadness resulting from his exile and nostalgia for his Mexico.300 The general died on
July 2, 1915. The following day, La Prensa published a tribute to “the Man of Mexico,” in which an
anonymous Porfirista accused the revolutionaries of being traitors and compared them to dogs for
overthrowing Díaz.301
Because La Prensa attempted to maintain a semblance of impartiality, it did not offer extensive
commentary on Díaz’s death or the reactions of La Prensa’s staff or audience. This void was filled by
García Naranjo, who developed a magazine in San Antonio through which he attempted to speak for and
on behalf of the Porfiristas. In August 1915, García Naranjo launched the first issue of Revista
Mexicana, a thirty-six page weekly magazine that catered to the Mexican immigrant community. This
first issue was dedicated to Díaz. The last known photograph of the dictator graced the cover, and the
magazine included tributes to Don Porfirio and his wife Doña Carmen. A piece entitled “Final
photograph of General Porfirio Díaz” described this image as the most accurate illustration “of the
bitterness of his exile.” The author stated that Díaz no longer “had the imposing expression of a ruler
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but rather the look of anguish and suffering.” The dictator, “once sober and calm,” seemed melancholic
“with the same offended dignity of the last months of Marie Antoinette.” His eyes, once “dominating,”
now “appeared tired, dejected, with a vehement desire to close forever.” The author lamented the final
plight of the dictator, who “dedicated his entire existence to the Homeland” only to be repaid with exile
and abandonment by the millions of compatriots who enjoyed the peace of the Porfiriato. Adding insult
to injury, Díaz did not receive a proper military salute at his funeral because the French government
needed all of its troops to guard its national borders.302
Díaz’s death was not unexpected, but the circumstances were certainly ironic. The stoic man
who rose to prominence based on his own skill and strength of character, depending only upon himself,
was deaf and partially blind at the end of his life. When Díaz was born in 1830, Mexico was entrenched
in constant civil war and the threat of foreign intervention—the same conditions the nation faced in
1915. Even in exile, Díaz did not escape chaos, as Europe, the center of civilization, ravaged itself in an
escalating global conflict. Díaz’s insistence on remaining in power and upholding científico rule
demonstrated an illusion of infallibility on the dictator’s part. In 1910, the Díaz administration
congratulated itself for fostering modernity, peace, economic progress, and scientific advancements that
impressed Western Europe and the United States. Five years later, Díaz and almost all of the científicos
were dead and vilified by the revolutionary regimes, their achievements marred by their ultimate failure
to put a political system in place to prevent war. Díaz’s death as an old, defeated man, away from the
country he served (and that turned its back on him) would serve as a metaphor for the Porfirista
experience as of 1915.
As it glorified Díaz, Revista Mexicana’s premier issue called for unity among the Mexican
immigrant population based on their common sense of nationalism. García Naranjo included “Pro
Patria,” a piece he wrote honoring Mexico on the one-year anniversary of his exile. He expressed that
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“one sad year of wandering exile has nobly convinced [us] that Mexicans cannot live except for
Mexico…Our nationality forms part of our being and there is no…force capable of tearing out our
thoughts of the homeland…We are Mexicans.” The editor explained that he included the photo of Díaz
on the cover so that readers could “contemplate” Mexico’s glorious history and one of the nation’s
greatest heroes.303 The tribute to Díaz incorporated nostalgia, patriotism, and nationalism, and García
Naranjo positioned Díaz as a symbol of these three elements with great success. The first edition of
Revista Mexicana circulated in the Texas cities of San Antonio, Laredo, Brownsville, and El Paso, as
well as Los Angeles, and the 3,000 copies sold out within a few hours.304 In fact, on October 17, 1915,
the magazine reprinted the photo of Díaz due to popular demand, and in Revista Mexicana’s five years
in circulation, this was the image that most frequently graced the cover.
For the Porfirista exiles, Díaz had become a cultural marker along with the Virgin of Guadalupe,
Benito Juárez, and the heroes of the independence movement from Spain. After Díaz’s death, the exiles
used his image to remind Mexicans of the prosperous, peaceful times they enjoyed before the revolution.
However, it is important to note that Revista Mexicana referred to Díaz as “General,” not “President,”
emphasizing his military service (perhaps to avoid alienating readers who did not support Díaz’s
policies). Díaz’s exemplary military career demonstrated his masculinity, patriotism, courage, and
honor, which were considered the ideal qualities of a Mexican man.305 The veneration of Díaz
contradicts the notion that Mexicans overwhelmingly perceived him as a villain in 1915.
It also sheds light on the impact of exile on the creation of Mexican myths and heroes. When El
Imparcial and La Patria constructed counter-revolutionary heroes, they did so to affirm their patriotism
and justify their opposition to the revolution. Porfirista exiles cast Díaz and Huerta as heroes in order to
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express both patriotism and nationalism. Porfiristas were now politically stateless, since they were
enemies of both the U.S. and Mexican governments. Their rights as citizens ended with their expulsion
from Mexico and subsequent blacklisting under the Law of 1862. Luis Roniger and Pablo Yankelevich
argue that
exile implies a permanent tension between the principle of belonging to a nation and the
principle of citizenship. Both principles are mixed within the framework of the nationstate…but, once a person is exiled, in other words, expelled from the national territory…a
rupture is produced between the principle of citizenship sustained by the State and the national
project that the exiles imagine being able to construct.306
The authors suggest that in spite of this disconnect, exile provides the opportunity to redefine and
reaffirm nationalism, especially since the exiles now share a common experience. The Porfiristas and
other political exiles unsuccessfully attempted this through the Peace-Making Assembly. García
Naranjo perceived the moment of Díaz’s death as another opportunity to unite his compatriots through
nationalism. He turned the reason for their banishment into a source of pride and used Revista Mexicana
to proclaim that despite efforts from the U.S. and Mexican government to silence the exiles, they were
Mexican and would continue to act in their nation’s best interests.
Nationalism was not the only motivating factor in reclaiming the heroic image of Díaz. As
Gabriela Cano points out in her discussion of gender in early twentieth-century Mexico, patriotism and
masculinity were directly linked in Mexican society. Men defended the home, their families, and the
nation. By characterizing the exiles as cowards and traitors, Carranza carried out a political castration
through which he emasculated his enemies by denying their patriotism. During the Porfiriato, Díaz
represented the ideal Mexican man. After his death, supporters emphasized his masculine qualities,
especially his military service. Thus, honoring Díaz and his memory became an act of patriotism which
legitimized Porfirista notions of masculinity. It also allowed the exiles to use the same gendered
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rhetoric to critique the ‘savage’ revolutionaries who did not display the same composure, elegance,
strength of character, and courage as their hero.
La Prensa and Revista Mexicana specifically targeted Carranza, Villa, and Zapata. For example,
in an article in La Prensa entitled “Carrancista Zapata,” the author called Zapata “Don Chancla”
(chancla is a popular term for an old shoe). The article also mockingly described him as “the illustrious
Zapata, the brave Zapata…[and] the unbeatable Zapata,” who never lost because he often switched
alliances depending on who was in power.307 Revista Mexicana often described Villa as a bandit, and it
also characterized him as “vulgar, entirely vulgar,” with a propensity for “pillage,
concubinage…treachery, and crime.”308 The magazine also insulted Carranza by continuously calling
him and his supporters traitors. One piece compared the Carrancistas to Judas and Pontius Pilate,
willing to sell and then kill Christ. The author added that the Carrancistas acted like “hyenas,” and they
were in no way comparable to Díaz, General Ignacio Zaragoza, and other patriots who demonstrated
“valor” and “lack of fear” in their efforts against Mexico’s enemies.309
The two publications also cast Huerta as a patriot. In early 1913 La Prensa openly supported
Huerta during his struggles with the Wilson administration. One article in La Prensa described Huerta
as honorable and a man of his word, and the article criticized the Carrancista press for questioning
Huerta’s honor, since Carranza and his supporters had none.310 However, after Huerta dissolved
congress in October 1913, La Prensa turned against him and expressed disgust at the political events in
Mexico. As Huerta declared himself dictator, La Prensa wondered if Mexico was a lost cause, and if
the nation “was condemned to disappear” because of the matricidal crimes committed against it (though
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La Prensa did not express the same indignation after the coup against Madero). Perhaps the newspaper
criticized Huerta at this point because of his actions against the legislature, demonstrating that his
regime would not even attempt to function under the façade of a democratic system. This article also
implicated the United States in Mexico’s problems and stated that the revolution would not save
Mexico; on the contrary, revolutionary leaders would place the nation’s fate in the hands of its greatest
enemy. The author lamented that the world “laughed at their misfortunes,” and that the Huerta regime
would become “one of those bloody dictatorships that arrived out of a damned necessity after a period of
anarchy.”311
Despite its critique of the Huerta administration, La Prensa discussed what it perceived to be a
plot between the United States, Carranza, and other revolutionary forces to bring further destruction to
Mexico following the occupation of Veracruz in 1914. The newspaper blamed Mexico’s problems, an
“inheritance of tears,” on the revolution, and it predicted that Carranza would attempt to take power with
help from the Wilson government.312 In various articles, Lozano (using the pseudonym “Pipo”)
recognized Huerta’s stubbornness and defiance toward Wilson as honorable traits. Pipo believed that
Huerta would never resign, and instead would tell Wilson that “they would both go to hell before he
resigned.”313 La Prensa now emphasized Huerta’s more likeable traits, such as his “fervent”
Catholicism and pilgrimages to the Basilica of Guadalupe, in contrast with the anti-clericalism of the
revolutionaries.314 Ultimately, La Prensa again sided with Huerta because he stood up to the United
States.
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In mid-1915, La Prensa published an article in which Huerta explained his actions and his belief
that he had been a victim of conspiracies by his enemies. The general also stated that the public had
“called him everything. [He was] for many a monster, extraordinarily evil…but nobody could take
away [his] nationalism, a feeling [he] upheld with pride.”315 Revista Mexicana also published a letter
written by Huerta during his imprisonment in El Paso. The general stated that life’s great
“difficulties…pain…[and] afflictions [were] predestined by the Almighty only for those who could
withstand them.” Huerta attested to this, stating that his own suffering did not “perturb [his] spirit.”316
When Huerta wrote this document his health was rapidly deteriorating, and he positioned himself as a
martyr by describing how he courageously dealt with his struggles (resulting from providence and not
his own errors).
These articles provided a space for Huerta to present himself to the public as a patriot who had
attempted to act in Mexico’s best interests. García Naranjo took this a step further by memorializing
Huerta as a Mexican hero after his death on January 13, 1916. In Revista Mexicana, the editor wrote a
tribute in which he clearly expressed grief over the loss of his friend. He stated that “the most
extraordinary man produced by Mexico in the last years [had] just descended into his tomb…He was a
rebel, an indomitable spirit…General Huerta believed in the Homeland and in his destiny…He
dreamed—because there was a romantic hidden behind his bronze mask—that under his iron rule
Mexico would be liberated from the North American influence.” García Naranjo described Huerta’s
bravery in accepting the constant challenges from the Wilson administration. He also blamed the
revolutionary forces for the dictator’s downfall, using a classical analogy and comparing Huerta to
Julius Caesar, who was killed by his compatriot Brutus. García Naranjo expanded this metaphor, stating
that Huerta did not fit in “the glorious caste of triumphant Caesars.” Instead, he belonged with
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Cuauhtémoc and other heroes who “in the midst of their defeat [had] an attitude of sublime pride, a
gesture of imperturbable greatness that they [flung] as a punishment against the insolent [faces] of the
victors.” Huerta exhibited this gesture during his imprisonment in Fort Bliss in El Paso. He was
isolated, abandoned, and without access to troops or arms. Yet he “continued to strike fear in all of the
United States. The entire nation was uneasy because Huerta spoke, because he moved, because he
existed.” García Naranjo then proclaimed that Huerta had such a significant impact on Mexico that the
nation would disappear before Mexicans forgot him.317
La Prensa and Revista Mexicana constructed Díaz and Huerta as martyrs who were unjustly
separated from the homeland by revolutionary forces that launched Mexico into a state of violence and
chaos. These publications also used nostalgia to remind readers of the time of peace before the
revolution. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana relied on the rhetoric of patriotism and masculinity in their
critiques of the revolution and the Wilson administration, but more importantly, they attempted to
convince readers that Díaz and Huerta were not the villains that the revolution characterized them to be.

The Rejection of the Constitution on 1917
The exiles may have had ideological, class, and political differences that prevented them from
uniting in 1915, but they finally came together in late 1916, when Carranza called a meeting to discuss
the drafting of a new constitution. This act shook the core of Porfirismo more than any other during the
revolution, and Revista Mexicana, played an important role in the fight against the new constitution.
The ratification of a new constitution also angered exiles from other factions, since it directly threatened
the Mexico constructed by Juárez and the liberals of La Reforma. The exiles who united in protest
against the Constitution of 1917 were self-proclaimed liberals, fighting what they perceived as an illegal
and treacherous political move against the political system established in 1857. The exiles also
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understood that a new constitution would diminish their political relevancy and position the revolution
as the dominant hegemonic force in Mexico.
When Porfirio Díaz and the científicos fled Mexico in 1911, the dictatorship became
characterized as the “old regime,” headed by “dinosaurs” that represented political backwardness and an
obstacle to the authentic liberalism and democracy espoused by Benito Juárez. The Mexican Revolution
began with the goal of restoring the principles of the Constitution of 1857. Immediately after the coup
against Madero in February 1913, Carranza and his associates signed the Plan de Guadalupe, which
declared the Huerta regime illegitimate, called for presidential elections, and named Carranza the First
Chief of the Constitutionalist Army. When Carranza entered Mexico City in August 1914, he did not
organize elections as the manifesto required. Instead, he established a “Preconstitutional” government
in 1915. García Naranjo wrote a critique of the concept of preconstitutionalism in late 1915. According
to García Naranjo, Carranza “worked outside of the Law” since the term “preconstitution” implied “that
the regime had nothing to do with the Constitution.”318 He added that this was a “mask through with
Carranza hid his impotence.” It was a diversion to postpone a reorganization of the government,
because the First Chief knew that once he allowed that, Obregón, a more popular candidate, would have
a legitimate chance at power.319 According to García Naranjo, U.S. recognition and Obregón’s victory
against Villa’s Northern Division removed all obstacles against the Carranza government. Peace had
not fully been restored, but there was no need to continue suspending the rule of law through
preconstitutionalism.
The supporters of the Constitution of 1857 considered it a source of pride and national identity.
It represented modernity and progress, and it set the foundation for Mexico to become a secular nation
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with a legal system fashioned after Western democracies.320 More importantly, it had provided the
framework for Juárez and his peers to establish a stable political system, a project that Porfiristas
believed was fulfilled by Díaz. According to García Naranjo, Preconstitutionalism did the opposite, as it
allowed Carranza to govern “as a constitutionalist with no constitution.” He added that Carranza’s
actions conflicted with the ideals set forth by the revolutionaries of 1910, including Madero and the
Flores Magón brothers, who argued that Mexico’s problems resulted from a lax adherence to
constitutional principles. Also, Article 128 of the Constitution of 1857 stated that establishing a
government outside constitutional parameters was illegal and punishable as “high treason.”321 Carranza
threatened his enemies by implementing the Law of 1862, but ignored Juarista laws when they did not
suit his needs.
In September 1916, Carranza convened the constituyente, a constitutional convention, which met
in Santiago de Querétaro from December 1, 1916 to January 31, 1917. The initial purpose was to amend
and reform the Constitution of 1857. Jürgen Buchenau argues that Carranza presented a “bland draft” to
the convention, since he believed that “social reform should be left to Congress.” Minister of War
Álvaro Obregón believed that social reform needed to be incorporated within the new constitution. The
general was not a delegate at the convention, but he was the most popular leader at the meeting. He
worked as an unofficial negotiator between the various factions present at the convention in order to
incorporate the demands of the labor and agrarian sectors.322 On February 5, the delegates ratified the
Constitution of 1917, exactly sixty years after its predecessor. It was celebrated as a progressive,
nationalistic document that finally put in place the ideals of the revolution. Knight describes the
constitution as “one of the most radical of its time,” particularly because of articles 27 and 123. Article
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27 stated that subsoil rights belonged to the nation, which qualified the previously sacred nature of
private property. Article 123 offered rights to the working class, including an eight-hour work week and
the right to strike, a significant victory for laborers who constantly fought against favoritism for foreign
employees and unfair wages during the Porfiriato.
Ramírez Rancaño argues that in reality the new constitution was not much different from the
1857 version, except for articles 27 and 123. As Knight also points out, both constitutions included “a
federal system, separation of powers, no re-election, provision for individual rights, [and] restrictions on
the Church.”323 Regardless of the similarities between the two documents, the Constitution of 1917
represented a symbolic rejection of the liberal plan for Mexico from sixty years before. In Revista
Mexicana, García Naranjo called the ratification “the most horrendous act of sacrilege that Mexico had
ever witnessed,” and likened it to replacing the national anthem with the plebian tune “La
Cucaracha.”324 He also lashed out against Carranza for his hypocrisy, stating that the First Chief wanted
to replace the constitution because it resulted in numerous dictatorships, despite the fact that he had been
appointed senator by Porfirio Díaz in 1904.
The Porfirista exiles and a number of their colleagues from the Madero administration found
common ground in their disapproval of the new constitution, and they immediately began expressing
their disgust at the constitutional convention. Calero wrote a petition which formally protested the newly
ratified document. Revista Mexicana published the protest on March 18, 1917, and García Naranjo
frequently updated readers about the reactions of the exile community to the protest and the new
constitution. The protest stated that the authors of the 1857 code personified “the highest concepts that a
conscientious people” could uphold: “civil liberty, political liberty, institutions, [and] Patria!” More
importantly, the Constitution of 1857 established a legitimate Mexican nation with a stable political
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foundation. The protestors argued that the instability of the early nineteenth century resulted from a
disregard for the Constitution of 1824, leaders who sought personal power instead of the good of the
nation, and foreign powers who did not take Mexican sovereignty seriously. Although the liberals of the
1850s and 1860s were imperfect and at times violated constitutional principles, they set goals to move
the nation towards democracy and progress. The Constitution of 1857 “saved the republic during its
struggle against the [Hapsburg] monarchy…and the foreign invader.” Sixty years after its ratification, it
continued to serve as the primary outline of Mexican ideals and a dominant symbol of Mexican national
identity. Calero emphasized the importance of the constitution in maintaining national unity. He wrote
that the exiles who protested the Constitution of 1917 were not united under a single political faction.
On the contrary, they were often divided by “deep” ideological differences, but they “were all liberals,
determined to prevent the death of the glorious work” of La Reforma.
Calero and the other opponents of the new constitution (many of them lawyers) pointed out the
illegality of the Carranza regime and the constitutional convention. Legally, the Constitution of 1857
formed the basis of the nation and its institutions, and Mexico achieved peace because the public
accepted to live under this law. Anyone who acted outside of the law, who disrupted social and political
order, could be classified as a rebel and a traitor. Calero condemned Carranza and his associates as
“corrupt” participants in the “grotesque [and] farsical” constitutional congress. He also stated that
Mexican population “would never accept that the symbolic and sacred Code that saved the republic
against the [French] invader be substituted by a fraudulent code, formed by men devoid of
patriotism.”325 Calero, a former Maderista, argued that the revolutionaries before Carranza sought to
work within the parameters of the law, and Díaz was overthrown because he did not respect the
constitution. Even Huerta upheld the Constitution of 1857, if only rhetorically. Carranza, on the other
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hand, nullified the law and replaced it. From the legal standpoint presented by the protestors, Carranza
was the real usurper, not Huerta.
This argument may have helped Porfiristas to reconcile some of the ideological differences they
had with the other exiles. For example, García Naranjo completely opposed the revolution, but he
agreed that Díaz had been in power for too long, which led to his downfall. He and other urbanprofessional Porfiristas criticized the científicos precisely because of their reluctance to step down from
their positions of power. Porfiristas and other exiles may have disagreed on the attributes and flaws of
Díaz and Madero, but they agreed that the Constitution of 1857 gave Mexico its legitimate political
foundation.
The protesters staged a year-long effort against the Constitution of 1917, beginning with the
publication of Calero’s petition. This document was signed by exiles from various factions, including
members of the Madero and Huerta cabinets, former governors who had aligned with Huerta, and other
Porfiristas such as Leonides González, La Prensa’s business manager.326 Aureliano Blanquet, Pedro del
Villar (Félix Díaz’s official representative), and General Luis Fuentes (Huerta’s son-in-law) also asked
to be included. Revista Mexicana encouraged participation from its readers, and the magazine included
a form which readers were to sign and return to the magazine’s office in order to have their name
included on the petition written by Calero.327
Moheno also criticized the new constitution. He wrote a series of articles in which he questioned
the new amendment that prohibited clergy from teaching at any school, arguing that it went against
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common sense. Catholic priests and missionaries had always been an important element of public
instruction in Mexico. The federal budget could not effectively cover the costs of funding educators for
the entire nation, which meant that removing clergy would drastically reduce the number of teachers and
severely undermine the Mexican education system. Moheno wrote that he expected nothing more from
the constitutional congress, full of men “lacking real culture and free of any spiritual integrity, but full of
haughty self-importance.”328
Furthermore, Moheno attacked the censorship of the press in Mexico by the Carranza regime,
which went against the new constitution’s provisions for freedom of the press. On April 10, 1917, the
government issued a decree prohibiting the publication of any slander, libel or “false or altered
information.” Breaking this law could result “in a fine of fifty to five-hundred pesos, or one to eleven
months in prison.” Moheno sarcastically responded to this rule by exclaiming that “in Mexico there is
complete freedom of the press…for everyone who publishes whatever pleases the government.
Admirable!”329 The federal government strictly censored Mexican media and prohibited anti-Carranza
U.S. newspapers such as La Prensa and Revista Mexicana from circulating in Mexico, though
smugglers still managed to move the newspapers across the U.S./Mexico border.
The Catholic Church also protested the Constitution of 1917 because of its anti-clerical reforms.
The exiled members of the clergy were spread out across Havana, Chicago, San Antonio, and Los
Angeles, and the church leadership developed and signed its own petition.330 Supporters included:
Archbishops José Mora y del Río, Leopoldo Ruiz, Martín Tritschler, Francisco Mendoza y Herrera, and
Francisco Plancarte, and Bishops Ignacio Valdespino, Francisco Uranga Sáenz, Jesús María Echavarría
y Aguirre, Juan Herrera y Piña, Miguel de la Mora, Vicente Castellanos, and Maximino Ruiz y Flores.
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They protested Article 3, which kept clergy from public instruction, Article 24, which banned public
religious displays, Article 27, which prohibited the Church from acquiring property, and Article 130,
which among other things, outlawed any political parties affiliated with any religious institution (such as
the Catholic Party).331
The Porfiristas generally took the same conciliatory approach to church/state relations as Díaz
had. Those who supported Calero’s petition criticized the Church for reigniting the old conflict between
conservatives and liberals instead of working with the broader exile community. In their protest, the
bishops stated that they would not question the legitimacy of the Constitution of 1917 because “their
purpose was not to be political;” they only wanted to “defend…religious liberty.”332 Revista Mexicana
pointed out that the bishops were, in fact, being political in their own media, Revista Católica (El Paso)
and Ecos de la Catedral (San Antonio). Each journal called the liberal exiles hypocrites for wanting the
clergy to act politically, when they had been forced “to live a parasitic life in the corners of sacristies”
by liberal politicians. The clergy also stated that liberalism was fundamentally anti-clerical; why would
they help “the children of those liberals who half a decade ago burned churches and convents, stole
Church property, [and] executed priests?” The Diocese of San Antonio also complained because the
liberals pressured the Church to become involved in the political conflict. García Naranjo stated that
this was not true, and that the liberals only criticized the bishops for not acting in solidarity with the rest
of the exiles. He added that the selfishness of the Church, “the lack of a spirit of sacrifice [and its]
traditional egoism,” caused its downfall, not liberal policy.333
The conflict between the Church and the Porfiristas was further complicated by the religious
leanings of the exiles themselves. For example, García Naranjo and Gamboa were practicing Catholics.
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They respected the memory and legacy of secular liberals such as Juárez, but these men also
demonstrated religious fervor; for them, liberalism and Catholicism did not conflict. These men were
products of the Porfiriato, negotiators who believed that Dáz’s conciliatory policies toward the church
had been ideal practice. Leaning too much in one direction in favor of or against religion resulted in
chaos and civil war. When Revista Católica and Ecos de Catedral attacked Revista Mexicana, an
unnamed author came to García Naranjo’s defense. This person wrote a piece for Revista Mexicana
entitled “Conservative Intelligentsia,” which contained a list of conservative Catholics who were given
important posts by García Naranjo during his tenure as Minister of Public Instruction.334 This article
also agreed with García Naranjo’s sentiments that if the Church faced struggles and problems, it only
had itself to blame. García Naranjo expressed his gratitude for the support he received (though he did
not specifically name anyone), and took another opportunity to denounce the Catholics “who organized
a crusade” against him and his colleagues. He wondered why the Church had not openly spoken out
against liberalism in the previous years of exile, and why so many Catholics in Mexico now supported
the anti-clerical Carranza after having been granted legal and economic benefits by Díaz under the
Constitution of 1857. According to García Naranjo, Catholic liberals were not anti-clerical; they wanted
“virtuous Clergy” and “honor and prestige in all institutions.”335
The protests against the Constitution of 1917 brought together Mexicans of various political and
religious factions in a debate about the ideological foundations of Mexico. These disputes showed that
despite the efforts of Juárez, Díaz, and other nineteenth-century liberals, Mexicans remained deeply
divided about how to structure and rule Mexico. For Calero, García Naranjo, and other self-proclaimed
liberals, there was no question that it should be done within the framework of the Constitution of 1857.
334 Ibid., “Intelectualidad Conservadora,” Sep. 8, 1918. García Naranjo named Bishop Valverde Téllez and Father Mariano
Cuevas to the National Academy of History. He also named conservative Francisco Pascual García Secretary of the Superior
Council for Public Education, and he offered the position of Director of the School of Medicine to conservative Dr. Fernando
Zárraga after conservative Dr. Urrutia resigned.
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This document represented the foundation of Mexican nationalism, a symbol of Mexico’s entry into the
civilized world. These exiles would continue their protests and counter-revolutionary efforts against the
Carranza regime, but their political unity would not last more than a year. As their resources became
exhausted, the exiles fought an increasingly uphill battle until the revolution decisively triumphed in
1920.

The Politics of Exile, 1917-1920
The exiles took advantage of the momentum of the 1917 protests to develop counterrevolutionary coalitions, and Félix Díaz and Blanquet formed an alliance for military action in
Mexico.336 However, they faced similar problems as they had in 1914 and 1915. The Mexican
government now employed Secret Service agents in the United States along the U.S./Mexico border, at
the request of the Mexican Consuls.337 The Carranza government was especially careful to trace
political activity in San Antonio, though Secret Service Agents also worked in cities including Los
Angeles and El Paso. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Justice kept surveillance on exile activities.338
Despite the obstacles, the exiles remained diligent in their efforts against the Carranza government.
A number of Porfiristas continued to support Díaz, who had become a symbolic leader of the
protest against the Constitution of 1917 because his father, Félix Díaz, Sr., had helped frame the
Constitution of 1857. Henderson argues that men including Gamboa and Rodolfo Reyes were among
the “converts” who had lost faith in Díaz but “regained their enthusiasm” for him in 1917.339 However,
Henderson does not take into account the friendships between Díaz and these men from decades before.
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Gamboa expressed support for Díaz throughout his memoirs (written as the events took place),
particularly after the Decena Trágica, and Reyes remained friends with Díaz even after the fall of the
Huerta regime.340
Díaz’s supporters helped him in various ways in strategic locations, including New Orleans (his
home base), New York, and Guatemala, where he had the backing of the Manuel Estrada Cabrera
dictatorship.341 Pedro del Villar lived in New York City, and was in charge of the finances of the
Felicista movement.342 The Felicistas attempted to raise funds through alliances with American
businessmen, but their efforts backfired. Cecilio Ocón, one of the main conspirators in the cuartelazo of
1913, convinced a group of Chicago bankers to exchange $600,000 U.S. dollars for $2 million in
worthless Felicista bonds, but the U.S. State Department quickly caught on to Ocón’s schemes.343
Moreover, the Felicistas were betrayed by a New Orleans businessman Charles E. Jones. According to
Michael M. Smith, “Jones had played a dangerous and still largely undetermined role in Mexican and
Central American revolutionary affairs.”344 Jones worked in arms trafficking and served as an agent for
the U.S. Department of Justice as a spy against Díaz and Villa. He infiltrated the Felicista movement by
1917, frequently corresponding with Del Villar, Blanquet, and the Díaz family to discuss personal,
political, and financial information.345 In March 1918, Jones offered to sell all of the information he
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gathered to the Mexican Consul in New Orleans, but opted instead to disclose everything to a Senate
Committee led by Albert B. Fall in 1920.346
Despite these setbacks, Díaz and his allies continued their efforts. The Carranza government
believed to have evidence that Ocón communicated with Francisco Carvajal (in New Orleans) and his
former Minister of Foreign Relations and of the Interior José María Luján (in El Paso), Creel and his
brother-in-law Alberto Terrazas (in Los Angeles), and Urrutia, Lozano, and the Vázquez Gómez
brothers (in San Antonio).347 García Naranjo used Revista Mexicana to promote the Felicista cause, and
Díaz frequently appeared on the magazine’s cover. The editor also published pro-Díaz articles,
including one written by Dr. Ignacio Alcocer entitled “Why I am a Felicista.” The author applauded the
general for his consistency in defending liberalism and religious freedom since the onset of the
revolution.348 Revista Mexicana also published “To My Friends in Chiapas,” in which Querido Moheno
(a former anti-Felicista) asked his compatriots to support Díaz.349
However, not all Porfirista exiles supported Díaz. In September 1917, García Naranjo wrote a
letter to Francisco León de la Barra (who lived in Paris) expressing his belief in the decline of
Carrancismo, especially after the ratification of the new constitution.350 However, in early 1918, García
Naranjo’s tone had changed. He expressed his disappointment at the ineffectiveness of the protests
against the Carranza regime, stating that “many times [the exiles] attempted to make their voice heard”
though no one bothered to listen. He asked De la Barra to act as the “moral ambassador” of the exile
community, since he was respected internationally, and García Naranjo gathered letters of support from
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exiles in cities including New York, New Orleans, Laredo, Brownsville, and El Paso.351 De la Barra
used his legal training to discuss the problems in Mexico on an international level, and he declined
offers from the exiles to join any specific political faction because he believed it would hurt his
credibility.352 In early 1919, he met with President Wilson, U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, and
Wilson’s advisor “Colonel” Edward M. House.353 De la Barra also formed part of the Committee for
International Law at the end of World War I, and he took part in the peace negotiations at Versailles,
unlike Alberto Pani, the representative from the Carranza government. As Henderson points out, to the
chagrin of the Carranza administration, a former member of Porfirio Díaz’s administration became the
accepted representative of Mexico in international relations.354
De la Barra represented a sector of the Porfirista exiles that chose to remain neutral to the
factionalism within the counter-revolutionary movement. Henderson suggests that this was a result of
the lack of confidence in Díaz’s political and military leadership, but it also reflects the influence of
geography and class on the exile community. The members of the Porfirista diaspora faced certain
obstacles and advantages specific to their location. The first wave of exiles, the científicos and
aristocrats who left with Porfirio Díaz, settled in Europe and detached from the chaos in Mexico. The
exiles that moved to Europe during the second wave of the diaspora also distanced themselves from
Mexican politics. De la Barra and Reyes, for example, articulated their support for the counterrevolution, but did not directly take part in it. Instead, they focused on French and Spanish politics,
respectively. They now had jobs in Europe and they were supporting their families far from the
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homeland. Reyes even expressed his excitement about returning to the country he considered to be his
motherland, and when his fourth son was born in Madrid, Reyes was happy to say that he was the father
of a Spaniard.355
The exiles in Havana criticized and conspired against the Carranza regime, but they did not
have direct access to Mexico the way their counterparts in the United States did. Havana was also a less
volatile location, where Mexican residents did not have to deal with the violence and racism prevalent
along the U.S./Mexico border. Those who chose to live in the southwestern United States faced a
greater amount of uncertainty and surveillance. It would have been difficult to live in a city such as San
Antonio or El Paso and remain neutral to political events. On the other hand, proximity to Mexico
allowed these exiles to retain cultural unity both among themselves and with the general immigrant
population.
As the decade came to an end, Porfiristas in the United States continued the political struggle
against Carranza, despite the mounting obstacles. Although they united with exiles from various
political factions in protest against the Constitution of 1917, by late 1918, the exiles developed
organizations that again marked their political divisions. The Alianza Liberal Mexicana (Mexican
Liberal Alliance) formed in New York on November 7, 1918, with the goal of uniting the “distinct
liberal factions” for the purpose of implementing the “ideals of redemption” of the revolution of 1910.
The Liberal Alliance stated that it was not a “militant political party,” and that it wanted to secure
individual rights and work for labor and agricultural unions. However, the by-laws stated that the
alliance promoted “tolerance of all opinions,” but expressly prohibited the membership of anyone
affiliated with the Huerta regime.356
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The Liberal Alliance was in fact a largely Villista organization that included Felipe Ángeles and
Miguel Díaz Lombardo (“Villa’s highest civilian official”).357 Not all members were Villistas, though.
Calero participated because he shared the view that “the constitution of 1917…was undemocratic, and
that Mexico should return to the liberal constitution of 1857.”358 Vasconcelos and Jesús Flores Magón
were also reported members.359 Ángeles presented the Liberal Alliance’s manifesto to Villa in an effort
to convince him to adopt it as his official plan. According to Friedrich Katz, “Villa was quite willing to
accommodate his old comrade in political terms. Even before Angeles joined him, he had agreed to
accept a [similar] program.” However, this did not make much of a difference among Villa’s followers
in Mexico. Katz argues that by 1918, the dynamic of the revolution had changed, and “the time when a
manifesto could mobilize the whole people, as Madero’s Plan of San Luis Potosí had done in 1910 or
Zapata’s Plan of Ayala had done in 1911, had long passed. Plans and manifestos were a dime a dozen in
revolutionary Mexico,” and had little relationship to military power.360
In response to the Liberal Alliance, the Porfiristas formed the short-lived Asociación Unionista
Mexicana (Mexican Unification Association) in January 1919, under the motto “Unity and Constitution
of 57.” According to Carrancista reports, the organization was headquartered in El Paso. The
organization’s members, however, were spread across the United States and Havana. They included:
former members of the Huerta cabinet such as Blanquet, Vera Estañol, Gorostieta, Moheno, Olaguíbel,
García Naranjo, and other distinguished exiles such as José Mondragón, Luis Reyes Spíndola, De la
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Fuente, Elguero, and González. Calero and Jesús Flores Magón also participated, and the association
named De la Barra an honorary member in September.361
The Carrancista surveillance carefully monitored the Liberal Alliance and the Unionist
Association, and the government was pleased with the growing division among the exiles. In February
1919, Carlos Contreras reported to the Mexican Consul in El Paso that Vera Estañol formed his own
group, the Alianza Nacionalista (Nationalist Alliance), in Los Angeles, writing that he creators of the
first two organizations disapproved, believing that the new alliance “completely vulgarized the principle
of ‘union.”362 A few days after Conteras’s report, however, Revista Mexicana published the Nationalist
Alliance’s manifesto, and the magazine actually applauded this group for uniting liberals in California.
The staff of Revista Mexicana did not criticize Vera Estañol or the other founders; on the contrary, the
magazine expressed solidarity between the Committee for National Unity, which had recently formed in
San Antonio, the Unionist Association in El Paso, and the Nationalist Alliance in Los Angeles. García
Naranjo even traveled to El Paso to speak on this topic to his compatriots there. However, Revista
Mexicana did question why the Nationalist Alliance wanted to work with the Liberal Alliance, since the
latter did not collectively seek the restoration of the Constitution of 1857. 363 Meanwhile, Contreras’s
report likely heightened Carrancista paranoia, and it demonstrated the potential unreliability of the
surveillance.
Despite their efforts, these groups faced a terrible setback in April 1919 when Blanquet was
killed in a Felicista revolt in Veracruz. Henderson suggests that Felicismo began to decline in 1918 after
Manuel Peláez, Díaz’s most important financier, a rebel who controlled the oil fields in Tampico,
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abandoned the cause.364 Nevertheless, Blanquet and Díaz conspired and decided to launch an offensive
in Veracruz in early 1919. Ramírez Rancaño argues that Blanquet used this opportunity to seek revenge
against Carranza. As Huerta’s running mate in the October 1913 elections, “Blanquet believed he was
the vice-president of the republic.” When he was forced to resign from the Ministry of War (and the
unofficial vicepresidency), he left Mexico “with hurt pride.”365 By 1919, Blanquet retained the respect
of the Porfirista exiles, but he was now a sixty-eight year old man in failing health. Even if Blanquet
had the strength to effectively carry out a revolt, U.S. and Mexican authorities were fully aware of his
movements across the United States and into Mexico, as well as his plans to meet Díaz in March.366 In
Veracruz, General Guadalupe Sánchez surprised Blanquet, General Pedro Gabay, and their men, and
Blanquet was killed on April 7, 1919.
The international press covered the story, sensationalized when the Mexico City newspaper El
Universal published a photo of Blanquet’s head, which Sánchez severed and carried to the city of
Veracruz as his trophy.367 El Universal was directed by Félix F. Palavicini, the man who shut down El
Imparcial, and it was the primary Carrancista medium in Mexico City. The newspaper celebrated
Blanquet’s death, especially since he was the “most important figure in Huertismo” following Huerta.368
Meanwhile in San Antonio, Revista Mexicana mourned Blanquet. The newspaper dedicated a section to
the fallen general on March 30, listing all of his military and political achievements, although it was no
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secret to the press or the general population that Blanquet had returned to Mexico.369 In memory of
Blanquet, Revista Mexicana published an editorial entitled “In Mexico or in Eternity.” The piece
included a statement from Blanquet’s representative Roberto Gayón, who claimed that the general
uttered these words, “in Mexico or in Eternity,” as he left for Mexico for the last time.370
The exile community then dealt with the political repercussions of the attempted revolt in
Veracruz. In late April 1919, García Naranjo was charged with violating U.S. neutrality laws as a coconspirator with Blanquet, Díaz, and Gayón (who was also arrested in New York City).371 In his
memoirs, García Naranjo explained that he and Gayón communicated in late March and early April.
Gayón wished to meet up with Blanquet, and he was considering contacting some associates in northern
Mexico in order to obtain information on him. García Naranjo discouraged this idea because of the
constant surveillance in the border region, and he told Gayón that he believed Blanquet was in Veracruz.
Nonetheless, García Naranjo obliged Gayón’s request for a letter of presentation for his trip into
northern Mexico. The letter was intercepted and used as evidence against the two men, although García
Naranjo claimed that he sent it to Gayón after Blanquet died. Initially, García Naranjo’s attorney
Marshall Hicks believed that his client would be found not guilty because only the letter (and not
Revista Mexicana) could be taken into account as evidence, since journalistic endeavors were not
punishable under U.S. neutrality laws. However, when the trial approached the following year, the
prosecutor informed Hicks that all of García Naranjo’s articles criticizing Wilson, former Secretary of
State William Jennings Bryan, and other U.S. officials would be translated to English and admitted as
evidence of conspiracy. Johnson suggested that García Naranjo plead guilty and pay a fine; otherwise, a
trial by jury could result in a more severe punishment. Arturo García Naranjo convinced his brother
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Nemesio to plead guilty in order to avoid a scandal that would hurt the exile cause, and because being
charged with a political crime was “always relative and sometimes honorable.”372
Blanquet’s death dealt a final blow to the exile efforts against the Carranza regime. Huerta and
Blanquet were deceased, Manuel Mondragón was sixty years old, and the younger Díaz continued to
prove he was an inept military officer. There was no possibility for the exiles to successfully overthrow
the Carranza regime without a strong military leader. More importantly, Blanquet’s death shed light on
a problem specific to the Porfirista community. In 1919, most of the científicos were dead, and most of
the military officers who served during the Porfiriato were also dead or advanced in age. Most of the
remaining Porfiristas were significantly older, and there was no new generation of soldiers, lawyers,
doctors, politicians, or writers who adhered to the values of Porfirismo in Mexico. The exiles would
have to pass their values on to their children and to the Mexican community-at-large, or else Porfirismo
would die out.
The intellectuals took on this task, but by 1920, Porfirismo had lost its steam and hopes for a
counter-revolution were mostly gone. In January, García Naranjo was forced to shut down Revista
Mexicana due to financial difficulties. Four months later, Carranza was assassinated. Villa negotiated a
cease fire with the interim president Adolfo de la Huerta in July, and Díaz surrendered to Sánchez and
went into exile in October. Álvaro Obregón assumed the presidency on November 30, 1920, and the
revolution definitively triumphed. Despite their defeat, the Porfirista exiles remained committed to their
nation, and they worked with and against the Mexican government as they saw fit throughout the
following decades. They also remained true to their identities despite being cast as Mexico’s villains,
and they continued to use the exile press to share their Porfirista values.
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Chapter 4: La Prensa, Revista Mexicana, and the Public Sphere
“While I addressed the exiles, [Ignacio E.] Lozano formed a tie with the [group] that he liked to call
“México de afuera” and who had nothing to do with our political and social convulsions. I was a
migratory bird, supported and sustained by other migratory birds…when the flock [returned to Mexico],
I lost my clientele and was…condemned to suspend my effort when I desired to fight the most. Lozano,
on the other hand, by connecting to a permanent audience, gave La Prensa an…unshakeable
foundation.”
- Nemesio García Naranjo

This chapter will analyze La Prensa and Revista Mexicana as products of their volatile
environment, and as texts that set specific cultural and political norms for their transnational audiences.
I will first situate them within their historical context by exploring the ways in which these media
continued the tradition of the Porfirista newspapers El Imparcial, La Patria, and Violetas del Anáhuac.
Journalists and writers helped to establish what Jürgen Habermas calls a “modern public sphere” in
Mexico. Lozano and García Naranjo continued this process in el México de afuera and contributed to
the burgeoning “U.S.-Mexican literary culture” on the border.
This newspaper and magazine formed an integral part of the exile network spanning the United
States, Havana, and Europe, and Mexico’s most prolific intellectuals of the early twentieth century
contributed to the two San Antonio publications. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana sought to instill
Porfirista values in their audiences, but each took a different approach in reaching out to their readers.
La Prensa called itself politically neutral, and it focused on reporting news from Mexico to all
immigrants, regardless of their ideological position. Revista Mexicana was a more reactionary
publication that used editorials and satire to openly criticize the revolution. Both media initially found
great success, but Revista Mexicana shut down in 1920, while La Prensa circulated until 1963. The
similarities and differences in the trajectories of these publications can be explained by analyzing their
content using the framework of political economy. Media scholars such as Douglas Kellner use political
economy to examine “cultural texts within their system of production and distribution.” According to
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Kellner, “the system of production often determines what sort of artifacts will be produced, what
structural limits there will be as to what can and cannot be said and shown, and what sort of audience
effects the text may generate…and it can also help determine the limits and range of political and
ideological discourses and effects.”373 Political economy explains how certain media become
hegemonic, or “mainstream,” how institutions use media to promote notions of class, race, and gender,
and the ways in which audiences use their consumer power to consent to, or oppose, the messages
presented by media. The news reports, editorials, and advertising within La Prensa and Revista
Mexicana were the primary texts used in efforts to assert Porfirista cultural hegemony in the
borderlands. A close analysis of this content will offer insight into the challenges and successes that
Lozano, García Naranjo, and their colleagues faced and enjoyed as they worked to sustain their identity
in the chaotic 1910s.

The Porfirista Press, the Public Sphere, and National Identity
Habermas defines the public sphere as that in which “private people come together as a public”
and use reason and logic to discuss and contest the political authority of the state.374 In mid- to lateeighteenth-century Europe, the literary public sphere developed in salons and coffee houses in which the
bourgeoisie (the literate and often wealthy members of society) gathered to discuss art, theatre, and
literature. These media were commodified in institutions such as museums for the bourgeoisie’s
consumption in the public realm, and newspapers became the primary tool for expressing cultural
criticism. Habermas argues that the existence of “institutions of the public…with forums for
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discussion” helped the “world of letters” to evolve into a political, and masculine, public sphere.375 As
men gained access to power by becoming property owners and participants in growing capitalist and
industrial societies, they engaged in dialogue and criticism to discuss the regulation of the private realm.
Public opinion served as the expression of this new political consciousness, which countered the
absolute sovereignty of monarchs, “articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract
laws,” and asserted itself “as the only legitimate source of this law.”376
Habermas conceptualized the public sphere as a republican space through which all rational
members of society could voice their opinions in order to achieve general consensus and check the
power of the state. Geoff Eley argues that this is problematic because it consists of “an ideal of critical
liberalism that remains historically unattained.”377 Problems with the public sphere arose because it
established normative, patriarchal structures for civil society which justified inclusion and exclusion.
Women, men who did not own property, and the illiterate population (all non-rational) were excluded
from political dialogue, though educated women could participate in the literary sphere. Ideally, as
literacy expanded within a liberal nation-state, the growing rational population would use dialogue to
peacefully influence politics, but the opposite was actually true. As people with more diverse opinions
entered the public realm, the possibilities for conflict and violence increased. In order to avoid these
tensions, the state and the rational members of society sought to control literacy and information,
defeating the original intent of the public sphere.
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These were the conditions in late nineteenth-century Mexico, where Porfirio Díaz censored the
press in order to maintain peace and achieve hegemony.378 The científicos believed that by creating a
homogenous nationalistic discourse through media, they could control the masses (even in a mostly
illiterate society) and sustain their power. Ernesto Laclau calls this the “hegemonic operation,” through
which the group in power convinces civil society that it has its best interests in mind. The established
“hegemonic relation” relies on “the production of tendentially empty signifiers” which members of the
power structures use to “take up the representation” of civil society.379 Michel Foucault argues that
when a power structure uses discourse to give these signifiers specific meanings, this knowledge
becomes an accepted truth and the basis for ‘authentic’ identity.380 However, the concept of hegemony
also accounts for the agency of civil society, which also uses discourse to accept these signifiers and a
community identity. According to Benedetto Fontana, as power structures and civil society engage in
discourse and the politics of representation, a circular power struggle develops in which the members of
society are constantly negotiating the discursive formation of their identities.381
In order to construct the signifiers necessary to claim legitimate representation over the Mexican
population, the Díaz administration needed the help of Mexico’s writers and journalists. In the 1890s,
José Y. Limantour suggested to Díaz that they align with a newspaper that would allow the científicos to
“treat certain issues with the public” in an unofficial manner. El Imparcial was chosen to “explain and
defend the actions, projects, and determinations” of the government to its broad audience. In return, the
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administration rewarded El Imparcial with a subsidy, though Limantour claimed that Director Rafael
Reyes Spíndola never asked for any compensation for his service to Díaz.382 Reyes Spíndola soon
became part of the influential group of publishers, journalists, and writers which Ángel Rama refers to
as letrados (or “men of letters”). Letrados had been essential for the development of Latin America
since the colonial period, and their purpose was to “prescribe an order for the physical world, to
construct norms for community life, to limit the development of spontaneous social innovations, and to
prevent them from spreading in the body politic.”383 These men displayed a “penchant for entrenching
themselves within the administrative structures of state power,” which was especially important in
counteracting the influence of the Catholic Church.384 By controlling literacy, the men of letters upheld
class structures in which they maintained their privileges. They also manipulated the production of
knowledge and used it to construct national identities and histories, claim and rename urban spaces, and
grant authenticity to oral traditions.
Rama suggests that Mexico’s modernization in the late nineteenth-century represented a
“triumph of the lettered city.” As letrados such as Justo Sierra helped to spread education and literacy,
“the proliferation of the written word permitted [them] to discipline the countryside, imposing
homogeneity and social hygiene.”385 Rural customs were allowed to exist, but only within the context of
modern Mexican history and literature. At the same time, letrados used the press to whitewash Mexican
national identity and incorporate high European culture within Mexican identity in order to “elevate the
masses” and create a rational, positivist society.
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El Imparcial became the primary científico medium during the Porfiriato, but La Patria also
privileged the positivist, modern Mexican national identity despite its opposition to the científicos. El
Imparcial published news from around the world, as well as cultural content such as sports and fashion.
La Patria focused on social commentary, and between 1884 and 1896, Paz published La Patria
Ilustrada, a weekly magazine consisting of literature, satire, and illustrations. The political differences
between the two newspapers were evident from the beginning, and Paz consistently criticized the
científicos and their elitism, appealing to Porfiristas increasingly resentful of the class disparities in
Mexico.386 Nevertheless, both publications supported Díaz and his modernization efforts, and
applauded the changes that took place during the late Porfiriato. In the late 1910s, La Prensa and
Revista Mexicana would exhibit similar dynamics: both newspapers were ideologically Porfirista, but
Lozano emphasized global news, and García Naranjo used his magazine as a medium for political
commentary.
Women also participated in the Porfirista press, and Violetas del Anáhuac became the most
important woman’s newspaper of the Porfiriato. Violetas del Anáhuac (1887-1888), published by
Ignacio Pujol, was directed by Laureana Wright de Kleinhans, “the most brilliant and radical defender of
women’s emancipation” of her time. Gabriela Cano argues that Wright de Kleinhans “believed the most
important task for women was to work for moral and intellectual education and moral strength, since
they were the only tools with which they could achieve independence and leave behind the narrowness
of the domestic sphere.”387 Mexican modernity was inherently patriarchal, and the success of
individuals, families, and the national body depended on the practice of specific gender roles that
determined the function of the public and private spheres. Femininity was defined by domesticity, but
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women began to assert their place within the world of the men of letters, while simultaneously blurring
the line between the public and private.
Each issue of Violetas del Anáhuac began with a biography of a woman prominent in society
and/or literature, and the first edition featured Carmen Romero Rubio de Díaz, who was considered the
ideal Mexican woman because she epitomized propriety, beauty, and elegance. This publication
celebrated femininity and granted women a space to claim their agency. Violetas del Anáhuac discussed
religion, art, history, and literature, as well as science and hygiene. The newspaper published a series in
1888 on positivism, in which the writer contemplated issues such as materialism, science versus
spirituality, and the theories set forth by men, including Isaac Newton and Charles Darwin, relating to
the nature of the world and humanity. The contributors to Violetas del Anáhuac were letradas actively
engaged in current intellectual discourse, and they encouraged their readers to emulate them. While
positioning women as equals to men in their importance to society, they also celebrated the differences
between the genders.. As mothers, Mexican women had the duty to raise healthy, strong, intelligent
children that would improve the nation and the race. They could also step into the public realm through
philanthropy and civic participation, which coincided with their “motherly” role for improving society.
Cano and Cristina D. Ramírez suggest that Violetas del Anáhuac represented an early form of
Mexican feminism in which women used discourse to fight oppression. However, both scholars point
out that women were limited in their approach, and the rhetoric in Violetas del Anáhuac represented a
“form of mimicry.”388 The publication was written using the elevated language of the elite, a “florid
European style” that did not make the newspaper accessible to the uneducated masses, but did grant it
acceptance among Mexican intellectuals. Wright de Kleinhans and her peers worked within the
patriarchal system to increase womens’ presence in the public sphere. They also politicized the private
sphere by redefining the home as a space in which women could carry out the national modernization
388
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project. Nevertheless, men continued to control the press while relegating women to their domestic role
and commodifying femininity.
The Porfirista press catered to the growing upper-class, and its gendered advertising and
women’s columns demonstrated how women were also allowed to participate in society as consumers.
As Kyla Schuller argues in her discussion of the “cosmetics of whiteness,” “the beauty industry was
both structured by and produced ideas of race” in the early 1900s.389 In Mexico (and throughout the
western world), women’s bodies became the site on which society imposed racial and class standards
that marked whiteness as pure, and non-whiteness as dirty and/or evil. Although the científicos did not
succeed in creating a widespread consumer base for their industrialization project, the elites and
professional classes demanded products such as clothing, and cultural goods including opera and theatre
in order to satisfy their desire to look, act, and be modern. Violetas del Anáhuac included a section in
each issue detailing the latest play, opera, or social event, including visits from foreign dignitaries (and
their wives) and balls hosted at the National Palace. In addition to being educated, women were
supposed to participate in social events and be updated on the latest in fine arts. Again, Doña Carmen
served as the primary example in this realm; she was the ideal hostess and intermediary between the
private and public, the sacred and profane spheres. Daniel Thomas Cook argues that Émile Durkheim’s
dichotomy of the “sacred and the profane” is problematic because “passage or communication between
them is unavoidable in practice, making contamination of one by the other an ongoing concern…[thus]
ritual interdictions are required to render contact between the two domains rare and safe.”390 In order to
achieve modernity, the Díaz administration needed a cultured female population that could move
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between the spheres and participate in the growing economy. It sought to deal with the potential moral
problems of women’s presence in the public realm by turning them into consumers of fashion and
beauty products. These would make women more feminine, beautiful, clean, modern, and white.
By 1910, El Imparcial included a “Página para las Damas” (Ladies’ Page), which included
advice from aristocratic women for female readers regarding the latest health trends and solutions for
beauty problems. The newspaper published the “beauty secrets” of Madame Lina Calieri, an Italian
opera singer considered the most beautiful woman in the world. She suggested that women sleep less
during the summer, and take time to exercise and shower twice a day, though “very robust” women
should shower three times (Calieri did not explain why). Calieri offered a number of recipes for face
washes and creams, which included ingredients such as lemon juice, rose water, cucumber juice, and
vaseline. Furthermore, women should be careful not to eat meat more than once a day, and to stay away
from candy because sugar produced body heat. Calieri recommended that women eat fruit, as long as it
was washed and showed no sign of rotting.391
The Ladies’ Page also published a column by Lucille, Lady Duff Gordon, one of the most
prominent European fashion designers of the early twentieth century. Lady Duff Gordon offered her
“philosophy” on fashion accessories. For example, she noted that it was acceptable to wear bird feathers
in French hats, but not in English hats because Queen Mary opposed the destruction of birds.392 In
addition to Lady Duff Gordon’s column, El Imparcial published the “design of the day” from Europe,
and the newspaper advertised dresses from Parisian designers such as Madame Rosinne Robert.393 The
Porfirista press illustrated women’s beauty as European and aristocratic, clearly marking class
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distinctions between Mexican women who could afford this standard and lower class mestizas and
indigenous women who did not have the time or the money for such luxuries.
Although the Ladies’ Page upheld the link between beauty and purity, women were sexualized in
the advertising throughout El Imparcial. Advertisements for Les Corsets Perséphone and the herbal
supplement Pilules Orientales displayed a woman in a suggestive pose, wearing only a corset. The ad
for Pilules Orientales promised women beautiful breasts like those of oriental women, since this part of
the female anatomy was considered “the most perfect expression of feminine beauty” in the orient.394
Furthermore, herbal supplements and medicines were advertised by doctors as a solution for acne and
other skin problems; one doctor even suggested that “skin eruptions resulted from bad blood.”395 These
advertisements positioned all Mexican women as inferior because they were Mexican. “Bad blood,”
including any traces of indigenous, African, or Asian ancestry, could literally disfigure a woman and
destroy her beauty and worth. Women with financial means could hide their Mexican features by
covering their bodies with European clothing, while correcting their blemishes with medicine and
European creams and body washes. Moreover, Mexican women were not considered sexual unless they
wore imported French corsets or enhanced their breasts like those of exotic oriental women. Mexican
women were desirable only if they changed their appearance to look less Mexican.
This was a more conservative posture compared to the rhetoric in Violetas del Anáhuac two
decades before, which celebrated the indigenous identity of its readers. The newspaper’s original name,
Las Hijas del Anáhuac, displayed pride in Aztec ancestry, since “Anáhuac” was the name of the Valley
of Mexico in Náhuatl. These women, like the Díaz administration, had to contend with Mexico’s
indigenous past, and these publications demonstrate ways in which Porfiristas attempted to reconcile
their ethnic heritage. The científicos resolved this “problem” by claiming Díaz’s descendancy from
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Cuauhtémoc and constructing a monument to the Aztec leader on the Paseo de la Reforma. The
Violetas, on the other hand, incorporated their indigenous and European pasts into their womanhood,
albeit as daughters of an Aztec fatherland.
The Porfirista press celebrated Mexico’s progress and Díaz’s leadership, and helped the dictator
to sustain hegemony and control over the formation of Mexican national identity. However, as literacy
and education spread and the public sphere expanded, so did counter-hegemonic discourse that exposed
the fragility of white, positivist, and Eurocentric nationalism. Although Díaz exiled the Flores Magón
brothers, they published Regeneración in the United States, which became the ideal location for the
flourishing revolutionary press. After the revolutionaries defeated Huerta in 1914 and El Imparcial, La
Patria, and all other Porfirsta newspapers were closed down, the Porfirista press resurfaced in the
United States. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana continued to promote patriarchy (particularly through
advertising), whiteness, Catholicism, and Eurocentrism. These two media united Mexicans through
patriotism and nostalgia and, by 1920, created a public sphere in the United States in which Mexican
immigrants had a greater opportunity to express their opinions than they had in Mexico.

La Prensa Becomes the “Voice” of el México de Afuera, 1913-1914
Before 1910, newspapers produced by Mexican Americans dominated the Spanish-language
press in the southwestern United States. These newspapers formed part of what Raúl Coronado calls the
“U.S.-Mexican literary culture” in the borderlands in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
Spanish-language newspapers “were used to intervene in the formation of political subjectivities, alter
attitudes about the public sphere, and defend the interests of competing groups.”396 In San Antonio, the
Spanish-language press was important for the political and cultural development of the barrio in the
early 1900s.
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Elizabeth Shannon Barker states that “by the late nineteenth century, the cultural landscape of
[San Antonio] was carefully divided between Tejanos on the West Side, Blacks on the East, and Whites
on the North.” These divisions resulted from the de jure segregation of African Americans and de facto
segregation of ethnic Mexicans, and “these separate ethnic enclaves…became permanent by the
1930s.”397 Barker states that class differences were evident in the Mexican West Side ward, which was
divided between “wealthy Mexican exiles” seeking to return to Mexico, “middle class entrepreneurs
who found their way to success in the American capitalist economy,” and “working class immigrants,”
but that the “common thread of lo mexicano…held these disparate groups together.”398 The San
Antonio Spanish-language press reflected a more complex reality. These newspapers had the important
function of maintaining cultural unity in the barrio, but they also marked a division between Tejanos and
Mexican immigrants, as well as the inability of Tejano journalists to fully separate themselves from
Mexican politics.
Pablo Cruz’s El Regidor and Colonel Francisco Chapa’s El Imparcial de Texas were among the
local Spanish-language newspapers that updated readers about news from San Antonio, the United
States, and Mexico. They had a distinct Tejano identity. Cruz used his medium to enhance his
community activism. Beginning in the 1890s, he “raised money for the legal defense of Tejanos,”
worked with other South Texas publishers for improved conditions for Tejano schoolchildren, and
encouraged voting among the population in Mexican American barrios.399 Ana Luisa Martínez-Catsam
argues that Cruz also formed part of a “transborder coalition of liberal journalists who condemned Díaz
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for violating the Constitution of 1857.”400 Cruz consistently criticized the Díaz regime and supported
Catarino Garza, a journalist who launched a revolt against Díaz along the border in 1891.
In 1901, Cruz worked to fund the legal defense of Gregorio Cortez, who was accused of murder
and famously evaded the Texas Rangers for ten days. Cortez was sentenced to life in prison in 1904,
and Cruz continued to work in his defense. Chapa took on that role after Cruz’s death in 1910. Chapa
was a wealthy businessman and owner of a drugstore in San Antonio, and he had extensive political
connections. He was friends with Governor Oscar B. Colquitt (who pardoned Cortez in 1913) and
Bernardo Reyes, whom he had offered to help during his rebellion against Madero in 1912. Chapa
served as treasurer of the San Antonio board of education, and he was a member of the Business Men’s
Club. Because of his visibility in both the Anglo and Tejano communities, Governor Colquitt and other
Anglo politicians relied on Chapa to gain the Tejano vote. 401 Chapa’s primary business was his
drugstore, but he decided to publish a newspaper in order to “capitalize on the Spanish-speaking
population,” despite his lack of journalistic experience.402 He launched El Imparcial de Texas in 1908,
demonstrating his support for Díaz by using the same name as the Mexico City newspaper. Chapa
needed a business manager for his publication, and in 1911, he hired Lozano.
Lozano had worked as a journalist in Mapimí, Durango, before moving to San Antonio in 1908.
The city was a center for the revolutionary exile press, where the Flores Magón brothers published
Regeneración in 1904 and Madero published his Plan de San Luis Potosí in 1910. Lozano had no
difficulty finding work as a journalist, and he became the business manager for Adolfo Duclós Salinas,
who fled to Texas in 1883 because of his opposition to Díaz. Salinas owned La Revista Mensual and El
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Noticiero, and after his death, Lozano took charge of the latter publication. El Noticiero was not a
successful newspaper, and Lozano decided to shut down the business and devote his attention to his
bookstore. Di Stefano suggests that “during the period spent in running the bookstore, the young
entrepreuner was able to accurately gauge the pulse of the San Antonio community. Lozano determined
which books were the most requested, which themes were of interest, and which authors were popular
with the city’s Spanish-reading public.”403 More importantly, Lozano observed the political dynamics
within the city, and he sold a variety of Mexican newspapers in his store, including the Maderista
publication El Monitor Democrático. His growing knowledge about politics and social dynamics in San
Antonio, Mexico, and the border region would help him become a legitimate and respected leader of
opinion.
Lozano’s reputation as a business manager and journalist impressed Chapa, and Lozano worked
for El Imparcial de Texas in 1911 and 1912, during which time the newspaper became the largestselling Tejano publication in San Antonio. This job gave Lozano more advanced training in newspaper
production, and he was soon prepared to launch his own business. The official reason for Lozano’s
“abrupt” resignation was an illness, but as Di Stefano points out, Lozano established his new business
within two months after leaving El Imparcial de Texas, which would have been difficult if he was ill.
Di Stefano also suggests that the two split because Lozano wanted to reach a broader audience than he
could with El Imparcial de Texas, which catered to local readers.404
This partially explains Lozano’s resignation, but scholars have not taken into account the
political implications of his timing. Lozano worked for Chapa during the period in which the colonel
helped Bernardo Reyes with his counter-revolutionary efforts in San Antonio. Chapa escorted Reyes,
his “old friend,” from New Orleans to San Antonio in October 1911, and helped with “recruiting men,
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and in acquiring weapons and equipment and moving them to the border.”405 When the conspiracy was
discovered by federal authorities, Chapa was tried for violating neutrality laws in January 1912, and it
was revealed during the trial that Reyes’s manifestos had been printed on the presses of El Imparcial de
Texas.406 It is likely that Chapa continued to closely monitor Reyes’s situation throughout 1912, and
that he knew about the plans for the cuartelazo. Lozano resigned and quickly prepared his newspaper’s
premier issue, which he launched during the Decena Trágica. His timing may have been purely
coincidental, but it seems likely instead that Lozano knew about the coup and foresaw the potential for a
sensationalist opening headline for La Prensa on February 13, 1913.
La Prensa began as a weekly four-page newspaper. It circulated on Thursdays, the same day as
El Imparcial de Texas, in order to directly compete with Chapa. La Prensa’s staff was small and
included Porfiristas Teodoro Torres, a respected journalist from San Luis Potosí, and Leonides
González.407 In its first month, La Prensa’s headlines kept readers informed on the chaotic drama
unfolding in Mexico. In its second issue, La Prensa reported the resignations of Madero and Pino
Suárez; the following week, the newspaper published details of their assassinations. Although it
presented itself as politically neutral, La Prensa included a column entitled “Coscorrones,” in which the
characters “Bachicha” and “Pipo” (both presumably Lozano) offered commentary on events in Mexico
and revealed the newspaper’s Porfirista orientation. For example, before Madero’s assassination,
Bachicha made fun of the deposed president for speaking to spirits who did not answer him during his
last attempt to remain in the presidency.408 Di Stefano argues that the use of fictional characters was a
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way for La Prensa’s staff to circumvent their commitment to impartiality, relying on satire (rather than
news reports or editorials) to comment on the revolutionary figures.
These characters also made observations about Mexican society, including traditional gender
roles. For example, Pipo shared a story of two ex-girlfriends with whom he cut ties because of their
political leanings. One woman supported Madero, and it put Pipo in a worse mood “than when all of the
callouses on [his] precious feet hurt at once.” His second ex-girlfriend, “dear God! [She] was a
Carrancista.” The two fought every day “and hurled more insults at each other than a panchovillista in
the thirty-third degree of drunkenness.” Pipo vowed never again to become involved with a woman
“who smelled like dynamite with her effective suffrage…constitutionalism, revolutionary plans, and that
bunch of calamities” that Pipo called “redemptory stupidities.” He ended his story by advising readers
that women should never become involved in politics, in order to prevent so many “bitter love affairs
and broken marriages.”409
Patriarchal views were also present in La Prensa’s Literary Page, published from 1913 to 1915.
This section included the pieces by Bachicha and Pipo, as well as poetry and prose from authors in
Europe, Mexico, and South America, and it served two purposes: to distract readers from the bleak news
reports, and promote patriarchal Porfirista values to the barrio audience. It was critical to maintain
social order in the midst of the volatile political conditions in the borderlands, and Porfiristas believed
that order began in the home. Thus, many of the pieces included in the Literary Page discussed
patriarchal notions of gender and the reasons for upholding them. La Prensa published a piece by
Victor Hugo in which he wrote that man “was the most elevated of all creatures” while “woman was the
most sublime of all ideals.” Hugo described men as strong, intelligent, with aspirations for “supreme
glory.” Women, on the other hand, were angels, pure and virtuous. One piece specified that “the Ideal
Woman…never [contradicted] her parents, siblings, relatives, or friends…[did] not shed abundant tears
409
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at every step…[did] not pronounce more than 100 words per minute…[did] not spend hours fixing her
hair…[and preferred] her home rather than the street.”410 If women adhered to these principles, they
would easily find husbands, which was another concern of the male authors whose work was included in
the Literary Page. In late 1913, La Prensa published a poem written by Luis Álvarez Méndez from the
perspective of an “old” forty year-old woman. The narrator desperately offered a prayer to Saint
Anthony, imploring him to help her find a husband.411 The message to La Prensa’s female readers was
clear—they should be quiet, virtuous wives and mothers.
Femininity was a great concern within the Literary Page, but Mexican masculinity was addressed
throughout the rest of La Prensa. Pipo’s comic, satirical observations entertained readers, but also
reinforced women’s submissiveness to men. Furthermore, La Prensa celebrated the birthdays of
significant national heroes, including Hidalgo, Juárez, Ignacio Zaragoza, and Díaz, by printing their
biographies on the front page of the newspaper. The stories recounted the heroism of each of these
leaders and emphasized their military service and willingness to fight and die for their country. La
Prensa used these symbols to lay claim on authentic Mexican identity. The issue of authenticity was
important for La Prensa, and it created tensions between the newspaper and the Tejano press. La
Prensa made it clear to readers that it had absolutely no ties to El Imparcial de Texas, and it criticized
this newspaper for promoting “false mexicanism.” Chapa and other unnamed members of the Tejano
press were hypocrites for calling themselves Mexican in order to attract a Spanish-reading audience, but
then presenting themselves as “red-blooded Americans” to the Anglo press.412 La Prensa was
unsympathetic to the ambivalent position of Tejanos, who were simultaneously Mexican and American,
yet not Mexican or American enough. Questioning the Mexican identity of the Tejano press helped La
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Prensa to present itself as a leader, or the voice, of the Mexican immigrant population. The producers
of La Prensa sought to demonstate that they understood the struggles of recent immigrants and exiles,
and that they could maintain cultural ties to Mexico by reading this newspaper.
The problems in Mexico formed the basis for La Prensa’s relationship with its audience. In its
premier issue, the newspaper stated that its mission was to serve readers as a “true friend,” and that it
would “applaud all good and condemn all evil” for the benefit of the patria.413 Readers who fled Mexico
could sympathize with the frustration evident in reports on the revolution, and La Prensa vocalized the
sentiments of Mexicans who wanted peace in their nation. La Prensa sought to unite el México de
afuera through a sense of solidarity and common struggle. Together, they witnessed their nation selfdestruct, and together they would attempt to move forward and uphold their patria in exile.
In December 1914, La Prensa sponsored a writing contest for readers to submit their proposals
for solving Mexico’s problems. By the end of the year, it had received 241 entries from various cities,
including Los Angeles, El Paso, Eagle Pass, and San Antonio, and the newspaper published a number of
them. The topics varied, and La Prensa printed submissions that did not necessarily match the
newspaper’s Porfirista ideology. For example, an author by the name of J.G.C. suggested that Mexico’s
problems were economic at their core, and that the Plan of Ayala was the best option because of its
emphasis on agrarian reform.414 The three judges for the contest were José Elguero (“Antimaco Sax”),
Eduardo Tamariz (Huerta’s former Minister of Public Instruction), and Mariano Viesca y Arizpe (former
Porfirista mayor of San Pedro, Coahuila). On February 17, 1915, La Prensa announced the contest
winners and the judges’ comments. They stated that readers succinctly analyzed Mexico’s problems,
but none of the potential solutions satisfied the judges. The participants were either too idealistic or they
only focused on military solutions. The judges clarified this point, noting that this did not make the
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ideas any less valid; on the contrary, this contest demonstrated the complexity of Mexico’s problems,
and the diversity of viewpoints regarding the subject matter.
Elguero, Tamariz, and Viesca y Arizpe congratulated Lozano and La Prensa’s readers for
participating in such an important project, “the first in the history of Mexican journalism to open a
public debate on such a highly transcendental topic.”415 The judges admitted that it was difficult to
select the winners, but their biggest challenge was confronting the magnitude of Mexico’s social,
political, and economic troubles as they read the hundreds of entries. The winning article, entitled “This
is a Matter of Life or Death: ‘To Be or Not to Be,’” argued that Mexico’s troubles resulted from a
century of passivity from Mexico’s masses, who accepted their subjugated position as caudillos,
politicians, hacendados, and other leaders took advantage of them. The judges critiqued the author for
not proposing any specific way to combat the cycle of exploitation, but they appreciated the historical
context and the author’s understanding that the revolution stemmed from long-term problems.416 This is
an interesting position taken by the Porfirista judges, since a fundamental characteristic of Porfirismo
was the belief that the Díaz regime had established order and progress in Mexico. Perhaps the judges
accepted that Mexico’s problems were so extensive that even Díaz had been unable to fully resolve
them.
The exiled intellectuals took a genuine interest in public discourse, and the judges seemed
excited that so many of La Prensa’s subscribers contributed to the debate. For the first time in decades,
perhaps in as long as most Mexican immigrants could remember, they could freely express themselves
without fear of state reprimand. La Prensa provided a safe environment for the proliferation of
opposing viewpoints. More importantly, this contest encouraged critical thought and validated the
opinions of all participants regardless of their political, class, or educational background. However, the
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judges and winners were all men, and there was no indication as to how many, if any, of the submissions
were from women. Although the Porfiristas expanded the public sphere to include Mexican
communities across the United States, it continued to be a male-dominated realm.
La Prensa’s commitment to el México de afuera resulted in widespread popularity, though it is
difficult to assess the level of cultural hegemony it attained because of the limited data on the
demographics of La Prensa’s audience. By June 1913, La Prensa doubled in size from four pages to
eight. In 1914, its circulation reached 10,000 copies per week, surpassing El Imparcial de Texas as the
largest-selling Spanish-language newspaper in San Antonio.417 However, while N.W. Ayer & Son’s
American Newspaper Annual and Directory published national circulation figures, it did not reveal
readership by city or region. There is also limited information available on La Prensa’s readership
according to class or nationality.
La Prensa’s growth in readership can nonetheless be explained as a result of its commitment to
the immigrant community. As García Naranjo pointed out in his memoirs, La Prensa also succeeded
because Lozano built it as a long-term business that focused on the community development outside of
Mexico. This ensured that La Prensa would be able to sustain itself regardless of the political events in
the homeland. According to David Gutiérrez, “at least one million, and possibly as many as a million
and a half Mexican immigrants entered the United States between 1890 and 1929.”418 The majority of
the immigrants were pacificos, not involved in the political struggles of the revolution, but they chose to
leave their homeland regardless. La Prensa catered to this audience by presenting itself as a politically
independent news source. It also reinforced Mexican culture within the barrios across the southwestern
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United States and gave a “voice” to the immigrant community in the midst of growing nativism in the
1910. Readers presumably placed their trust in what they believed to be a legitimate news source that
had their best interests in mind without explicitly siding with a particular faction. The demand for
seemingly impartial news also helped La Prensa in mid-1914, when Carranza shut down all opposition
newspapers, including El Imparcial and La Patria. In October 1914, La Prensa began circulating as a
daily newspaper, and from that moment it became the largest-selling Mexican newspaper in the United
States.419
Revista Mexicana, on the other hand, did not establish the foundation to be a long-lasting
business because, as political propaganda, its success depended on the course of the revolution. García
Naranjo launched his magazine in August 1915 just as Huerta and Orozco’s plans to invade Mexico
failed, and the publication served as another attempt to organize the political exiles. Moheno, José
María Lozano, Francisco M. de Olaguíbel, Jorge Vera Estañol, Ricardo Gómez Róbelo, and Emilio
Rabasa, all writers for Revista Mexicana, had been directly involved with the Huerta administration.
Other contributors such as Calero and Elguero were considered enemies of both the Mexican and U.S.
states. Their reputations preceeded them, and readers knew why these men had been expelled from
Mexico. This meant that the writers for Revista Mexicana had less to lose by freely expressing
themselves, unlike Lozano, whose reputation depended on his image as an impartial journalist. In his
memoirs, García Naranjo recalled feeling unsure about the public’s reaction to Revista Mexicana
because of its political stance, but the magazine was initially successful. On November 15, 1915,
Revista Mexicana stated that two thousand copies of the premier issue were printed, and the five
hundred copies in San Antonio sold out in two days. Revista Mexicana had a circulation of 5,000 issues
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per week from late 1915 to 1918. This represented less than half of La Prensa’s figures, but the number
was nevertheless impressive because Revista Mexicana was so adamantly against the revolution.

Porfirista Identity in the United States
Lozano and García Naranjo had different goals for their newspapers, and the two publications
differed in terms of style and content, but ultimately La Prensa and Revista Mexicana embodied a
similar vision for Mexicans living outside of the homeland. Both wanted to uphold Porfirista identity in
el México de afuera. Efforts to promote their racial, class, and gender values were similar to those of
their predecessors, including El Imparcial, La Patria, and Violetas del Anáhuac. However, the exiled
Porfiristas worked to impart their ideals within the context of living in the United States, where
Mexicans were the racialized ‘other.’
The contributors to La Prensa and Revista Mexicana continued the modernization project that
had been so important to the Díaz administration and the Porfirista press. They encouraged political
participation, literacy, and education. They believed that Mexicans were not passive consumers of
information and entertainment, and were capable of engaging in critical debates and politics, becoming
educated, and having successful careers and businesses. Women, in particular, could actively
demonstrate their patriotism by raising strong, healthy children who would improve the Mexican race.
Both publications idealized European culture, advertised products that endorsed European standards of
beauty and whiteness, and encouraged readers (particularly men) to aspire social mobility through
education.
Two important dynamics manifested themselves in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana. The news
reports and editorials functioned as political texts, the words used to fight the revolution and maintain
the unity of el México de afuera in the ambivalent position of exile. At the same time, the visual content
of the newspaper, the advertisements and illustrations, upheld the cultural status quo of the Porfiriato
that emphasized modern, positivist, and patriarchal notions of race, class, and gender. These dynamics
173

complimented each other because they combined nostalgia, the community’s uncertainty about the
future, and patriotism. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana understood readers’ anxieties and fears;
together, in spite of their obstacles, they would celebrate national holidays and keep the spirit of the
homeland alive. Readers responded positively to the publications, and between 1915 and 1920, La
Prensa and Revista Mexicana circulated a combined average of 15,000-18,000 copies for their Sunday
editions.
In his memoirs, García Naranjo stated that his magazine appealed to Mexicans and Mexican
Americans because Revista Mexicana was not afraid to call out Anglos and the Wilson administration
for their hypocrisy and racist attitudes. In August 1915, Revista Mexicana reported the lynching of a
black man named Stanley in Temple, Texas. Stanley was burned alive in the presence of women and
children, and then his body was hung in the town plaza. The magazine included the gruesome details of
women picking up charred bones and taking them home as souveniers, and the author sarcastically
commented, “this is culture. This is mercy. This is humanity. No wonder President Wilson,
representative of such a moralized nation…has constituted himself as the defender of Interanational
Law.”420
La Prensa also addressed racial discrimination An author by the name of “Chitón” wrote
“Greasers,” an article that also questioned the civility of the United States, given the prevalence of
racism. Chitón wrote that people who used the derogatory word “greaser” were “uncultured” and unfit
to be called American. Although many Americans did not discriminate against Mexicans, the ones who
did were categorized as “the waste of the Old Continent…imbeciles who [were] unfortunately abundant
in all places....[and] ‘civilized’ people who loved justice when they apply it by their own hand through
lynchings.” Chitón also attacked the stereotype of the “cowardly…drunk, lazy and servile” Mexican
popularized in films. He ended his piece by thanking non-racist Americans on behalf of the Mexican
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community, but stating that “for those who at every step ‘grease’ us, we send our most significative
scorn, accompanied by a piece of advice:… ‘degrease’ the ‘greasers.’”421
During the Porfiriato, the científicos understood that not being perceived as Other by Western
Europe had significant political and economic implications for Mexico. As the nation became
incorporated into the modern, civilized world, Mexico reaped the benefits of foreign investment,
economic expansion, and Eurocentric cultural renewal. More importantly, it avoided being militarily
colonized by European imperial powers. However, Porfiristas in the United States had to contend with
the consequences of being perceived as the Other in Anglo society. By moving into the U.S. nationstate, Porfiristas became colonized objects in a predominantly Anglo society in which U.S. Mexicans
were politically and economically disenfranchised. In San Antonio, for example, Mexicans were
confined within one sector of the city, and most Porfiristas lived and/or worked in the barrio, a space
that fostered Mexican culture, but where poverty and disease were common. 422 Porfiristas may have
migrated to San Antonio with intellectual capital, but they could not fully disassociate themselves from
the problems seemingly related to the lower classes.
La Prensa and Revista Mexicana reacted to these conditions by taking a stand against racist
language and practices among Anglos, while continuing to privilege whiteness within the U.S. Mexican
community. These messages complicate the narrative on eugenics and Anglo/Mexican relations in the
1910s. Natalia Molina points out that in California public health officals dealt with a 1916 outbreak of
typhus in Mexican railroad worker camps by “using cyanide gas to destroy lice, ticks, and other
pests.”423 Residents of these camps were often forced to bathe in coal oil once a week. That same year,
La Prensa published a report given by Dr. Theo Y. Hull to the Bexar County Medical Society on
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tuberculosis among children in San Antonio. Dr. Hull stated that the rate of infection was greatest
among children whose “families depended on charity” (which might implicate lower-class Mexicans),
and that the most “progressive” way to contain tuberculosis was to “segregate” infected children and
adults.424 Furthermore, Alexandra Minna Stern describes how U.S. Public Health Service officials in
Texas “branded” the arms of immigrants, “in permanent ink, with the word ‘ADMITTED’ after being
bathed and physically examined.” The officials claimed that “the ink branding was necessary to defend
Texas from the lice, smallpox, and other germs usually carried by ‘Mexican paupers.’”425 In 1917,
officials worked to contain a Typhus epidemic by examining immigrants for lice, and bathing them with
“a mixture of soap, kerosene, and water.” Men with lice would have their heads shaved, and women had
“a mixture of equal parts kerosene and vinegar applied to the head.”426
Stern and Molina argue that these eugenic policies were a way of racializing Mexicans,
controlling their bodies, and casting them as the dirty ‘other’ who could infect white U.S. citizens.
However, Porfiristas projected a similar message in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana. The advertising
in these publications reveals the importance placed by Porfiristas on the male and female bodies, and the
ways in which Mexicans were supposed to stay clean and healthy in order to be considered acceptable in
society. Mexicans needed to strive for good hygiene and appearance, even if it meant changing their
body structure or the color of their skin. Women, in particular, were obligated to produce healthy
children in order to improve the Mexican race.
Phenotype standards were evident throughout the advertising in both publications. La Prensa
advertised the Parisian skin bleach Blancher Cream, which promised men and women that it would
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reduce skin darkness caused by genetics or sun exposure and remove dark spots.427 An advertisement
for Gouraud’s Oriental Cream guaranteed that it would give skin “accentuated beauty and pearly
whiteness,” and the French Perfume Agency claimed that Crème Simon would restore skin’s whiteness,
remove imperfections, and restore beauty, important because the face was “the window to the soul.”428
Although these advertisements appealed to consumers’ vanity, some companies used the science
of hygiene as a marketing strategy. An ad in Revista Mexicana for “Hierro Nuxado,” an iron
supplement, had three illustrations of the same female/male couple. The first showed them young and
happy at age twenty, the second showed them at age thirty; the man looked slightly older, but the
woman was not smiling and looked tired. Finally, the couple was shown at age forty. The man was
smiling and looked healthy, but the woman looked elderly and haggard, with a wrinkled complexion.
The copy stated that anemia (caused by an iron deficiency) led to a loss of “youth, beauty, and charm,
making [women] coleric, nervous, and downtrodden.”429 Medicine could prevent premature aging of the
face, and it could also make other body parts beautiful. Revista Mexicana published advertisements for
“GETS-IT,” a medicated callus remover. One of the illustrations depicted a happy man watching a
woman (presumably his wife) removing calluses on her feet with a smile on her face.430 Regardless of
whether or not these advertisements specified gender in their copy, they all contained illustrations of
women benefiting from the products, indicating that these creams were marketed for a female audience.
Other merchandise was gender-neutral, including “Trados,” an apparatus advertised in Revista
Mexicana used to change the structure of the nose. The copy stated that it was “absolutely necessary for
one to care for her/his physiognomy if she/he [expected] to be something and succeed in this life,” since
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“as a general rule, the world [would] judge a person” by her/his appearance. The advertisement
illustrated a man and a woman wearing the device, which consisted of a metal nose covering held in
place by a strap around the forehead and another that wrapped across the cheeks and behind the neck.
This product was a “fast...safe and permanent” alternative to surgery, and the testimonials from men,
women, and a doctor stated that they saw positive results within two weeks. “Before” and “after”
illustrations of a facial profile showed a nose with a bump on the tip and then completely straight.431
James B. Twitchell argues that advertising “is selling the oppression of consumption. The weak
and marginalized, especially the female and the black, are trapped into a commodifying system, a “false
consciousness” and “fetishism.”432 He also states that advertising in the early twentieth century
colonized the human body by selling the message that the body needed to be cleansed and purified. Jean
Kilbourne adds that
sexual images in advertising…define what is sexy and, more important, who is sexy...women are
portrayed as sexually desirable only if they are young, thin, carefully polished and groomed,
made up, depilated, sprayed, and scented…we never see eroticized images of older people,
imperfect people, people with disabilities. The gods have sex, the rest of us watch…[and] we
can never measure up.433
The advertising in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana set a model for personal appearance that was
potentially attainable only by people who could afford these beauty products. Moreover, the dominant
message in this advertising was that people with certain facial features, skin color, and “deformities”
such as calluses were ugly, dirty, and sick. They needed to fix themselves, spending as much money as
possible on European products if they wanted to be acceptable members of society. Porfiristas
denounced Anglo colonization, but set standards that internally colonized el México de afuera.
Calluses, for example, would be more prevalent among people with jobs requiring manual labor, and in
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San Antonio, approximately three-fourths of the immigrant population worked in unskilled jobs.434 The
advertising within La Prensa and Revista Mexicana fetishized whiteness while directly associating
social mobility (and happiness) with a middle- to upper-class standard of consumption and appearance.
Furthermore, La Prensa and Revista Mexicana used the rhetoric of cleanliness and hygiene in
advertising in order to promote patriarchal gender roles and justifying them with science. One of the
products frequently advertised in La Prensa was “Compuesto Mitchella,” a supplement for women in
child-bearing age. Women were advised not to “fear maternity,” since this natural product would
alleviate the pain and discomfort associated with pregnancy and child birth. Women who took this
supplement were promised “robust, healthy, and strong” children. One of the ads for this product
featured a woman wearing an elegant dress and pearls, carrying a healthy infant, demonstrating that
mothers were happy and fashionable. Advertising targeted men’s health issues as well, and another
frequent advertiser in La Prensa and Revista Mexicana was Chicago physician James Russell. His
company promoted a ninety-six page book for men suffering specifically from syphilis or gonorrhea.
This free book offered home remedies for these ailments and “impure blood, skin diseases…impotence,
cerebral debilities, and diseases of the kidneys and bladder.”435 One version of the ad included an image
of Dr. Price, but another illustrated a man with boils all over his face, a symptom of syphilis. This
particular ad stated that Dr. Price’s book could help with “secret vices” and numerous sexual disorders,
and that by ordering this book men could find a cure for their diseases in the privacy of their home.436
The messages presented to women and men differed significantly. Women had to bleach their skin, bear
children, and change their body structure in order to be publicly accepted. Men were also encouraged to
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change their appearance if necessary, but if they experienced an ailment resulting from a “secret vice,” it
could be dealt with privately with no public shame attached. Of course, women had no such vices.
Men’s and women’s bodies were the primary sites on which Porfirista ideas about race and
hygiene were negotiated, but the Mexican body also became an important patriotic symbol in the midst
of the Mexican Revolution and World War I. During the Porfiriato, the media were responsible for
marking gender roles as part of a larger peace-time modernization project. In the 1910s, however,
Mexicans faced the daily reality of civil war and an unprecedented global conflict. La Prensa and
Revista Mexicana made it clear to readers that although they faced uncertainty, they would overcome
their hardships together if every individual carried out her/his patriotic duty.
Male readers were asked to emulate the nation’s heroes, particularly Díaz. The dictator died on
July 2, 1915, and La Prensa offered its homage by publishing what other newspapers wrote about
Díaz’s historic legacy, in an effort to appear impartial.437 La Prensa also included a letter from an
anonymous subscriber who expressed that Mexicans turned their backs on the hero, but that now Díaz
would experience ultimate glory in heaven.438 The newspaper honored Díaz in a seemingly objective
way, showing respect for the former president and general, but not too much. Revista Mexicana had less
restraint, and its premier issue included the final photo of Díaz on the cover. García Naranjo dedicated
the issue to the fallen dictator, and lamented the dishonorable way in which he was treated by the nation
he served for decades. Revista Mexicana also included a poem by Luis G. Urbina honoring Doña
Carmen, the “ideal princess” who continued to be the epitome of elegance, whiteness, and femininity
even after her husband’s death.439
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The cover page was perhaps the most important element of Revista Mexicana, since it was the
first part of the magazine that people saw, and it offered a full-page visual that summarized the theme of
the issue. More importantly, it made Revista Mexicana’s political orientation clear. Of all the men
featured on the cover of Revista Mexicana, Díaz was featured the most in the magazine’s five-year
history. On April 2, 1916, Revista Mexicana celebrated the forty-ninth anniversary of Díaz’s victory in
Puebla by printing a speech given by García Naranjo in 1912, in which he asked for April 2 to be
declared a national holiday. The following year, on May 6, Revista Mexicana commemorated Díaz’s
other important victory against French forces in Puebla by publishing a portion of The Porfirian Epic, a
biography written by Ricardo Gómez Robelo, the former Attorney General under Huerta. Revista
Mexicana only included the section on Díaz’s military service during the French Intervention. As
previously discussed, both Revista Mexicana and La Prensa focused on Díaz’s heroism on the
battlefield rather than his political activities.
Two other Porfirista heroes, Huerta and Félix Díaz, were the second and third most prominent
figures on Revista Mexicana’s cover. Their depiction on the cover ensured that large photos of Huerta
and Porfirio and Félix Díaz were seen on newsstands and anywhere else the magazine was sold, keeping
their images alive within the collective memory. The photos commemorated important dates and
political moments, including the anniversaries of the deaths of Porfirio and Huerta, and Félix’s photo
graced the cover every time he published a political manifesto. In October 1915, García Naranjo
reprinted Porfirio’s final photo due to popular demand, and the following year Revista Mexicana took
advantage of this in order to increase subscriptions.440 The publisher stated in May 1916 that it could no
longer meet the demand for the premier issue, since only a few copies remained. However, if a reader
submitted the names and addresses of ten potential subscribers, she/he would receive the anniversary
issue of the Decena Trágica with a photo of Bernardo Reyes on the cover. Fifteen submissions
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guaranteed an issue with Félix’s photo, eighteen submissions guaranteed any issue with Porfirio or
Huerta on the cover, and with twenty submissions, the reader would receive the Revista Mexicana’s
second issue, which had a photo of the Angel of Independence on the cover, and other images of the
Paseo de la Reforma and Mexico City.441
Revista Mexicana succeeded in its first years by selling nostalgia, images from the homeland,
and photos of Mexico’s most prominent military men of the previous decade. The magazine also
honored the nation’s intellectuals, but never on the cover. The section entitled “Our Intellectuals”
featured a series of interviews with Mexico’s exiled intellectuals who lived scattered across the U.S. and
Havana, including Moheno, Francisco Vázquez Gómez, Ricardo García Granados, Urrutia, Fernando
López (who helped to organize the Mexican Red Cross in 1909), and Gonzalo Garita, an engineer who
worked on the plans for the Angel of Independence. Each man gave his opinion on current events,
particularly the global wars. López, for example, expressed his certainty that the “strong and vigorous”
German Empire would be victorious in Europe.442 García Granados discussed his work as a historian,
which included writing the sixth volume of México a Través de los Siglos, an encyclopedia of Mexican
history.443 Revista Mexicana emphasized the importance of these men and their contributions to
Mexico, but none of them were memorialized in a similar way as Mexico’s generals. Though the
intellectuals represented Mexico’s progress and success, Porfirio and Félix Díaz, Huerta, and Reyes
symbolized the physically strong, stoic, courageous, and masculine nation. These were the men that
Mexican boys should look up to. With the exception of Félix, all of these generals were dead. Revista
Mexicana could now manipulate the memory of these heroes and present them in a positive light.
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Readers who admired Díaz, Huerta, and Reyes were encouraged to display their photos in their homes,
just as they might do with images of the Christ, the Virgin of Guadalupe and other Catholic saints.
Of course, La Prensa and Revista Mexicana also used and built on Mexican Catholicism more
directly. Richard Dyer discusses the “motif of embodiment” prevalent in Western Christian discourse,
which allows people to think “of bodies containing different spiritual qualities, or of some having such
qualities and others not having them (a trope of white racism).”444 Dyer argues that “the body is the
basis of Christian imagery, notably in the two great set pieces of the birth and death of Christ.”445
However, there is a duality within Christianity between the body and the spirit, and “Mary is a vessel for
the spirit; she does nothing and indeed has no carnal knowledge, but is filled with God…Christ on the
other hand is God, fully divine and fully human.”446 Just as Christ suffered by allowing the torturing of
his body, Mexican warriors who sacrificed their bodies for the homeland carried out the redemptive
sacrifice.
Mary continued to be the utmost representation of Mexican femininity, and women who
nourished their spirits and remained pure acted as vessels that elevated the spirit of the nation.

The

Virgin of Guadalupe was the dominant national symbol that helped immigrants remain attached to the
homeland. San Antonio had Catholic churches for the German and Anglo Catholic communities, and
Our Lady of Guadalupe Church was built specifically to meet the needs of the immigrants living in the
city’s West Side ward.447 Thus, the Virgin of Guadalupe became a cultural marker which distinguished
Mexican Catholics from Germans and Anglos. Ideally, Guadalupe might have also served as unifying
symbol for Mexicans and Mexican Americans living in the barrio. However, Revista Mexicana marked
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the difference between immigrants and Mexican Americans. On December 12, 1915, the magazine gave
homage to the Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe by publishing an image of a celebration at the Basilica
of Guadalupe in Mexico City. Yet the magazine made no mention of any festivities in San Antonio.
Revista Mexicana stated that “the Virgin of Guadalupe [was] more than Mexican: she [was] all of
Mexico.” The author praised this icon because her “supernatural light of celestial goodness” offered “a
merciful ray of hope, [alleviated] hunger and thirst, [refreshed] the sweat from anxiety and fatigue, and
[gave] peace to the simple souls.” Revista Mexicana acknowledged that this cult and the legend of her
apparition to the Indian Juan Diego did more to bring the masses together than any theory or logic.448
For this reason, the Virgin of Guadalupe became a symbol used by Mexican warriors going into battle.
This appropriation of the Virgin of Guadalupe as a nationalist symbol demonstrated that she was
not perceived as a passive figure within Mexican Catholicism. She provided hope to Mexico’s
oppressed groups, particularly the peasants, and she gave them protection as they fought for liberty.
However, this was the relationship between the Virgin of Guadalupe and Mexican men. Mexican
women were supposed to emulate her domesticity, though this was not a passive quality either. One
article in Revista Mexicana, entitled “Conversation with the Mexican Woman: Pro Patria,” explored the
relationship between patriotism and the domestic sphere, stating that “the home could exist without the
homeland” but not the other way around. It added that an “intimate relationship” existed between
women and their homeland, and the “daughter of Mexico” needed to “meditate on the importance of the
role she could carry out in the life of the nation.” The author stated that women should to reject
“radical” and unnatural ideas such as suffrage and feminism, and that they needed to model their lives
and homes after those of Mary of Nazareth. The “redemptive doctrine” sprung from her home,
“breaking the chains of Sparta and elevating the woman, formerly a slave, to her present dignity as the
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companion of man.” The author emphasized this last point: that women were cooperating with men in
the Creator’s grand plan, and that their role was to foster the spirits of their children.449
As Mexican men fought on the battlefield or in the political realm, women were called to use
their femininity to support the cause and produce healthy and strong children. La Prensa projected a
nationalistic image of women in a patriotic drawing published on the anniversary of Mexican
independence in 1916. The newspaper included a full-page illustration portraying an image of Mexico’s
past, present, and future. The caption under the drawing read
All of modern Mexico’s history is condensed here…The Past is the sun…The Past shines with
the transparent clarity of a star. 1810 has the splendor of a firmament that comes together in one
point on the horizon…But, without transitions, abruptly, the perspective changes and we feel as
if we are descending into a limbo where all beauty vanishes and, in the midst of the fire’s smoke,
only the grim outline of Tragedy appears. That is the Present…Disaster seems to have blown
through the untilled field…But, once again…the scenery changes. It is no longer the sun of 1810
that fills the firmament with clarity, rather…the Future that points to the first light of dawn…The
Homeland is on foot…[she is] erect and robost in spite of her [pregnancy] pain, with her swollen
breasts ready to nourish new humanity and her womb erect, as if ready to give birth to the robust
children of tomorrow.450
The woman was described as “La Patria,” which could be translated as “The Homeland” or “The
Fatherland.” Within the Mexican context, “La Madre Patria” referred to Spain; “La Matria,” or “The
Motherland,” was not commonly used. In this illustration, motherhood was presented as Mexico’s
salvation, and women who endured the pain of childbirth made the ultimate patriotic sacrifice. Men
gave up their bodies and their lives for the nation; women produced life and generated Mexican bodies.
This illustration, the advertising telling women not to fear childbirth or motherhood, and the literature
that consistently reinforced patriarchy demonstrated the gender roles that Porfiristas continued to
perpetuate within Mexican society.
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La Prensa and Revista Mexicana directly tied Porfirista identity to patriotism and continually
reinforced the message that readers had the duty to act for the benefit of the nation. Even though they
lived outside of the homeland, Mexican immigrants could still contribute to the patriotic cause while
preparing for Mexico’s future. The Porfirista press served el México de afuera by promoting cultural
nationalism and assuaging the community’s nostalgia for the homeland. As the decade progressed, La
Prensa and Revista Mexicana also increased their activism in order to deal with the realities of
discrimination and war.

The Porfirista Press Politicizes el México de Afuera, 1915-1920
In La Prensa’s premier issue, the staff introduced itself to readers by stating that its “program
could be amply explained with these words: we came to fight.”451 The Spanish word used was “luchar”
which translates to “fight,” but in this context meant that La Prensa’s staff would work to succeed in
spite of their displacement in a new country. García Naranjo and his staff, meanwhile, embarked on a
“nationalistic campaign,” putting themselves in “a combative position, which is what all of the exiles
wanted in 1915.” Revista Mexicana focused on editorials, commentary, and satire rather than
straightforward news reports, and contributors expressed their anger, frustration, and sadness regarding
events in Mexico. This magazine offered a glimpse into the mindset of a group of men whose
worldview was constantly under attack, and it revealed the bitterness of exile, the stress of constant
surveillance and harassment from U.S. and Mexican government officials, and the trauma of defeat.
La Prensa became a more activist medium during this period, and it increasingly reflected the
realities of life in the United states. For example, the newspaper’s staff took a special interest in
improving social conditions for local Mexican children. Beginning in 1917, the newspaper sponsored an
annual Christmas celebration for children living in poverty in San Antonio, and the first of these events
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took place in the National Theatre.452 Furthermore, La Prensa published a series of articles on the topic
of “Mexican children and the schools in the state of Texas,” which was “a serious and transcendental
problem.” This series included a speech given by Professor W. J. Knox at a teacher’s convention in
Corpus Christi, in which he spoke about the unique conditions faced by Mexican children. According to
Knox, Mexicans were sentimental and had “a rare attachment to the history, language, and customs of
their homeland.” They also exhibited “admiration for the way in which [Americans] did things,” and
wanted American ideals such as democracy for their nation. Knox commented on how “nobody
[exceeded] Mexican parents in their love for their children,” and education was very important for the
immigrant community. The speaker argued that it was necessary for Mexican children to learn English
and to have the same access to a quality education as Anglos and children of other nationalities.453
La Prensa denounced segregation in Texas schools as racist, but it also stressed the importance
of bilingualism among the immigrant population. The newspaper frequently advertised English without
an Instructor, a book for anyone wanting to learn English, which was sold at the Casa Editorial Lozano.
La Prensa supported Knox’s assessment that teaching English to Mexican children was essential, but for
a different reason. Knox contextualized immigrant education within a broader assimilationist project
that taught children “American values.” La Prensa strictly opposed assimilation and always stressed the
importance of retaining the mother tongue, but Porfiristas understood the political, economic, and
cultural benefits of fluency in more than one language, particularly English and French. La Prensa’s
activism against segregation in Texas schools demonstrated a commitment to the community, but also
signaled recognition of the possible permanence of el México de afuera in the United States, as the
children of immigrants entered schools that would expose them to the culture and customs of the United
States, and not Mexico.
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Although La Prensa paid greater attention to local issues than Revista Mexicana, it was
surprisingly quiet about the escalating violence in South Texas throughout 1915. In January, rebels
drafted the Plan of San Diego, called for the liberation of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, and
Colorado, “of which states the Republic of Mexico was robbed in a most perfidious manner by North
American Imperialism.” The plan would also create a “Liberating Army for Races and Peoples,”
proclaimed “the liberty of the individuals of the black race,” and promised to return ancestral land to
indigenous groups who supported the plan.454 The conflict was designed as a no-quarter race war, since
the rebels specifically targeted all Anglo males ages sixteen and older. U.S. officials immediately
discovered the plot, and the ensuing war between Texas Rangers and ethnic Mexicans resulted in the
deaths of twenty-one Anglos and approximately 300 Mexicans. The rebellion also damaged the local
economy, as Mexican workers returned to Mexico and Anglo farmers fled the area as well. While this
was primarily a rural movement, the deteriorating race relations in South Texas had important
implications for cities in the region with similar tensions between Anglos, Tejanos, and Mexican
immigrants. Regardless, La Prensa did not closely follow the conflict, and took a neutral stance when it
did. For example, La Prensa reported in August 1915 that the Wilson administration was concerned
about the violence and was prepared to send reinforcements to the Rio Grande Valley. La Prensa made
no comment regarding this position, despite its potential for worsening the race relations in the region.455
In fact, when problems arose in the United States because of the Mexican Revolution in Texas,
La Prensa generally maintained its neutrality. This rebellion presented a complex dilemma because La
Prensa did not support the violence related to the revolution, which would have positioned it against the
rebels. At the same time, consistency with other positions would have suggested opposition to the
violence against Mexicans by the Texas Rangers. Neutrality was the best course of action for Lozano
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and his colleagues because it kept them from alienating readers and prevented any problems with the
U.S. government or the Carrancista surveillance.
Although Carranza had triumphed militarily in in Mexico and taken some steps to consolidate
power, he had certainly not gained the full consent of the masses, and hegemony was still being
contested among the revolutionary factions in Mexico and among the exiles. In the United States, the
debate about hegemony in Mexico took place through the press. Michael M. Smith notes that both
Spanish and English-langauge newspapers across the Southwest widely opposed Carranza, including La
Patria and the El Paso Morning Times in El Paso, Regeneración and El Heraldo de México in Los
Angeles, and La Prensa, Revista Mexicana, and El Imparcial de Texas in San Antonio.456 The
Carrancistas responded to that situation when Carranza agent Roberto V. Pesqueira formed the Pan
American News Service (PANS) in 1914, which became “an international wire service operating as a
division of Carranza’s department of foreign affairs. Utilizing the international cable and telegraph
system, Pesqueira sought to link the Constitutionalist government to all sections of the United States by
establishing local offices of the PANS in every city containing a Mexican consulate.”457 Two other
agents, Modesto C. Rolland and Carlo di Fornaro, developed the Mexican Bureau of Information in New
York, where they published articles and bulletins for free distribution to approximately 500 newspapers
across the United States.
Despite their best efforts and the ties to the Wilson administration that they developed,
Carrancista agents could not contain the “enemy press” in the United States and elsewhere. Printed
media and communication and transportation networks became the most important weapons against the
Carranza regime because the oppositional texts circulated beyond the reach of the Mexican state. What
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was worse for Carranza, the exile press also had access to international telegraph services within the
United States. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana gave el México de afuera access to distinct viewpoints
and arguments. In 1916, for example, La Prensa included a section entitled “Overview of the Press,”
which published articles from other newspapers such as the New York Times. The Porfirista press also
exposed readers to other types of media. La Prensa included a list in every issue of the holdings in
Lozano’s bookstore, Casa Editorial Lozano. The listings included novels, books on religion and history,
and math and science textbooks.
La Prensa spoke out against the Carranza government’s censorship of the press while
simultaneously calling journalists in Mexico “ignorant, uncouth, servile, [and] obscene” pawns of the
First Chief. The newspaper also called the revolutionary press “a disgrace from any point of view,”
unlike the exile press which actually “constituted the homeland.”458 Lozano, García Naranjo, and their
colleagues positioned themselves as superior to journalists in Mexico because they believed themselves
to be more courageous than their counterparts. Such a claim was questionable, of course: they faced
constant surveillance, but they enjoyed the relative safety of living north of the U.S./Mexico border.
From their perspective, however, they all made a greater sacrifice than any journalist living in Mexico,
since they lived displaced from the homeland.
Perhaps because they now had a solid readership, La Prensa’s staff began to take greater liberties
in expressing their political views, and the newspaper critiqued other aspects of the Carranza
government. In particular, the newspaper blamed Carranza for the widespread hunger and misery across
Mexico. On June 9, 1916, an article stated that “while Mexico [died] of starvation, Carranza [sent]
beans to Europe.” A ship from Mexico had arrived in New York the previous day en route to Europe,
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and the author wrote that exporting a basic dietary staple such as beans was the final straw from the
Carrancistas, who were flinging the nation “into infernal misery.”459
La Prensa’s critiques of the First Chief were tame, however, in comparison with those of Revista
Mexicana. Revista Mexicana was willing to launch attacks against anyone perceived as Mexico’s
enemy, and García Naranjo noted in his memoirs that “what [readers] liked the most was that the
arrogance with which we threw darts at Carranza and Villa inspired us to throw flaming arrows at
[Wilson].”460 In its second issue, the magazine asked “tu quoque, Brutus?” in reference to the Latin
American countries that had seemingly betrayed Mexico by negotiating with the United States in
Niagara Falls to hasten Huerta’s resignation in 1914. The author wondered why these nations were
surprised that Mexico was in a state of disgrace.461 Revista Mexicana also implicated the Wilson
administration in the execution of the former Villista mayor of Torreón, Coahuila, Santiago Ramírez, in
July 1916. Before joining Villa, Ramírez had been “one of the blood brothers of Carranza”; therefore,
despite their ideological differences and “regardless of his [Ramirez’s] crimes,” Carranza owed him
some consideration. Revista Mexicana defended Ramírez for fighting against General John J.
Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico, and the magazine called Carranza a traitor for ordering the
execution of his former friend despite offering amnesty to accused criminals battling Pershing. The
author wrote that not even “the Apache, the Hooligan, [or] the Mafioso…invoked the sacred name of the
Homeland for murder” as Carranza did. He also blamed the Wilson administration, the “defender” of
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human rights, for recognizing and legitimizing the Carranza regime and marking Mexico with the “curse
of Judas.”462
In fact, Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916 and the subsequent Punitive
Expedition received widespread attention from both publications. La Prensa responded by publishing
telegrams with information about the negotiations between the Wilson and Carranza governments, and
an article stating that “the majority of the Mexican population [opposed] the entry of [U.S.] troops.”463
La Prensa did not directly comment on the conflict in the editorial section, but did include a front-page
article in which Manuel Calero stated that it was “embarrassing that a bandit like Villa precipitated an
international crisis.”464 Revista Mexicana shared Calero’s sentiments, but placed the blame for the crisis
on Carranza. An editorial in the magazine entitled “An Acceptable Solution” argued that after almost a
month, it was time for Pershing to withdraw from Mexico, and the Wilson administration should be
content with having scattered Villa’s forces. Carranza, however, committed treachery against Mexico
because he all but welcomed U.S. troops into Mexico and demonstrated that he was willing to sacrifice
the nation in order to maintain favor with Wilson. Worst of all, Carranza exposed his inability to deal
with the “demented and criminal acts of Mexico’s bad sons” such as Villa.465
Although the Porfirista press kept readers updated on the political conflicts in Mexico, La Prensa
shifted its attention to local isses when the United States entered World War I in April 1917. According
to La Prensa, Mexican immigrant men who had no proof of their nationality began to panic when faced
with the possibility of being drafted into the U.S. military. In May, La Prensa assessed the situation and
stated that many immigrants did not register in Mexican consulates because they lived in rural and
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inaccessible areas, or because they did not trust the Carrancista consuls. La Prensa urged readers to
register at the nearest consulate, but if they had lived in the United States for more than six years, they
needed to prove that they had not voted or run for political office. It seemed that the panic among
immigrants became increasingly widespread in San Antonio, where troops gathered at Fort Sam
Houston to form the Fifty-ninth Infantry Regiment in July.466
According to La Prensa, Mexican Consulates were overwhelmed with requests for
documentation. In an effort to compel Mexican nationals to obtain all of the necessary documentation to
reside in the United States, the consul in San Antonio declared in January 1918 that he would no longer
grant Mexican passports to anyone who could not prove Mexican citizenship. This angered Mexican
immigrants, who believed that their U.S.-born children were also Mexican nationals because of
ethnicity. One article asserted that “none of these individuals consider American citizenship to be
inconvenient; rather, the love for the homeland that beats in their hearts made them profoundly sad”
because their children could not legally be considered Mexican.467 The sons of Mexican parents now
had the obligation to fight for the United States if called to serve, and Mexican families were legally
divided by nationality. La Prensa did not explicitly state whether or not U.S.-born Mexican men should
serve in the U.S. armed forces. Instead, the newspaper argued that these men should not be forced to
serve because of a lack of documentation.
Several exiles formed the “Committee of Mexican Citizens” in order to deal with this problem.
The officers of this organization were former Huerta cabinet members Tamariz and David de la Fuente,
Salomé Garza Aldape (brother of Manuel Garza Aldape), Lozano, and Valentín Rivero. The committee
received word in September 1918 from Major General Enoch Crowder and the U.S. Department of
Justice that “subjects or citizens from neutral countries, including Mexico” would not qualify for
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military service “even if they had their first papers or had voted in the United States.”468 Although the
war in Europe was approaching its end by this time, the cooperation between these Mexican leaders and
U.S. government officials represented an act of solidarity. The meeting also helped to establish a legal
process through which immigrants could obtain the necessary documents to prove their nationality. The
committee, in conjunction with the Mexican Consul in San Antonio, Teódulo Beltrán, developed
questionnaires accepted by the U.S. government that would validate Mexican citizenship. In September
and October 1918, La Prensa reminded readers of the importance of filling out the questionnaires, and
over 1,500 immigrants in San Antonio submitted them.469 Mexican consuls in El Paso, Dallas, and Ft.
Worth followed similar measures.470 La Prensa’s staff, Mexican authorities, and the broader exile
community worked together to ensure the legal protection of el México de afuera and the children of
Mexican immigrants. The committee’s work was patriotic because it encouraged immigrants to assert
their national identity, but it was also a matter of self-preservation, since the questionnaires were a tool
used to avoid military service.
Until this moment, La Prensa had focused primarily on the wars in Mexico and Europe. It
continued to do so, but it now paid more attention to local issues in an effort to help the Mexican
community confront new legal realities of living in the United States. Compounding the challenge of
the draft was a new immigration law in 1917, which included provisions stating that Mexicans could
enter the United States “without prerequisites” only if they proved that they were going to work in
agriculture.471 Immigrants would have a much more difficult time freely crossing the U.S./Mexico
border, and they needed to be better educated about the requirements for residency in the United States.
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There also needed to be cooperation between immigrants, Mexican officials, and the U.S. government in
order to ensure the protection of immigrants, and Lozano used his newspaper as part of this broader
network.
The Porfirista press was not, however, against the war effort. In fact, the U.S. government
bought advertisement space in both publications to promote it. Readers were presented images of Uncle
Sam and families looking at soldiers carrying the American flag as they were asked to “help the cause of
Democracy” by purchasing U.S. savings bonds.472 Another advertisement asked Texans to work in
factories.473 Regardless of their criticism of the Wilson administration, the Porfirista publications
supported democracy, which was the rhetoric used by the United States to justify its participation in the
war. And of course from an economic perspective, both publications benefitted from this advertising,
especially La Prensa, which printed more of these ads and generated more revenue.474 The publications
could have been adversely affected politically and economically by choosing not to print the government
ads, but in doing so the complexity of their transnational position became clear. As much as La Prensa
and Revista Mexicana attempted to protect Mexican nationalism, Lozano, García Naranjo, and many of
their readers lived within the boundaries of the U.S. nation-state. They may not have been U.S. citizens,
but these ads projected a message to readers that they owed a measure of loyalty and patriotism to their
host nation.
This complicated Porfirista politics in various ways. This group often criticized President
Wilson and the United States for acting as the aggressor in Mexican affairs. However, by supporting the
war effort, La Prensa and Revista Mexicana backed U.S. involvement against the Central Powers. This
might seem like an ironic shift, since Porfiristas now demonstrated a level of trust in the United States’s
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ability to resolve global problems. However, García Naranjo stated in his memoirs that when World
War I began in 1914, he and others (including José María Lozano) believed that U.S. involvement was
inevitable, and that the United States would likely emerge as a dominant global power.475 Perhaps the
Porfiristas living in the United States believed that it was in their best interests to support what they
believed would be a U.S. victory, especially since they lived in that nation. Critiques of the U.S. war
effort might also be considered seditious activity.
As Porfiristas dealt with the U.S. war effort, they also continued to fight the Carranza regime.
Revista Mexicana devoted 1917 and much of 1918 to the protest against the Constitution of 1917, asking
readers to demonstrate their opposition by signing the petition printed in the magazine. This gave el
México de afuera the opportunity to join Mexico’s top exiled military leaders and intellectuals in a
public public protest against the Mexican government. Of course, there was no way to force agreement,
and even Porfiristas reacted differently to the petition. La Prensa made no mention of it, and according
to a list in Revista Mexicana, González signed the petition, but Lozano did not.476 The reasons for
Lozano’s reaction are unknown. La Prensa did not support the new constitution, and it made a political
statement by publishing a photo of Juárez on the front page on February 5, 1917, but perhaps Lozano did
not want his name and that of his business attached to the protest.
In February 1918, Revista Mexicana reprinted the petition and stated that even Carrancistas
publicly scoffed at the new, fraudulent constitution, and that the “authentic” constitution would soon be
restored. But ultimately the protest failed, and the Constitution of 1857 became a historical document
with no legal validity. This reality became increasingly apparent throughout 1918 and 1919, and Revista
Mexicana’s contributors reacted by writing articles tying the Constitution of 1917 to Bolshevism. This
reflected the fact that, as the decade ended, Porfiristas had to face not only a Mexico, but a world in
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which positivism and their ideas about progress and modernity were no longer relevant. The revolution
became the hegemonic force in Mexico after the ratification of the Constitution of 1917, and within the
context of the Mexican nation-state, Porfiristas and the supporters of the “old regime” became decidedly
counter-hegemonic.
In addition, Europe, the center of their idea of civilization and progress, had ravaged itself in a
barbaric war. García Naranjo referred to these years as “the burning of the old world,” and many of the
exiles would have a difficult time adjusting to these changes.477 The Porfirista exile experience between
1914 and 1920 was shaped by geography, profession, class, gender, race, and personal temperament. La
Prensa and Revista Mexicana represented two exile trajectories. Lozano’s newspaper increasingly
catered to the Porfiristas and broader immigrant community who chose to remain in the United States,
and García Naranjo’s magazine decreased in popularity as the military phase of the revolution came to
an end.
Despite these differences, both publications were important in the development of the Mexican
community in the United States. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana succeeded (at least initially) by
selling nostalgia and providing a sense of “home” away from the homeland. They also engaged the
community through a sense of common struggle, which Mexicans could overcome by adhering to their
proper gender roles and emulating Mexico’s national icons. The Porfirista exile press attempted to
educate its audience and act as the purveyor of culture as its predecessors had during the Porfiriato. It
also acted as an oppressive force by presenting messages on the importance of whiteness and specific
physical features, particularly for women. La Prensa and Revista Mexicana worked to incorporate el
México de afuera into a broader global community and expand its worldview. While it is difficult to
ascertain the level of cultural hegemony achieved by Porfiristas through the press, these publications
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(through writing contests, political activism, and social work) helped to open the public sphere to el
México de afuera in a way that was not possible in Mexico.
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Chapter 5: “El Incendio del Viejo Mundo”: Displacement, Nostalgia, and Identity
“Do not worry Federico; those who left us homeless and without a country will someday face God’s
punishment for the horror they have done and will continue to do under the pretext of vindicating the
nation…”
- José María Lozano to Federico Gamboa, November 11, 1916

During the 1910s, Porfiristas faced triple displacement: World War I destroyed their idealized
conceptions of progress, they were forced to leave their homeland, and they confronted Anglo
discrimination as ethnic minorities in Texas. This chapter will shift the analysis from San Antonio to the
broader Porfirista diaspora, exploring the effects of displacement and the ways in which this group
reacted to the global conflicts and changes of the late 1910s and early 1920s. Jana Evans Braziel and
Anita Mannur argue that “diasporic traversals question the rigidities of identity itself – religious, ethnic,
gendered, national.” They add that diasporic movements also represent “a nomadic turn in which the
very parameters of specific historical moments are embodied and – as diaspora itself suggests – are
scattered and regrouped into new points of becoming.”478 As the Porfirista exiles dealt with their
geographic and political dispersal, they also worked to identify themselves within the context of a new
Mexican nationalism that marked them as “villains.”
Porfiristas resented being forced into “new points of becoming,” and an analysis of the primary
sources reveals that the exiles resisted the changes in their lives in various ways. The more outspoken
writers continued to use the press in the United States, Mexico, and Cuba to fight the Mexican
government’s efforts to destroy their reputations and question their patriotism. Other authors, such as
Francisco M. de Olaguíbel used poetry to express their sentiments. Gamboa kept track of the
psychological effects of exile on family members and close friends in his diary, and García Naranjo
commented on his experiences in retrospect in the 1950s. In San Antonio, Aureliano Urrutia and his
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family defied racism by proudly expressing their Aztec heritage. Regardless of these differences, the
reactions contained elements of nostalgia for Mexico, but more importantly, for the Porfiriato, which
they considered Mexico’s prime (and bygone) era.

Porfirista Reactions to World War I
Hamid Naficy examines the concept of exile within the framework of the “ethnoreligious,
sexual, and nationalistic atrocities worldwide” in the postmodern, late twentieth-century. Naficy argues
that the conflict in the Balkans, in particular, prompted a “radical redefinition of the term ‘exile’” from
“a homogeneous, unitary, and monolithic conception,” to “one that consists of multiple and variegated
exiles.” The author suggests that exile no longer constitutes “strictly political expulsion and
banishment” from one nation-state to another. Instead, it is now a “more nuanced, culturally driven
displacement.” In the Balkans, the policy of ethnic cleansing, religious conflict and persecution, rape of
females as a weapon of war, and the use of concentration camps left millions without “house, home, and
homeland.” Moreover, the “physical violence and psychic ruptures of war, exile, rapid change, disease,
and other factors…led to a crisis of the body.” Exiles lost their homes and were forced to leave their
homelands. They were also “evicted from their own eviscerated bodies…the first and most intimate
home of humans,” through the violence imposed on them, which left them without control over their
bodies.479
Although Naficy challenges the one-dimensional conception of exile as political banishment
from a nation-state, his argument is problematic because it considers “culturally driven displacement” as
a strictly postmodern phenomenon.480 Globalization and electronic media have indeed changed the
ways in which groups interact within and across national boundaries. Arjun Appadurai suggests that the
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world is currently undergoing a process of “deterritorialization,” as “money, commodities, and persons
are involved in ceaselessly chasing each other around the world.”481 The implications of
deterritorialization on exile are significant because the “homeland” can be an abstract space and no
longer limited to a geographic location, specifically a nation-state. Exiles also have easier access to
modes of communication, as well as artifacts from “home.” However, the Porfirista experience in the
1910s was not so different from the nuanced, multilayered exile described by Naficy. The Mexican
Revolution overthrew a political regime while reacting against positivism and the Eurocentrism that
privileged a small sector of the population. The members of the Huerta regime left Mexico as political
exiles, but they also represented the final vestiges of the Porfirista way of life, purged to make way for a
new national identity. Inadvertently, their exile became part of a larger global experience as the modern
world succumbed to war. Porfiristas were displaced politically and culturally, and though they escaped
the violence in Mexico to save their lives, some of them suffered the physical and psychological effects
of exile in the form of depression, anxiety, and even suicide.
This unprecedented global conflict weighed heavily on many Porfiristas, who saw it as
mankind’s rapid descent into a state of barbarism. The exiles found ways to use humor, poetry, and
prose in their reactions against the Carranza regime, but they did not know how to deal with World War
I. Their writing expressed fear and increasing helplessness with each passing year, and the stress of the
uncertainty manifested itself in various ways, including physical and mental illness. In their memoirs,
Gamboa and García Naranjo expressed shock and horror, and La Prensa updated readers daily on the
disasters and tragedies taking place across Europe. World War I proved to be an interstice, an “inbetween” moment where competing visions about the world violently clashed, devastating societies and
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killing and displacing millions of people.482 Though the war took place immediately before radio
became a commodified medium, newspapers such as La Prensa took advantage of telegraph networks
and had correspondents in Europe who provided a daily chronicle of the war. Porfiristas were directly
caught in this interstice, and they were forced to defend their cultural and political identities while
simultaneously adapting to the conditions in exile.
On July 30, 1914, numerous exiles aboard the “Buenos Aires” stopped in Havana after fleeing
Mexico. They accessed the day’s Diario de la Marina, which reported that Austrian Emperor Franz
Joseph had declared war on Serbia, and that Russia, Germany, and France prepared to mobilize their
armies.483 García Naranjo described this poignant moment forty years later in his memoirs, but the
exiles understood at the time that the news foreshadowed what they believed would be a much greater
tragedy than the one they were presently living. He and José María Lozano discussed the political
situation in Europe with mixed reactions. They believed that the United States would take the upper
hand in global events, leaving Mexico at its complete mercy. On the other hand, they were relieved
because the war in Europe offered them some respite. García Naranjo stated that the world quickly
forgot about Mexico’s civil war and turned its attention to the “giant hurricane” in Europe. After
arriving in New York, García Naranjo realized that reporters were no longer interested in sensational
declarations from the exiled members of the Huerta administration. He and Lozano were grateful for
that, since it provided them opportunity to “lose [themselves] in complete anonymity” and escape
reporters and politics, albeit briefly.484
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Gamboa expressed his strong reactions to the European conflict throughout his diary. On August
2, 1914, he wrote “Europe burns. Germany has thrown itself on France!...another tragedy begins! And
civilization?...The European fire is proof that human savagery is universal and incurable. Homo homini
lupus! [man is man’s wolf].”485 Three years later, he commented again on the seemingly endless war.
On December 31, 1917, he wrote
What a year, Lord God, what a fateful year! Where there is no war…there are the complications
and consequences of these…catastrophes—or plague, or misery and hunger, or terrifying
problems with extremely difficult solutions—, [sic] socialism is advancing…and no one knows
what it will demand through violent means after the conclusion of the European conflict—
everywhere there is pain, pain, infinite and eternal pain that is man’s fatal partner in the forced
pilgrimage to the cradle of the tomb; but an intensive, quintessential, implacable pain…And
throughout the entire world, even in its most obscure corners, human rights…suspended and
mocked…[two men] act as the supreme arbitrators of the world’s destiny, two dictators, two
despots, two delirious and egocentric ideologues, two Lucifers…these two monsters are Kaiser
Hohenzollern and President Wilson. Deliver us, Lord, from these sinister characters!...Miserere
nobis [have mercy on us] if Wilhem II of Germany and Woodrow I of Yankeeland continue to
[use their power] for the misfortune of the species. Miserere nobis!”486
This passage represented a stark contrast from his optimistic entries written seven years earlier. Gamboa
organized the Mexican centennial celebrations and rejoiced in the pomp, visits from foreign dignitaries
(including German diplomats), and patriotic displays of Mexican progress and inclusion in the civilized
world. 1910 represented all that was good in the world, the pinnacle of civilization; by 1917, Gamboa
witnessed how base and evil humanity could be, and only God’s mercy could save them.
Gamboa’s conceptualization of the world through the dichotomy of good versus evil needs to be
considered as a product of the times. The writer was born in 1864 and grew up during the peaceful
Porfiriato and before the existence of “world war.” He became an important part of Mexico’s literary
culture as the western world celebrated its accomplishments through extravagant world’s fairs.
Modernity was supposed to alleviate humanity’s problems through advances in science and technology.
These same advances were now being used to kill millions of people across the world. For a man such
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as Gamboa, who stood with Díaz during Mexico’s glorious centennial celebrations, watching the world
self-destruct was utterly heartbreaking, and it worsened his depression and anxiety.
Porfiristas articulated their sentiments in other ways. Revista Mexicana published numerous
pages of photos of the war in its first issues, displaying a wounded soldier carried by members of the
Red Cross, children in the Prussian city of Königsberg tending abandoned fields, and soldiers saying
goodbye to their wives and children.487 The magazine even presented wartime fashion in late 1915 and
the ways in which French designers created women’s clothing inspired by military uniforms.488 La
Prensa reported the latest news from the European warfront on a daily basis, as well as a column
entitled “From the Battlefield,” which included photographs. Readers could “watch” the war almost
daily, seeing images of the Fokker aircraft and its inventor Anthony Fokker, French military officers
observing the front lines in Germany, British artillery, and Pershing visiting with Belgium’s King Albert
I after the United States entered World War I.489 The newspaper also published a photo of the
“caterpillar tank,” followed by an interview from La Prensa’s correspondent in San Francisco with
British Colonel Ernest Swinton, the inventor of the weapon.490 Throughout 1915, readers could glimpse
at scenes such as Italian soldiers shooting at Austrian forces from the trenches, German troops gathering
a wheat harvest for provisions, and wounded Turkish soldiers.491 La Prensa did not use adjectives to
describe these photographs; the newspaper only included subject headings. In 1916 and 1917, however,
these headings incorporated adjectives, making them more dramatic. Readers could now witness the
“Echoes of the Romanian Disaster,” “The Terrible Effects of the Austrian Artillery,” and “The Terrible
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Maritime Campaign,” which portrayed burning ships at sea.492 La Prensa even depicted “Picturesque
Scenes from the War,” such as a group of soldiers struggling to pull a cannon up the Vosges Mountains
in France (since it was “impossible” to do with horses or mules), and smiling American troops who were
going to fight alongside French forces.493
A number of the newspaper’s editorials, particularly at year’s end, reflected a growing sense of
despair as the war progressed. On December 31, 1914, La Prensa published the editorial “1914,”
describing the “agony of the Red Year,” and calling for peace in Mexico and throughout Europe.494 The
following year, the editor (either Teodoro Torres or Ignacio E. Lozano) likened the war in Europe to a
battle between the titans, and he called each battle a stanza in “Death’s poem” acted out by man. The
author noted that it was unfair to criticize Europe for its savagery when Mexico could not resolve its
own civil war. At least the war in Europe offered a “grandiose spectacle;” Mexico had spent the
previous five years involved in “the most dreadful and unfruitful of all wars,” whose
“horrors…exceeded all those witnessed during the black year of 1915.”495
In 1916 and 1917, the year-end reflections focused on the civil war in Mexico, but with the end
of World War I in late 1918, La Prensa’s editor took the opportunity to comment on the effects of the
global struggle. He stated that it was not the end of a year, but rather “the end of an era, tragic, osseous,
and adverse for humanity.” The author likened this to a death on a hospital bed, alluding to fate of many
soldiers, but he also expressed hope for the future, calling 1919 the “year of rectifications.” Humanity
had a second chance at life and nature would restore equilibrium. Moreover, a transformation was
taking place that would “consolidate societies upon new foundations with more humane, equitable,
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moral, and universal orientations.” The editor also placed his utmost hope in the homeland and stated
that “apart from her, we [the exiles] have learned to love her more and better, and we make an effort to
teach [others] to love her…all of our cares, all of our aspirations, all of our loves rise upright in favor of
the homeland urging to redeem [us from our] state of affliction…like a martyred matron.” He ended his
reflection by calling upon all Mexicans to use reason and come together harmoniously to “save and exalt
[their] Homeland.”496 Because the newspaper circulated daily, readers could get the sense that La
Prensa was constantly with them, partaking in their struggles. La Prensa suffered and rejoiced
alongside its audience, and after years of following World War I every single day, there was finally hope
for the future. The newspaper demonstrated awareness that the world was inherently different compared
to 1914, and it considered this as a positive circumstance.
However, Revista Mexicana did not. Throughout World War I, García Naranjo’s publication
focused primarily on the civil war in Mexico and the problems of the Carranza regime, referring to the
European conflict sporadically in the editorials. After 1915, the magazine also stopped printing photos
from the warfront.497 At the end of World War I, Revista Mexicana addressed the increasing global
prominence of Bolshevism and its negative influence on the Mexican Constitution of 1917. Throughout
1919, the magazine published a seventeen-part series written by Jorge Vera Estañol entitled “Why the
Constitution of 1857 is National, Why the Constitution of 1917 is Bolshevik.”498 As the title of these
articles suggested, Bolshevik ideology had no place within Mexican political or national identity. Vera
Estañol claimed that the “bastard constitutional congress” of 1917 destroyed the principles of the 1857
document, and the attempts to implement communist principles in Mexico posed a threat to the nation.
Like Moheno, Vera Estañol criticized the secularization of the education system, since it reduced the
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number of teachers in an abundantly illiterate society.499 He also pointed out that the right to own
private property was what propelled Mexico’s economic growth, and he argued that Article 27 of the
Constitution of 1917 “was neither properly individualist…nor communist” because although it upheld
the value of ejidos, it did not give Mexicans collective access over all national territory.500 Even if the
Constitution had taken the latter measure, “modern collectives that subsisted organically and reached
maximum efficiency” could not exist because they required complete equality among members, which
went against human nature.501
The critiques of the Constitution of 1917 demonstrated a genuine apprehension about
communism. Vera Estañol’s use of Bolshevism as a framework for attacking the new constitution
underscored a more serious fear—that the ideas about progress that shaped the Porfirista worldview
were in decline. Monarchies were toppled across the globe and capitalism and positivist notions of
modernity were seriously challenged by communism. The United States now posed as the dominant
world power (to the dismay of Porfiristas), and not only was Mexico’s position in the civilized, modern
world compromised, it became difficult to define the “civilized world.” The supporters of the
Constitution of 1857 had to face the reality that the Constitution of 1917 now gave Mexico its political
legitimacy, especially since it was accepted by the United States. Porfiristas, particularly those involved
with the Huerta regime, were considered reactionary after Huerta’s resignation in 1914, when it
remained unclear which faction would win control over Mexico. With the ratification of the
Constitution of 1917, the revolution became the hegemon from which Mexico’s leaders claimed
legitimacy for the remainder of the twentieth century.
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The Exiles Chronicle the Displacement from Mexico
Porfiristas were now decidedly counter-hegemonic, part of the “old regime” that had waning
relevance in Mexican and broader Western politics and society. They were also cast as traitors because
of their opposition to the revolution. In an effort to defend themselves, their families, and their
reputations, Porfiristas kept track of their experiences in exile, as they had during the Huerta regime.
The memoirs recount the story of a group defeated in almost every way possible, and their fall from
grace reads like a tragedy. The texts were highly political, displaying an unapologetic attitude on the
part of the authors. Writing and publishing these memoirs served as an act of defiance against the
revolution, ensuring the existence of documentation of the perceived injustices of the Carranza regime.
Judith Butler argues that while censorship generally regulates offensive speech, it can also
produce speech when “censorship precedes the text.”502 She adds that “to move outside of the domain of
speakability is to risk one’s status as a subject,” and the act of speaking creates subjectivity only if it is
done within the normative limits.503 The Carranza regime attempted to eliminate the subjectivity of its
opponents by censoring the press, thus removing any “normative limit” through which the opposition
could express itself. Despite Carranza’s efforts to do this beyond the nation’s borders, the exiles still
managed to publish critiques of the First Chief and his regime. The intellectuals who formed part of the
Mexican “reaction” understood that literacy equaled power, especially beyond the reach of Carrancista
censorship, and they had the capability of documenting their critiques, feelings, and experiences as a
way of asserting their own subjectivity. In retrospect, the written words of these exiles kept them from
being erased from the historical record by the institutionalized revolution.
García Naranjo’s memoirs were written in hindsight, allowing the author to reflect on his
decisions and actions. On the other hand, Moheno’s letters (published as one volume) and Gamboa’s
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diary provide insight into the process of exile as it took place. Although these texts account for only two
individual experiences, they are important because they trace the immediate reactions to the conditions
in which the exiles lived, particularly in Havana. These sources need to be read with the understanding
that they were not meant to be private; both Moheno and Gamboa intended to publish this material as
soon as possible. All three authors expressed a general frustration with their political situation, but
Gamboa was careful about omitting information he deemed dangerous, such as his extensive
involvement with the counter-revolutionary Pacificatory Assembly in San Antonio. García Naranjo and
Moheno, on the other hand, openly criticized and insulted Carranza, Wilson, and the rest of their
enemies. Despite the differences in the three accounts, the authors hoped to accomplish the same goal
through their writing—to uphold their nation and defend their reputations.
García Naranjo wrote about the initial anger he felt upon arriving in New York, stating that the
“rage” he felt was “the worst of all advisers…I was blind and I wanted to stay that way.”504 He was
especially hurt by the dispersal of his family and friends. In October 1914, the Cuadrilátero met
unexpectedly in New York. García Naranjo ran into José María Lozano outside of a subway station in
Times Square, “in one of those coincidences that rarely occur in life.” Lozano had just returned from
Spain, and García Naranjo told him that Moheno was on his way from New Orleans. The three men met
at the Belmont Hotel, remembering their friend Olaguíbel, who was incarcerated in Mexico City by the
Carranza regime. They chatted, shared stories, and discussed their future plans. García Naranjo had
accepted an offer from Rubén Valenti to move temporarily to Guatemala because New York was too
expensive. Lozano “did not know what route to take” because of his difficult financial situation, and
Moheno only had funds to live in New Orleans for six months.505 In his memoirs, García Naranjo
remembered “the terrifying impression” he felt about the “provisional lifestyle” they were living.
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This feeling only intensified when he moved to Guatemala, sending his wife Angelina and their
two children to Monterrey to live with her family. García Naranjo recalled feeling especially guilty for
leaving his infant children and missing significant milestones in their development. The rest of his
family was spread out as well; his mother lived in Laredo, and his brother Arturo in Mexico City.
García Naranjo stated that “the word ‘dispersion’ squeezed [his] nerves and froze [his] blood,” and the
two weeks after he left his family in Monterrey were the “most bitter of his long exile.”506 Nevertheless,
he moved to Guatemala with Valenti (his colleague in the Ministry of Public Instruction) in December
1914. García Naranjo worried about his dear friend, who fell into deep states of depression when he
consumed alcohol and who “needed someone to force him into absolute abstinence.”507 In March 1915,
García Naranjo earned enough money to move to Texas, but he was reluctant to leave Valenti alone,
fearing for his mental well-being. García Naranjo asked Valenti to wait three months, enough time to
gather enough money to relocate Valenti to the United States. García Naranjo remembered Valenti’s
face “lighting up” with this possibility, giving him hope for the future.508 They said their goodbyes, but
before García Naranjo arrived in Texas, Valenti died after jumping off of a third-floor balcony. Based
on García Naranjo’s account, it seemed that Valenti suffered from bipolar disorder, and the day of his
suicide, he took an excessive amount of stimulants to calm his nerves. It was a tragic end for the man
García Naranjo considered the “first rebel against positivism,” an “intelligent” man and “one of the best
sub-Secretaries of Public Instruction.” On a personal level, the news of Valenti’s death made García
Naranjo “feel like a part of himself had been amputated.”509
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The exiled Huerta regime, though dispersed, felt a sense of solidarity through common tragedy.
Moheno dedicated his collection of letters, entitled Sobre el Ara Sangrienta, to “all of the victims,” and
more specifically to Alberto García Granados, the only Huerta cabinet member executed by the
Carranza government.510 The collection begins with a scathing letter to Ignacio Baeza and Carlos
Fernández Benedicto, written shortly after Moheno arrived in Havana in 1915. In late 1914, Baeza and
Fernández Benedicto developed a magazine of satirical caricature entitled Semanario Humorístico de
Caricaturas Moheno, which made fun of Moheno and his colleagues. Moheno charged them with
claiming his name as their “personal patrimony and happily exploiting it…without scruples, [and]
without reflecting upon whether [they] had the right to do so.” The exile accused the publishers of
“throwing themselves” against him “with the rapacity of a band of vultures that devour the remains of an
animal, dead and forgotten in the solitude of the countryside.” Their actions demonstrated their “great
mental poverty and null morality,” and Moheno felt “nothing but great pity” for them. He then called
the publishers cowards who lacked “Christian charity” for attacking a fallen compatriot, and hypocrites
for supporting Madero, then turning against him, and doing the same with Huerta. He asked them how
it felt to sit at the dinner table with their wives and children while eating the food “acquired through the
suffering of others,” and if they ever gagged in disgust over their “nauseating work.”511
Throughout 1915 and 1916, Moheno also expressed grievances against the aristocrats in the exile
community. In a letter to García Naranjo, Moheno wrote that a nation’s elites had the capacity to
“possess superior culture” and pass it to the rest of the nation. The Mexican aristocracy, however, acted
as a “malignant tumor,” a “useless appendage,” “selfish and lacking virility” because of the group’s
“idleness” and lack of “ideals and civic valor.” Mexico’s aristocrats had “no right to live as the superior
castes” because they only sought self-preservation rather than the benefit of the nation. Moheno then
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described the conditions in Havana, where “two thousand” Mexican refugees lived while “avoiding each
other, hiding from one another in order to eat their slice of bread alone…without having to share with
their neighbor, much less a compatriot.” The exile recalled speaking to “a young opulent Mexican man”
who traveled to Mexico from Europe in order to “see if the [country] had been fixed” (which Moheno
accepted as evidence of the aristocrats’ detachment from the troubles in Mexico). This young man told
Moheno that he did not want to reside in Havana, because he “feared finding a large Mexican element”
in the city.
In this same letter, Moheno criticized the aristocrats for not supporting the Peace-Making
Assembly, and he cited all of these as examples of a “selfish” upper-class who “closed their ears and
their hearts” to the homeland and to their fellow Mexicans.512 These were the same critiques launched
against men like Limantour, who preferred being in Paris rather than attending the Mexican Centennial
celebrations. From the perspective of Moheno, García Naranjo, and the many others involved in the
counterrevolution, the aristocrats were traitors. They wanted to save their assets without risking their
lives and without any regard for the people in Mexico facing the effects of war, or their fellow exiles
struggling to make a living.
Gamboa made no direct accusations, but he did include an anecdote in his diary regarding this
situation. On June 28, Lozano visited Gamboa to present a plan to “unmask the bad Mexicans
[Carrancistas] to the South American republics,” which would cost $100,000. Gamboa was baffled by
the cost of the plan, but most of all by Lozano’s belief that the aristocrats would contribute the money.
That same day, the writer received an anonymous letter from Paris, written by a person describing
himself as “an old friend who went into exile when the Administration of the grand Porfirio Díaz fell.”
Gamboa deduced that it was from Limantour, and the former Finance Minister expressed that he had
found “refuge in the tomb of oblivion,” where he “hoped to remain indefinitely.” Limantour sent
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Gamboa his “most enthusiastic applause” for an article in Havana’s La Reforma Social in which he gave
a “well-deserved flagellation” to the “men living on the other side of the Rio Bravo… responsible for
our…national misfortunes.” It is noteworthy that Limantour blamed the United States for Mexico’s
problems, since the success of the Díaz regime depended on positive relations with its northern
neighbor. Gamboa saved the letter, but made no comments about its content.513
Limantour’s letter revealed the considerable disconnect between the various groups of exiles.
While Limantour lived in Paris, his “friend” Gamboa frequently described living in poverty in Havana,
suffering the consequences for standing up to the United States and Mexican governments. MacíasGonzález states that in Paris, the “great Mexican colony of wealth” lived in “fine homes” and “moved
among the most select circles of belle époque society,” even during the initial stages of World War I.514
Tello Díaz writes that the Díaz family and other Parisian aristocrats left the capital when World War I
began, but were able to return to their homes in early 1915 and live in relative peace. Even though Don
Porfirio understood that the war would “devastate humanity,” it seemed that the aristocrats had the
resources to better shield themselves from the consequences of World War I. 515 Limantour’s sense of
guilt was evident; he could not even directly address Gamboa, hiding instead behind a flimsy attempt at
anonymity. Gamboa’s resentment was also clear. He was never an aristocrat, but from his perspective,
he gave up his comfortable diplomatic life in Europe to fight for Mexico in the political realm. His
colleagues in the Díaz cabinet had done the opposite.
The memoirs shed light on a perceived misconception about the exiled members of the Huerta
regime. When they fled Mexico, Moheno, in particular, was charged with leaving with vast amounts of
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money and stealing from the Mexican treasury. In 1914, the Veracruz newspaper El Dictamen called
Urrutia and Moheno traitors and “villains,” accusing them of inviting U.S. troops to Mexico in order to
facilitate their escape. Moreover, these men were fleeing “with their ‘acquired’ gold and their lives
guaranteed after usurping power, snatching gold, and strangulating the lives of honorable citizens.” El
Dictamen characterized Moheno as the “personification of cynicism, shamelessness, and political
impunity.”516 It also assured readers that “Moheno would not die of starvation.” He would make money
in the United States by selling his “stories” to U.S. businessmen and possibly a circus owner, since the
ex-minister was a “great political acrobat” who “always landed on his feet in spite of the roundness of
his figure.”517
García Naranjo’s memoirs and Gamboa’s diary told a different story about their friend. When
the Cuadrilátero met in New York City in late 1914, Moheno disclosed that he had come to the
metropolis to visit an old client who had agreed to pay a debt. The money would help him survive for
six months, since he had not earned “a single cent” in New Orleans.518 Moheno did not fare better in
Havana. In late 1916, he shared the condition of his family’s poverty with Gamboa. Moheno’s “wife,
sick from anxiety, [took] care of the kitchen duties, and his sister [cleaned] the house, there, in the
outskirts” of Havana. Gamboa sympathized with Moheno, stating that “in this exile the sorrows of our
friends become our own…Poor Moheno, like me, like many…”519 That same year, as Gamboa and
Moheno discussed possible amnesty from the Carranza government, Moheno exclaimed the he “did not
want amnesty, only tribunals; if anyone could prove that he stole a single cent, dishonored or shed
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anyone’s blood…he would sign his own death sentence!” He was penniless and only wanted to work to
sustain his family.520
According to the memoirs, most of the exiled members of the Huerta regime and their families
struggled to survive, unlike their aristocratic counterparts. But they faced more than just financial
troubles. Gamboa’s diary illustrates the physical, emotional, and psychological effects of displacement
more than the other memoirs. The author was quite frank about the emotions he experienced as his
world fell apart, and between 1914 and 1919, his diary focused extensively on the topic of human
mortality. Before his exile, he noted the passing of family members and friends, and he remembered the
anniversaries of the deaths of his parents and siblings. Beginning in 1914, however, Gamboa’s diary
entries became more somber as he reflected more broadly on death, human misery, and suffering.
During his time in Cuba, he and his wife María Sagaseta de Gamboa experienced a rapid decline in
health, and the stress of exile and poverty contributed to Gamboa’s state of depression. Yet, despite his
constant melancholy, Gamboa attempted to remain optimistic, and he frequently called upon God for
assistance through all obstacles. The writer did not miss Sunday Mass or important Catholic feast days,
and his religious devotion helped him to believe in a brighter future after death.
The language throughout his memoir was bleak and reflected Gamboa’s general mood.
Whenever he referred to politics in Mexico he would make comments such as “so much sadness today!”
or “letters and news from Mexico…heart-breaking!” On August 20, 1915, he stated that “in light of all
that is happening, I have come to this…conclusion: Mexico is irretrievably lost.”521 He discussed the
capacity for “social crises” to bring out the worst in everyone, since “mutual disgrace [leveled]
conquerors and the conquered, intellectuals and commoners, brave people and cowards, strong and weak
souls, adolescents and adults, men and women.” He added that “everyone exposed their incurable
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defects, carefully hidden during normal periods…[and people were] moths…human moths worthy of
little esteem.”522 Gamboa’s hopelessness was evident, and in his entry for August 29, he wrote
“colorless and sad day. But what day isn’t?” In September, Gamboa described a visit he and his wife
made to a group of friends from Mexico in Havana, stating that “exile melancholized everything and
melancholized everyone.” After the visit, Gamboa experienced a “furious” panic attack. Although he
attributed the breakdown to the anniversaries of the deaths of his father and brother Pepe, the visit with
his Mexican friends may have also been a factor.523 Gamboa’s suffering continued through the
remainder of the year, and on December 31, he wrote “another year has died, and with it many things,
many hopes, many desires.”
He began 1916 at “fifty-one years of age, without a homeland, with [his] health in a precarious
condition, and [his] finances in a worse state.” Nevertheless, he had the “instinctive certainty” that “if
God desired to prolong [his] life,” he would return to Mexico that year and live in peace without “being
followed nor harassed.”524 As the year progressed, Gamboa realized that his predictions would not
come to pass. In February 1916, the writer chatted with Pablo López, an acquaintance who was in
Havana as part of Carranza’s Secret Service. Gamboa asked if he ran any risks by returning to Mexico,
and López replied that the Carrancistas “would make a banquet with him.”525 This brief encounter
helped Gamboa to understand the precariousness of his situation, and when Moheno proposed a trip to
Mexico in June, Gamboa dissuaded him, telling his friend that “if we arrive and they sacrifice us, who
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would defend us after our death?” Gamboa was prepared to defend himself and “prove his innocence,”
but not until he could safely return to the homeland.526
By December 1916, Gamboa likened his situation to that of the biblical character Job. On
December 7, he wrote “In a very bad mood!...Disenchantment, desperation, fears, uncertainty. The
years eating away at my body internally and externally…I should exclaim with Job: -Dominius [sic]
dedit, Dominus abstulit; sit nomen Domini benedictum [the Lord gave and the Lord has taken away;
may the name of the Lord be praised].”527 During this time, Gamboa’s income depended on his writing,
and he accepted jobs translating books and submitting articles for publication in newspapers, but it was
not enough, especially since it seemed that his work was rejected because of his politics. For example,
Gamboa unsuccessfully submitted an article for publication in the Saturday Evening Post, which would
have paid one-thousand U.S. dollars. Gamboa believed that his “enmity” with Woodrow Wilson
influenced the editor’s decision, and “as long as the puritan from Princeton inhabited the White House”
no one would offer the Mexican exile even “a single drop of water.”528
Gamboa also struggled to publish enough material in Cuba to support his family, further
aggravating his emotional state. As the residents of Havana celebrated the end of 1916, Gamboa
experienced “an internal state of mourning,” adding that
from my bed I hear the racket on the streets; I think of my loved ones in Mexico…the three of us
[Federico, María, and Miguel] here, my employment hanging by a thread, filled with bitterness
and desperation….I feel forsaken and out of luck, my house and my homeland more distant each
day, and my joy and that of my loved ones farther away than the homeland. Facing the grave
risk of losing the [salary] with which we eat and live poorly, if I did not blindly believe in God’s
mercy like I do, I would have to follow the example of bankrupt merchants…[and declare]
FEDERICO GAMBOA IN LIQUIDATION!529
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On January 1, 1917, “after seeing the failure of [his] prophecies for the previous year,” Gamboa decided
not to make any more predictions for the future. He placed his fate in God’s hands and wondered if the
days ahead would be better or worse.
The writer had clearly lost faith in humanity and constantly lamented his circumstances, but the
belief that God would someday relieve his suffering sustained him through his trials. It seemed that his
faith influenced at least one of his friends. Olaguíbel once told Gamboa that the exiles could be
categorized into three groups: the rebels, dreamers, and the serene ones. According to Olaguíbel, most
of the exiles fell in the second group, but Gamboa was one of the few men who belonged to the third.
During this same conversation, Olaguíbel stated that he felt he was becoming a “providentialist’ who
would no doubt end up a Catholic.” In his diary, Gamboa commented that “the school of suffering
[was] an admirable vehicle for conversions!”530
Gamboa’s faith in God was directly tied to his Catholic devotion, and in his diary, he frequently
mentioned attending Mass on feast days related to the Virgin Mary. On December 8, 1916, he and his
wife celebrated the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, albeit by partaking in a meal consisting of “the
only luxury…[they] could permit themselves: grapes and dates.” This was also María’s “santo,” or feast
day, which made her “more homesick than usual.” However, the Virgin Mary offered consolation to
Federico. He wrote about the celebrations on the Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe, “his Indian Virgin,”
on December 12, 1916. Ángel Sánchez, an exiled Spanish priest who had served in Coatepec, Veracruz,
officiated Mass. Next, the exiles sang the Mexican national anthem at the altar “at the feet of the
Patroness of Mexico.” 531 The following year, Gamboa and his son attended Mass at the church Nuestra
Señora de la Merced, officiated by the exiled Archbishop of Yucatán. Gamboa recalled seeing General
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Mondragón at the service, but provided no further details. At the end of the Mass, the organist “played
the sweet and heroic” Mexican national anthem, moving many of the pilgrims to tears.532
These recollections demonstrated the importance of this nationalist symbol in maintaining
cultural unity in exile. The feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe helped its observers to feel a sense of home
in spite of their nostalgia (though as María demonstrated, the opposite was also true). The Carranza
regime could not force the exiles to relinquish their Mexican identity. Hence, these cultural celebrations
became acts of resistance against the First Chief and everyone who labeled the exiles as traitors.
Furthermore, this feast day served as an opportunity for Porfiristas to create their own sense of “home”
in Havana. Catholic feast days were important in cities such as San Antonio, as well, where immigrants
and Tejanos could potentially worship and celebrate together. These groups were united by common
faith, language, and Mexican heritage. Porfiristas in Cuba faced a different dynamic. Although they
lived with other Spanish-speakers (and it had been less than three decades since José Martí published his
ideas in favor of Pan-Americanism), Porfiristas were not Cuban. Catholicism marked this difference,
since Cubans venerated their patroness, the Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre (the Virgin of Charity),
rather than Guadalupe.
Chicana feminist scholars have considered the Virgin of Guadalupe as a symbol of nonconformity. Ana Castillo argues that many activist Chicanas reconcile their support for the patriarchal
Catholic Church by focusing on their personal spirituality and reverence for Guadalupe, rather than
masculine symbols such as the Holy Trinity. Moreover, the Virgin offers a sense of motherly comfort to
Chicanas rebelling against their own mothers, families, and patriarchal, heteronormative, “machista”
society.533 Castillo’s argument adds another dimension to the characterization of the Virgin of
Guadalupe by emphasizing her motherhood as a conduit for rebelliousness. This was not the Virgin
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whose image appeared on the banners of independence leaders and revolutionaries as they stormed into
battle. Nor was she the passive, pious, obedient wife. Rather, she accepted and loved all of her children
unconditionally and gave comfort to those who did not conform to oppressive social standards.
This characterization of the Virgin of Guadalupe coincides with Gamboa’s devotion to her. Of
all of the Catholic feast days, the celebrations in honor of the Virgin Mary (particularly on December
12) were the only ones regularly mentioned in Gamboa’s diary during his exile. He was not rebelling
against patriarchal Mexican society, but he was certainly a non-conformist facing rejection,
homelessness, and hardships for not complying with the new status quo. The Virgin of Guadalupe acted
as a good mother and validated Gamboa and accepted him unconditionally. Like Chicanas and other
marginalized groups seeking comfort in Guadalupe, Gamboa’s devotion allowed him to feel at “home,”
an imagined site where he had the freedom to be himself—Catholic, Mexican, and Porfirista.
In October 1919, the Carranza government granted amnesty to Gamboa and his family. María
was gravely ill, and Federico asked for permission to return to Mexico in order to provide a more
adequate treatment for his wife. More importantly, they believed that returning home, being close to
their family, and leaving the humid Cuban climate would lift her spirits. After Gamboa’s arrival in
Mexico, various newspapers published the story of his return, and he recalled the misinformation printed
in these newspapers. Mexico City’s Excélsior reported that Gamboa cried once he saw his homeland,
“placing tears in his eyes” that he did not actually shed. Moreover, El Demócrata published an
interview in which Gamboa allegedly stated that he would “grant Carranza a courtesy visit, in order to
thank him” for the amnesty. Gamboa felt insulted by this, since he had made no such remark. In his
diary, he wrote “rectify? Not in my lifetime!...Give thanks [to Carranza]? I would rather leave [Mexico]
again before thanking him. What did I do to him to deserve the pain of forced expatriation?” He then
asked whom he should thank “first and foremost, [for his] saintly wife’s grave illness caused by poverty,
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melancholy, malnourishment, and terrible climate throughout [their] prolonged exile. And [for his]
son’s education, forever truncated…”534
As they reintegrated into Mexican society, Gamboa and his family once again found comfort in
the Virgin Mary. On December 12, 1919, he and his son attended the celebrations at the Basilica de
Guadalupe (María stayed at home due to her illness). Even though the church was filled to capacity and
they were unable to hear the Mass, Gamboa was moved after seeing a blind man standing in front of him
with exceptional “fervor…in his sightless eyes…!”535 Catholicism and the belief in God and the Virgin
Mary sustained Gamboa through almost five years in Cuba and the moments of blindness when he could
not perceive the end of his exile. He continued to rely on his faith after María’s death in 1920, and he
practiced Catholicism the rest of his life, clandestinely during the Cristero War of 1926-1929.
By writing and publishing his diary, Gamboa (like Moheno and García Naranjo) created an
archive for one facet of the Porfirista exile experience. These exiles faced poverty and unemployment,
and they relied on one another and on their shared cultural traditions to sustain each other through the
trials that came with displacement. Although most expressed anger and frustration in their writing, a
number of Porfiristas embarked on a mission to cheer up their compatriots as the world around them
burned.

Using Humor to Deal with Anguish
Carranza became the primary target of Porfirista ire because they believed he unfairly expelled
them from Mexico. Although Porfiristas blamed the revolution in general for Mexico’s problems, they
developed a hatred for Carranza that they did not feel for Madero, Villa, Zapata, or any of the other
revolutionary leaders. Carranza ruined their lives and threatened to execute them for treason, and he
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was also destroying Mexico and its inhabitants. Consequently, beginning in 1914, the exiles projected
their anger, bitterness, despair, and fears about the future onto the First Chief, who they considered their
worst enemy and the cause of all of their problems.
Revista Mexicana and La Prensa and used humor and satire to insult the First Chief, though each
publication took a different approach. The editorials in Revista Mexicana directly attacked Carrancista
policies, but the other sections of the magazine relied on satire to criticize the First Chief in a spirit of
arrogance and irreverence. One anonymous article, for example, described Carranza’s “ardent passion
for the ‘Supreme,’” a play on his self-description as the Supreme Chief of the Revolution. The author
wrote that “decidedly, that tragi-comic senescence known as Venustiano Carranza [was] terribly
passionate about the word Supreme.” The author identified Carranza as the “supreme sleepyhead”
during his tenure as a Porfirian senator, and “supreme at not doing anything good as governor” of
Coahuila. The author also called Carranza the “supreme deliverer of decrees…supreme twoface…supreme traitor… [and] supreme bilimbiquero,” referring to the Bilimbique, the Constitutionalist
currency that “squashed the country’s wealth.”536
The magazine also contained articles written by various characters who discussed the triumphs
and shortcomings of the Constitutionalist regime. Mexican writer Celedonio Junco de la Vega
developed the character “Silverio,” a staunch Carrancista who wrote letters “from Jauja” (a fictional
Mexican city) to his friend García Naranjo every week between late 1915 and 1918. He discussed topics
ranging from foreign and monetary policy to the accusations of widespread hunger in Mexico, and he
always argued that “Mexico [finally] began to experience joy” after Carranza took control of the
government.537 In one letter, Silverio commented on the numerous titles given to Carranza based on his
extensive achievements, including “Ex-Senator” and “Patriarch.” However, Carranza’s most recent
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title, “Maintainer,” best described his talents. According to Silverio, the First Chief “maintained all
liberties,” including the right to “occupy the property of others without paying rent.” Carranza
“maintained national integrity” by only allowing U.S. soldiers into specific parts of northern Mexico.
He also maintained foreign iron mines in order to send “equipment” (weapons) to Europe “destined for
the reproduction of the human species.” Most importantly, Carranza held the title of “Maintainer of
National Starvation,” an honor which “no one would be able to usurp.” Silverio ended his letter to
García Naranjo with a poem in which he praised “Don Venus” for having mercy on hunger, and
choosing to spare it rather than kill it.538
Writers for Revista Mexicana used the term “Carranclan” as a crude substitute for “Carrancista,”
and the word “Carrancear” became popular across Mexico as a synonym for stealing. However, Silverio
re-appropriated this language by creating a “Constitutionalist Dictionary” in which he defined important
terms related to the regime. For example, “Venus” was a magnificent star “in the sky of the homeland.”
“Pre-constitutional” described a “transitory political period…It could last five years or fifty, but was still
transitory, nonetheless.” Moreover, the best type of government was “DE FACTO, because it had no
DE FECT [sic].” Silverio also addressed the Wilson administration, defining an “invasion” as a
“punishment against any Head of State who did not salute flags with stars and stripes on them.”
“Neutrality” allowed nations who had not declared war to move weapons and troops to their neighbors
involved in armed conflict, and “Wilsonianism” was a cult through which Carrancistas worshipped “the
grand protector of liberties, loyal to neutrality, and incapable of trampling on foreign territory.” Silverio
defined terms relating to other Mexican leaders, as well. He referred to the “odious” Díaz regime with
the feminized nickname “La Odiosa,” and “peace” was a clay artifact “venerated during the times of ‘La
Odiosa.’” “Zapatismo” represented a “glorious emancipation movement initiated [in 1911] by Generals
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wearing white underwear,” and “Villismo” was a mental disorder that “threatened the life of the goddess
Venus” in ancient times.539
García Naranjo responded to Silverio’s letters using the pseudonym “Valerio,” and in his first
piece, Valerio informed his friend that he was going to rob his satirical style. Valerio practiced the
philosophy that “property is theft.” He did not believe he was doing anything wrong, since the
revolutionary generals used this same philosophy to justify taking other peoples’ homes. The generals
“invited the former property owners into their former homes to sit on their former living room
furniture,” which Valerio considered a “beautiful” gesture that reflected the good manners of the
revolutionaries. Thus, Valerio invited Silverio to read his letters and “see how what was yours has now
become mine.”540 In his memoirs, García Naranjo wrote that the banter between Silverio and Valerio
lifted his spirits immeasurably. He stated that Silverio’s contributions to Revista Mexicana made the
magazine more entertaining and popular, but they also helped García Naranjo on a personal level, since
Silverio “made [him] laugh and regain [his] good mood.” Silverio’s letters encouraged García Naranjo
to remain optimistic in the midst of his “monotonous and grey life.” He admitted to facing economic
struggles and poverty, and often feeling “an impotence that determined his desperation.” Silverio
prompted him to find humor in politics and express it in his own work; if García Naranjo “had not
combined his pain with laughter, it would have been impossible to bear the prolonged exile.”541
Silverio and Valerio were not the only characters in Revista Mexicana to address the Carranza
regime. The Mexican poet Guillermo Aguirre y Fierro also critiqued the Carranza regime on a regular
basis through his character “Quasimodo.” In one poem, Quasimodo urged Carranza to leave the
presidential seat and flee to Berlin before his enemies turned him into “sausage.” At the end of the
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poem, the author realized that if Carranza remained in power, he would face a similar fate as Madero.
Quasimodo then changed his mind and encouraged the First Chief to remain in the presidential seat.542
In 1916, the poet wrote a series of fictional epitaphs, known as “Calaveras,” in honor of the Day
of the Dead. The author addressed the principal leaders of the revolution and the various revolutionary
plans and institutions. Quasimodo described the Constitutionalist army as a group “formed by evil” and
comprised of “worthless, lazy…[and] dumb” ruffians who only served to make the “barbón” (Carranza,
the “bearded-one”) rich. Another epitaph told the story of Lucifer, and how he had all of his slaves hide
his money. When a person asked if he was hiding his wealth from the Carrancistas, Lucifer replied that
he was actually hiding it from Ernesto Madero, Francisco I. Madero’s uncle.543
In 1918, Quasimodo wrote another series of “Calaveras” for Revista Mexicana in which he
described how he envisioned the deaths of revolutionary leaders. Carranza’s epitaph read “here lies the
bearded-one. He unjustly occupies a place in this holy ground, because he buried an independent nation
in mourning, dishonor, misery, and grief. Maggots shoot from his dark corner (and you would be wise
to reach for the formaldehyde).” Quasimodo also described unsavory ends for Carranza’s allies. He
spelled General Francisco Murguía’s last name as “Mugría,” a play on the word “mugre” which
translates to “dirt” or “filth.” Quasimodo predicted that “Mugría” would commit suicide in order avoid
a confrontation with his enemy Villa, and that Finance Minister Luis Cabrera would Cabrera also killed
himself out of desperation.544 Álvaro Obregón’s epitaph warned those buried around him that even
though the general “lost five fingernails,” he could easily kill anyone with his remaining hand. The
“Calaveras” described Villa as “an astute bandit, who wore big pants despite not having been a tailor,”
and they predicted that Zapata would divide his burial plot among other Zapatistas.
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The author also wrote Calaveras for prominent figures who opposed the revolution. Gamboa’s
epitaph described a defeated man, bitter for not having won the Mexican presidency. He led the PeaceMaking Assembly in San Antonio and the Mexican Casino, a social club in Cuba, and the epitaph
suggested that Gamboa continued his leadership efforts by trying to take charge of the cemetery and its
inhabitants. Francisco Vázquez Gómez also died of “presidentitis,” and his brother Emilio paid for his
service to the revolution with seven years in exile, plus interest of “a few years and months [owed
to]…the bearded-one.” Although all of these men died in a lamentable state, Quasimodo redeemed
those who served Mexico honorably. For example, he described the former Huertista general and
cabinet member Enrique Gorostieta as the “personification of integrity,” and he praised Blanquet for his
bravery. Quasimodo also applauded Félix Díaz for “throwing out the money lenders who profaned the
temple,” and “taming lions and trampling on serpents” as Christ did. Urrutia’s epitaph stated that he
died knowing he elevated his nation through his medical talent, and Moheno’s tombstone read “a
prophet is not without honor except in his own country.”545
The Day of the Dead is a Mexican cultural celebration in which people honor their deceased
loved ones. It follows the Catholic Feast of All Saints, and together, these days encompass a celebration
of death and afterlife in heaven. Quasimodo showed respect to the members of the Díaz and Huerta
regimes, but acted irreverently against the revolutionaries while highlighting their negative qualities.
These “Calaveras” were significant because they reinforced cultural identity outside of the homeland,
and it allowed the exiles to reclaim their Mexicanidad, much like they did through the Feast of the
Virgin of Guadalupe. Most importantly, Quasimodo encouraged Revista Mexicana’s audience to find
humor in death and their present situations.
La Prensa also relied on humor to make political statements, particularly in headlines and
cartoons. Beginning in 1918, La Prensa no longer attempted to uphold its political neutrality or hide its
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disdain for Carranza. The newspaper now had a solid readership, and it would likely not alienate many
readers if it took greater liberties in its critiques against the Mexican government. On March 19, 1918,
the newspaper’s headline read “Carranza’s government is like a porcupine, but smells worse.” The
headline was copied from an editorial published in the Niagara Daily Press in New York, which
“attacked Mexico’s good name.” La Prensa stated that it was unfortunate that other nations maintained
such a negative perception of Mexico, but that their assessment was correct because Carranza and the
revolution made life in Mexico “not worth living.”546 La Prensa’s headlines also called Carranza the
“enemy of Mexico, the United States, and all of civilization,” and characterized him as having “the gift
for offending everyone.”547
By early 1920, the Carranza regime was “in agony.” García Naranjo commented in his memoirs
that Carranza’s death was not surprising, and that “one did not need to be a prophet to know that the
presidential succession of 1920 would be violent.”548 Álvaro Obregón launched the Plan of Agua Prieta
against the First Chief on April 23, and in early May, Carranza decided to transfer his government to
Veracruz rather than surrender. On May 11, 1920, La Prensa published a political cartoon depicting
Carranza as one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse. Murguía rode the “war” horse, Cabrera rode
“hunger,” Carranza rode “misery,” and Minister of the Interior Manuel Aguirre Berlanga rode “plague.”
Although La Prensa satirized Carranza and his associates through this and other political cartoons, the
newspaper used a more serious tone to announce Carranza’s death. On May 21, the First Chief was

546

“El Gob. de Carranza es Como un Puerco Espín y Huele Peor,” La Prensa, Mar. 19, 1918.

547

Ibid., “Carranza es Enemigo de México, de los E. Unidos y aún de la Civilización,” Jul. 29, 1919, “Carranza Tiene el Don
de Desagradar a Todos,” Apr. 26, 1919.

548

García Naranjo, 8: 293.

227

assassinated in Tlaxcalantongo, Puebla, and La Prensa reported that the president died as “a victim of
betrayal and perfidy, and shot with the bullets of his own partisans.”549

Becoming the “Enemy Other” in the New Homeland
Cultural humor helped to cope with nostalgia, but it also served as a tool for combating racism.
Demonstrating pride in Mexican identity, symbols, and the Spanish language proved to be one way to
maneuver in a society where racial slurs and violence against non-whites were common. Porfiristas took
on a leadership role in fighting discrimination, but their activism contradicted the rhetoric in La Prensa
and Revista Mexicana, which frequently advertised skin bleach and other “whitening” products.
Gamboa’s diary inadvertently underscored an important difference within the Porfirista
experience. The writer was considered persona non grata in the United States because of his hostility
against the Wilson administration.550 He also believed that he and his family faced difficulties in Cuba
for political reasons, since they were under the constant surveillance of Carrancista spies. The exiles
living in the United States confronted an entirely different situation; they were perceived as enemies
because of their politics and their race. Neither Gamboa nor Moheno mentioned experiencing any racial
discrimination in Cuba, but the exiles in Texas had to contend with the reality of lynching and other
racial violence against Mexicans.
Miguel A. Levario uses the framework of the “enemy other” to describe the way in which white
Texans defined ethnic Mexicans.551 He also contextualizes “whiteness” as a racial ideal which
immigrants of different ethnicities (but certain phenotypes) could attain. One result of the pursuit of
whiteness was the acceptance of the lynching of racialized “others.” According to Cynthia Nevels,
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“Texas as a whole was prone to lynching, earning the unfortunate ranking of number three in the nation
for lynch victims, after Mississippi and Georgia.”552 Nevels argues that Italian, Irish, and Bohemian
immigrants in East Texas held an ambiguous position in the black/white racial binary in the 1890s.
They “came to realize the social and economic advantages of white skin,” and claimed whiteness by
“taking advantage of, or even participating in, the South’s most brutal form of racial domination: the
lynching of black men.”553 Lynching in Texas increased as the African American population rose, and
“whites thus resorted to violent means to control the social and political ambitions of blacks at the turn
of the twentieth century.”554
Nevels focuses exclusively on the lynching of African Americans in Brazos County because the
region did not have a significant Mexican population before the 1920s, but Mexicans also suffered from
this violence. On November 4, 1910, a man named Antonio Rodríguez was lynched in Rocksprings,
Texas. Rodríguez was accused of murdering a Mrs. Lem Henderson, but before he could be tried, a mob
burned him at the stake.555 Anti-American protests took place across Mexico as people heard the news
of the Mexican national who was violently executed in the United States without due-process.556
Newspapers reported stories of “insults…hurled against the American flag and rioters [attacking]
business houses owned by Americans” in Mexico City, where a mob also threw rocks at the offices of
the American-owned Mexican Herald. Rioters injured Americans, including Ambassador Henry Lane
Wilson’s son.557 Creel, Gamboa, and De la Barra worked through the Ministry of Foreign Relations to
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guarantee the safety of Americans in Mexico.558 Creel “assured the American ambassador that prompt
action would be taken to insure [sic] the punishment of the rioters guilty of insulting the American flag.”
Ernesto T. Simondetti, editor of Mexico City’s El Diario, added that “the expressions of the mob” were
“resented by all Mexicans of the better class.” The Díaz government cracked down on the protests, and
police (under orders to “shoot to kill”) reportedly killed two medical students and a “peon.”559 This
retaliation only intensified the anti-U.S. and anti-Díaz sentiments just days before Madero launched the
revolution.
This incident made it clear that in spite of the científicos’ efforts, Mexicans were still not
perceived as white by all of U.S. society, and they remained grouped with African Americans as
‘others.’ The científicos made every attempt to protect their alliance with the U.S. government by
apologizing for the barbaric riots in Mexico, even though a Mexican man was executed through
extralegal means on U.S. soil. The “better class” preferred to appease the United States rather than seek
justice for one of its compatriots (ironic, considering Gamboa’s change of heart regarding the U.S.
government in 1914). However, once the gente decente, or “decent people,” were forced into exile in
the United States, that class distinction did not keep them from being perceived as stereotypical dirty
and lazy “greasers.”
Dr. Joaquín González Cigarroa Jr., the nephew of Leonides González, recalls an incident told to
him by his father. The González family moved to San Antonio in the 1910s, and when Joaquín Sr. first
arrived, “somebody on the street called him a Mexican greaser, and he got up and knocked [the man]
down.” The González family was highly influential in Mapimí, a “thriving silver mining community” in
Durango during the Porfiriato.560 Leonides was the jefe municipal, or mayor, with close ties to Porfirio
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Díaz. When the revolution began, he and his immediate family were forced into exile in February 1911,
and many other relatives soon followed, settling in San Antonio. However, despite the family’s
prominence in Mexico, their status did not shield them from racism in Texas.
The Plan de San Diego revolt in 1915 and ensuing violence worsened race relations between
Mexicans, Tejanos, and Texas Rangers in South Texas. In his memoirs, García Naranjo described the
Texas Rangers as the “undisciplined” force “responsible for the antipathy and friction existent” between
the ethnic groups. He believed that during the “incursions [against] the so-called bandits from Mexico,
the lives of many good Mexicans were sacrificed,” and the Rangers acted “more savagely” than Villa
during his raid on Columbus.561 Furthermore, Revista Mexicana openly criticized the Wilson
administration (and broader U.S. society) for hypocritically promoting democracy around the world
while upholding segregation within its borders. Moheno also wrote extensive letters on the topic, stating
that when a nation “[proclaimed] dogmas, principles, and general rules of conduct for a global public, it
[exposed] itself to criticism if it [breached] these dogmas, principles, and rules.” Thus, the U.S. policy
should have been applied within its borders, “protecting all people without distinction,” including
“Catholics and Orthodox…whites, yellows, blacks…the strongest and weakest nationalities alike.
However, this did not reflect President Wilson’s political conduct.”562
La Prensa remained neutral and disassociated itself from the revolts linked to the Plan of San
Diego, perhaps to prevent any problems with the U.S. and Mexican governments. However, this
reaction was reminiscent of the position taken by the “better class” in Mexico after Rodríguez’s
lynching, since the Porfirista gente decente did not partake in or condone such violent retaliation.
García Naranjo also wrote that the “most ignorant [Mexicans]…were induced to take revenge” against
the Rangers, attributing the violent Mexican reaction to an unfortunate lack of education among the
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lower classes.563 Richard A. García argues that the ricos (Mexican upper class) of San Antonio “worried
about the discriminatory impact of [stereotypes]” as well as “the impact on the Mexicans’ self-image.”
The “ricos did not want their countrymen in the United States to become Americanized nor did they
want them to learn behavioral patterns from the stereotypes. They wanted Mexicans who were
educated, sophisticated, and gente decente, not lower-class Mexicans or Americanized Mexicans.” This
included speaking Spanish correctly, a “virtue” not found in “gente corriente,” or the plebian lower
classes.564
Porfiristas primarily encouraged their compatriots to become educated in spite of the obstacles,
since it was the best way for the Mexican community to advance in the United States. It was an
important lesson for Mexican Americans who continued to face discrimination in later decades.
Cigarroa remembers taking an entrance exam at the University of Texas at Austin in 1941, stating that
“fortunately, I got a very high score, probably the highest...and [the administrators] thought I had
cheated. How could a Mexican American do that? They wanted me to take the test again, and my
answer to that was ‘well, you just watch my progress at the University of Texas and see how I do, and
then you can judge me.’” Cigarroa believed that the administrators’ attitudes towards him “changed
after that.”565
Urrutia had a different way of dealing with racism. He did not internalize the Porfirista rhetoric
which privileged whiteness, or the messages in Porfirista media stating that a person needed to have
light skin in order to succeed. Instead, he took pride in his indigenous heritage and encouraged his
children to do the same. His grandson, Aureliano “Bud” Urrutia, recounts how “it wasn’t so easy to be a
Mexican in San Antonio. Mexicans were relegated to the back of the bus, and drinking fountains were
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segregated. So, the story goes that [Aureliano’s] children arrived home one day complaining...‘they’re
calling us ‘beaners’ and ‘greasers!’” Aureliano’s answer to this was to “just tell them you’re an
Aztec!”566
Urrutia challenged the complex racial position held by Porfiristas in the 1910s. He was born in
1872 to Pablo and Refugio Urrutia, who lived in Xochimilco. Refugio was of “náhuatl origin.”567
Urrutia benefitted from the expanding educational system during the Porfiriato, and he graduated from
medical school in 1895. After 1900, he became a popular surgeon after saving the life of Rodolfo
Gaona, a famous bullfighter. He also performed surgery on Huerta in 1900, successfully draining a
ruptured liver abscess that almost killed the general, and the two became compadres shortly thereafter.
The surgeon commissioned the clinic Sanatorio Urrutia in Coyoacán in 1911, which also became “a
meeting place for artists, musicians, scientists, [and] intellectuals.” The inauguration of the Sanatorio
was a gala event attended by elite Mexican society, including De la Barra, Francisco I. Madero, and
their wives. The poor Indian from Xochimilco had joined these elites. His talent and intelligence
helped him to overcome the Porfirista racial hierarchy, though he also benefitted from marrying Luz
Fernández in 1896, “the fair-haired, gray-eyed daughter of a wealthy Mexican merchant.”568 Bud recalls
that “one of the things that I was impressed with was that [Aureliano] a poor little Indian kid goes from
humble origins to appreciating ‘the very fine things in life.’ He worked his way through school, went to
the national military school, served with Huerta, and then as a young man in Mexico (shortly after 1900
or 1901) was able to enjoy very fine leather shoes, fancy French shirts, and driving the finest cars that
were being made.”569
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However, Urrutia never rejected his indigenous roots, and he embraced his identity as a darkskinned, indigenous man active in a Eurocentric society. According to Bud, in San Antonio, Aureliano
“at times he portrayed himself as a poor little Indian, wearing huaraches [sandals]…but at other times he
was an extraordinarily well-dressed man with cape and top hat. So the one side of him wanted to be like
Juan Diego, and the other wanted to be the aristocrat.”570 Aureliano took pride in his ancestry, and he
encouraged his children to do the same by claiming an Aztec heritage. This defied the Porfirista ideals
about Mexico’s indigenous roots. The científicos displayed Mexico as an exoticized Aztec nation at the
world’s fairs, and Díaz claimed to be the political descendant of Cuauhtémoc. Yet the administration
showed reverence to the Aztecs of the conquest period while massacring groups such as the Yaquis and
Mayas. Aureliano did not conceptualize his indigenous identity as an abstract heritage. On the contrary,
expressing this dual identity had personal implications. In exile, it became a way for his family to
maneuver between the Mexican and Anglo worlds that often collided in Texas.
Furthermore, Aureliano discouraged his children from protesting against discrimination. Bud
remembers his grandfather saying that “this land [the United States] has given us a place to live and
work, and we should be appreciative of that.” Unlike a number of his counterparts in San Antonio,
Aureliano did not embark on any campaign against the Wilson government. In fact, he ended his
political activity once he left Mexico and focused on his medical career. He was grateful for the
opportunity to start his life in San Antonio after his banishment, and for the chance to live in relative
peace, work as a surgeon, and care for his family, especially after Luz died in 1917, leaving him with
eleven children. Aureliano displayed a fondness for the United States, and encouraged his children to be
proud of their American identity. Adolfo Urrutia (Bud’s father) served in the U.S. armed forces during
World War II. Bud states that “my daddy was the only son that went to World War II. My daddy was
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very proud of that, and Aureliano was very proud of his son Adolfo, who had gone and participated. My
daddy landed at Normandy, and they exchanged many letters during that time.” 571
Although the exiles living in Texas embraced their national identity in the face of racism, Urrutia
demonstrated that even this strategy was not homogenous, since he was the only one who openly
expressed his indigenous heritage. Urrutia’s optimistic acceptance of life in the United States also
reflected the differences between the “rebels,” “dreamers,” and “serene” exiles. By the end of the
decade, the latter groups began to accept their circumstances and their new lives. The “rebels,”
however, stubbornly continued to fight the Constitutionalist regime, exhausting their economic
resources and risking imprisonment and death.

Porfiristas Lose the Battle against Carranza
Gamboa (one of the “serene” exiles) remained angry at Carranza for acting unjustly and
unmercifully towards his family and compatriots, but he chose not to actively partake in the counterrevolutionary movement after 1916. The writer did not sign the petition against the Constitution of
1917, and perhaps this helped him gain amnesty in 1919.572 On the other hand, many of his colleagues
acted on their frustration despite the increasing odds against them toward the end of the decade. Revista
Mexicana and La Prensa demonstrated the different ways in which Porfiristas dealt with this reality.
Both newspapers increased their attacks against Carranza, but La Prensa seemed more accepting of the
global political and social changes that took place between 1918 and 1920. On the contrary, the
contributors to Revista Mexicana resisted these changes as much as possible, even when they knew that
theirs was a lost cause.
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Revista Mexicana did not take defeat lightly, and in this sense García Naranjo’s journalistic
endeavors resembled Félix Díaz’s persistent, yet futile struggle against Carranza. One year after the
exiles signed the protest against the Constitution of 1917, the magazine reprinted the petition and
reiterated its commitment to defending the Constitution of 1857. Throughout 1918, Revista Mexicana
continued to print images of Porfirio and Félix Díaz, odes to Juárez, and poems about the Porfiriato. On
May 5, the magazine published the latest information from Díaz’s army in order to demonstrate the
“active, constant, and patriotic struggle” that Díaz’s forces were undertaking.573 The magazine also
included a poem entitled “Señor…A la Memoria del General Porfirio Díaz,” by M. Muzquíz Blanco.
He wrote to the general that “far away from you, the good homeland that you dearly loved / whose fallen
glory you restored / whom you abandoned with your soul worn out with anguish / sighs for the man with
the strong arm, waits / in vain for the wise man, [for] the hero…to return and restore the old glory of the
flag.”574 Olaguíbel, meanwhile, contributed an expression of almost saintly devotion to Juárez. The
poet described the world as being “a confused crowd, blind and unorganized…a Dantesque procession
of human tragedy.” Olaguíbel believed that the spirit of Juárez could save Mexico, and he exclaimed
“you are not in the tomb, under the hard marble…you are not in the turbulent and dark past./ You are in
the radiant apotheosis of the future;/ you are in the inviolate and white [parts] of our soul!... // Oh,
Father, you have not left; oh Father, you are not dead!”575
These two texts exemplified the Porfirista dilemma in 1918. By this time, there was no
possibility for a successful counter-revolution against Carranza. The First Chief enjoyed constitutional
legitimacy and formal U.S. recognition. Villa and Zapata did not pose strong threats, and Félix Díaz
continued to lack sufficient financial support to build his forces. Porfiristas such as Muzquíz Blanco and
Olaguíbel “waited in vain” for a savior comparable to Juárez and Don Porfirio, or for these two leaders
573

“Ejercito Reorganizador Nacional,” Revista Mexicana, May 5, 1918.

574

Ibid., “Señor…A la Memoria del General Porfirio Díaz,” Jul. 21, 1918.

575

Ibid., “El Poema de Juárez.”

236

to help Mexico from beyond the grave. However, Juárez and Porfirio were only memories. There was
no Porfirista “strong man” who could topple Carranza, and no politician savvy enough to offer an
alternative to the revolution. When García Naranjo launched Revista Mexicana in 1915, Juárez and
Porfirio represented a Mexico that he imagined could still be; in 1918, they were artifacts of a Mexico
that no longer existed (even though the revolution appropriated Juárez’s image). Yet, Revista Mexicana
continued to support Félix and publish photos and accolades pertaining to him and his uncle, and its
contributors clung to the hope of somehow being rescued from Carrancismo.
On July 2, 1919, the Mexican community in Laredo organized a celebration in honor of Porfirio
Díaz on the fourth anniversary of his death. The event took place at Laredo’s Strand Theatre, and
García Naranjo served as the keynote speaker. He first gave an overview of Díaz’s life and
achievements as a soldier, then as president, when he “constructed contemporary Mexico.” García
Naranjo then spoke about Díaz’s heroic qualities, stating that “the hero of antiquity [received] his
strength from the gods.” Díaz, however, was the “modern hero” who “[passed] through history as one
of those complete figures whose greatness could only be limited by [himself],” because all of his actions
came from “the depths of his genius.” García Naranjo ended his speech with a prediction about Díaz’s
legacy in Mexico. He believed that once the civil war ended, the president’s remains would be returned
to Mexico, and his “cult [would] be restored without compromise, honorably,” by the “repentant”
public. García Naranjo envisioned Díaz’s glorious return, when “all of Mexico would carry his coffin
and take him, amidst canticles and incense, to the altar where immortals sleep.”576
By mid-1919, García Naranjo struggled to maintain Revista Mexicana in circulation. He “felt
that he was going to die, morally, and like a swan, [he] wanted to prepare his last song.” The El Paso
exile community invited García Naranjo to speak about the “tragedies carried out by Carrancismo in
1919.” He recalled wanting to “vent, to expel the passions [he] held inside, [and] scream out before his
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fall. And before a mad audience, [he] paraded the bloody caravan of the victims” of the Carranza
regime. García Naranjo gave homage to Zapata, who “crystallized…the aspirations of [Mexico’s] lower
classes,” and to Blanquet, Felipe Ángeles, and the other “victims,” regardless of whether or not he had
once criticized them.577 The “object of those desperate shouts, which [García Naranjo’s] listeners heard
in the midst of clamors and tears,” was to “plant in them the conviction that even if ‘Revista Mexicana’
died, [he] was not going to leave the barricade nor ask his adversaries for the slightest compromise.”578
García Naranjo stated in his memoirs that he knew that the presidential succession of 1920
would be tragic, and he could not fathom suspending his magazine during that critical period. However,
he had accumulated a significant amount of debt, and despite the magazine’s initial popularity, he did
not have enough money for his own offices or to pay most of the contributors. U.S. participation in
World War I also impacted his business, since the price of paper increased from two cents per pound in
1915, to ten cents in 1917.579
Furthermore, circulation figures dropped from 5,000 copies per week in 1918 to 1,100 in
1919.580 García Naranjo attributed this to exile repatriation to Mexico, but perhaps the public had also
grown weary of Revista Mexicana.581 For almost four years, the magazine published the same antiCarrancista, anti-Wilsonian rhetoric. This had worked during the height of the counterrevolutionary
efforts, but it no longer did. After years of the same, perhaps readers lost hope, accepted their present
situation, or realized that the exiles had finally lost their battle.
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García Naranjo did not publicly admit to his dire situation, despite the rumors about Revista
Mexicana’s financial problems. On August 3, 1919, the magazine’s cover featured a photograph of
Félix Díaz and an article addressing rumors in San Antonio that Revista Mexicana and Felicismo were in
a state of “agony.” The author first denied that the magazine served as a Felicista organ, although it did
applaud Díaz for never giving up in the face of continuous defeat. Next, the author proclaimed that
Revista Mexicana “lifted the banner of the Homeland in exile,” and if the magazine was forced to shut
down, it would be a result of a dwindling exile population, not Díaz’s defeat.582 The last comment was
perhaps motivated by the accusations against García Naranjo for allegedly conspiring with Blanquet and
Díaz in April 1919 (before Blanquet’s death). Although they faced insurmountable circumstances, Díaz
and Revista Mexicana fought until the very end. Quasimodo wrote a poem for Díaz in August 1919,
summarizing the position of the rebels:
My General: we continue to raise our flag,
despite the hole
in the ship’s keel…
Sir, we can still fight,
and we fight together…
We do not lack courage
for this rough combat…
though we almost find ourselves
with no sword and no shield!
No sword and no shield!
What profound grief!
But we look to heaven
for the desired redemption!...
Our ship is deserted;
we see nothing in the distance;
but hope lives on…
[the fight] is almost over,
my dear General,
and the bearded wreck
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remains in power…
[but] within my keel-less ship
which the sea is burying,
my pen continues to vibrate
over [my] final sheet of paper!”583
Revista Mexicana celebrated its fourth anniversary on September 12. The week’s editorial stated
that the magazine never set out to be a successful business; rather, the exiles used the medium to defend
their nation. “Certain people” believed that the magazine would fail because of its critiques of the
United States, but Revista Mexicana’s editors remained unapologetic. They wrote that “our intransigent
Mexican spirit, Mexican without reservations…Mexican in the face of possible catastrophe, is
what…turned away subscribers, agents, and advertisers, but it is also the pedestal on which our
publication stands.”584
Unfortunately for García Naranjo, his tenacity was not enough to sustain Revista Mexicana, and
on December 28, 1919, he finally conceded defeat. The editorial announced that from that point
forward, the magazine would “comment on more general and varied issues,” since the magazine’s
audience, like the immigrant community, had significantly changed and “many of the expatriates of
1915 had returned to Mexico.” Moreover, the constant critiques against Carranza now “seemed
superfluous, because Don Venustiano and his men were morally dead” and it would not be long before
they were ousted from power.585 The editor concluded by stating that “with this issue, the aggressive
and intransigent Revista says goodbye in order to make way for the serene and constructive Revista.”
This change came too late, and on January 25, 1920, Revista Mexicana announced its “temporary
suspension.”586
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In his memoirs, García Naranjo remembered this as a “melancholic and opaque” end for his
magazine. He explained that he did not expect to live in San Antonio permanently, and he never
believed his magazine would be permanent either. Yet he dreamed (“with a sense of excitement”) about
how he would end his publication. For four years, García Naranjo envisioned that the final issue of
Revista Mexicana would proudly announce Carrancismo’s definitive defeat and the success of the
efforts of his colleagues. Instead, his “newspaper was silently extinguished,” and private letters were
sent to subscribers at the end of 1919, asking them not to renew. In hindsight, what hurt García Naranjo
the most was that he only needed “three more months of resistance” to fulfill his desire for Revista
Mexicana’s “splendid” finale.587 He also became deeply embittered by the reaction of the elite
“conservative class” when he closed his business. García Naranjo “distributed twenty percent of Revista
Mexicana’s shares among trusted friends,” to be sold within the exile community. Only four shares
were sold in Havana, two in Laredo, and Aureliano Blanquet purchased five in New York City. “That
was all, since the wealthy persons feared that [if they did,] the doors to Mexico would be shut” to them.
García Naranjo wrote that these people “had no obligation to help him out of solidarity,” but he likened
this to Moheno’s experience with the Peace-Making Assembly, when the exiled aristocrats refused to
offer money for the counterrevolution out of fear of losing their possessions in Mexico. García Naranjo
considered this ironic, since their homes and belongings had probably already been destroyed.588
Shortly after Revista Mexicana shut down, U.S. authorities arrested García Naranjo and found
him guilty of violating neutrality laws. Around the same time, Mexico’s leaders reached out to Lozano
in an effort to bridge the Mexican communities on both sides of the border. In April 1919, La Prensa
published a letter written to Lozano by Zapata three weeks before his assassination. Zapata wrote to
Lozano with the specific intention of reaching out to the Mexican population in the United States. The
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general called La Prensa a “very important” newspaper and congratulated Lozano for its wide
circulation. He then stated that “the homeland must be served by free will or by force, out of
obligation;” thus, the revolutionaries had the “the right to demand the greatest sacrifices, if necessary,
from its citizens.” He offered this as his reason for contacting Lozano, since his goal was to reach out to
the “sovereign” public, the only group who had the right to solve Mexico’s problems. Zapata explained
his own plan for Mexico and asked el México de afuera to consider it as a viable option. He placed his
support behind Francisco Vázquez Gómez (who lived in San Antonio) for the Mexican presidency,
proposed to restore the Constitution of 1857 and carry out agrarian reform, and offered amnesty to all
Mexicans regardless of political affiliation. Although Zapata wrote to La Prensa in order to gain
support for his agenda, he expressed a broader vision for Mexico, stating that “in reality, all I propose is
an…indestructible union between all Mexicans, established through a civil organization or element that
has not yet been considered by anyone.”589
In June 1920, Obregón granted Lozano an interview in Mexico City. A presidential candidate at
the time, Obregón stated that his top priority was “reconstructing the economy” and restoring the
nation’s credit. He also planned to reorganize and reduce the size of the army. Lozano asked about the
status of the exiles and what Obregón’s policy would be. The general responded by saying that he
“considered the promulgation of an amnesty law…immoral.” Obregón did not believe that the
government had the authority to legislate a citizen’s right to live in Mexico; it should be a person’s
individual decision whether or not to repatriate. In fact, the nation’s “borders should be open for all
Mexicans who wish to return to their Homeland, and only the Tribunals could judge those who
committed crimes punishable by [Mexican] laws.”590
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Although Zapata and Obregón proposed different plans for Mexico, it is highly significant that
they communicated with Lozano. They considered el México de afuera instrumental in the pacification
and unification of Mexico as the military phase of the revolution came to an end. More importantly,
they did not consider emigrants any less Mexican than their compatriots at home. La Prensa’s
transnational scope also became clear; even though the Carranza government censored Lozano’s
newspaper, it was obvious that it had an audience in Mexico and that leaders of the revolution read it
and understood its popularity in the United States. The “independent” stance taken by La Prensa since
its premier issue paid off. Now that peace was gradually being restored in Mexico, the newspaper
served as a bridge in a dual sense. It connected Mexicans in the United States and in Mexico, but it also
helped readers cope with the shift from the war-time 1910s to the arguably more stable 1920s. Because
it was not as reactionary as Revista Mexicana, La Prensa survived the changes within the Mexican
community in San Antonio and the U.S. Southwest in the immediate post-war period.
La Prensa increasingly focused on popular culture after the end of World War I, and it launched
the “Página para el Hogar,” or “Ladies Page,” in late 1918. Lozano continued to advertise his bookstore
in La Prensa in an effort to promote Spanish-language literacy. The newspaper also published literature
for adults and children, as well as scientific experiments for young readers. Throughout the 1920s, La
Prensa included news from Hollywood and featured Mexican actors and actresses performing at the
National Theatre in San Antonio, encouraging the community to attend their functions. It also printed
information about the latest in U.S. sports, particularly boxing and baseball.
Lozano and his staff did not ignore the United States’ replacement of Europe as the political and
cultural center of the world and by the 1920s, Lozano and his colleagues were raising Mexican
American children and had successful business ventures in the United States. However, this was not
evidence of Porfirista acculturation. On the contrary, La Prensa continued to “face south” and act as a
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strictly Mexican newspaper. When Lozano and González made the decision not to return to Mexico,
they understood it as a lifelong, self-imposed exile.
In March 1920, Lozano visited García Naranjo and invited him to work as a contributor for La
Prensa, “where he would earn less than if were selling corn and flour, but [would be] more in tune with
his vocation and destiny” as a writer.591 García Naranjo considered this a new chance at life, an
opportunity to rise after Revista Mexicana’s defeat. Lozano had been García Naranjo’s friend, but after
that moment he “quickly became [his] brother in every sense of the word.” García Naranjo introduced
Lozano to his sister-in-law Alicia Elizondo, and the two married in 1922. On their wedding day, García
Naranjo welcomed his “brother” into their family, and the bond between the two “lasted until death.”592
Moheno also accepted an invitation to write for La Prensa. He and García Naranjo, two exiles
that stubbornly fought Carranza’s censorship, suddenly had a broad audience in the United States. Their
articles were also featured in El Universal in Mexico City during the 1920s. As the new decade
commenced, the exiles encountered new opportunities and different challenges. Mexico continued to
change politically and culturally, and as the nation’s leaders institutionalized the revolution, their
Porfirista critics became less relevant. García Naranjo, one of the last surviving Porfiristas in Mexico,
wrote his memoirs in the 1950s in a final attempt to set the record straight and ensure that his
experiences and those of his colleagues became a part of the historical record. In the United States, the
remaining Porfiristas and their descendants continued the mission to “elevate the masses.”
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Chapter 6: Porfiristas and the Politics of Representation after 1920
In November 2010, the San Antonio community observed the centennial of the Mexican
Revolution by drawing attention to the city’s place within the history of the conflict. Trinity University
sponsored a symposium on “Revealing the Mexican Revolution in San Antonio,” and the Museo
Alameda launched the exhibit “Revolution & Renaissance: Mexico and San Antonio 1910–2010.”593
These two events formed part of a larger project undertaken by scholars, artists, and other community
leaders to reevaluate San Antonio’s transnational importance in the Mexican Revolution. The exhibit’s
inauguration also brought together two of the most prominent Mexican American families of the
twentieth century, represented by guests of honor María Alicia Brochmann (daughter of Ignacio E.
Lozano) and Congressman Charles González (grandson of Leonides González and son of former
Congressman Henry B. González). February 2013 will mark the centennial of La Prensa, and though
the newspaper closed down in 1963, its sister publication La Opinión remains in circulation under the
direction of the Lozano family.594 Established in 1926 by Lozano and González, La Opinión serves as a
symbol of the Porfirista legacy in the United States. More importantly, it demonstrates that the Mexican
Revolution could not fully crush Porfirismo.
Thomas Benjamin argues that the revolutionary regime began crafting an “updated master
narrative” beginning in the 1920s. “The regime of Porfirio Díaz,” he writes, “was transformed from the
apotheosis of liberal evolution to yet another dark period of reactionary ascendancy…La Revolución,
naturally, took its former exalted place.”595 The revolución became the Revolución, appropriated and

593

The symposium was sponsored directly by Trinity University’s Mexico, The Americas, and Spain (MAS) Program.

594

After Lozano’s death in 1953, his wife Alicia continued to run the business with González’s help. She sold the
newspaper after Gónzalez retired in 1957. The various subsequent owners could not sustain the newspaper, and it was
officially suspended in 1963.

595

Thomas Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2000), 22.

245

institutionalized by the Mexican state in order to consolidate a national identity (with the government at
the forefront) and by doing so enhance the legitimacy of the new regime. The revolutionary regime
built monuments, declared national holidays, and rewrote the official national history. By acting as the
descendants of Zapata, Villa, Carranza, and Madero, Mexico’s leaders replicated what Díaz had done
decades earlier when he commissioned the statue of Cuauhtémoc on the Paseo de la Reforma. Samuel
Brunk complicates Benjamin’s argument by stating that “the creation and use of nations and their heroes
is both a collective endeavor and one that can be opposed…for heroes and nations to be heroes and
nations, people have to accept them, and in doing so they also participate in their formation, adapting
them to their personal needs or to those of the smaller communities in which they live.”596 This
hegemonic relationship between the state and the public is based on a common identity and symbols, but
maintaining hegemony is complicated because these symbols can be interpreted differently by
individuals, communities, and political groups.
Porfiristas did not accept La Revolución, nor did they occupy a space within the new national
identity. The revolutionary regime offered Mexicans a select group of heroes to venerate, and Díaz was
not one of their options. Porfiristas could only partake in the relationship between the state and the
public as counter-hegemonic subjects with little political influence. But even their status as Mexican
subjects was questionable, especially when Plutarco Elías Calles revoked the amnesty of the Porfiristas
who criticized his regime and supported the Cristeros. As the Mexican government worked to eradicate
Porfirismo, time also worked in its favor; most Porfiristas and members of the Huerta cabinet died
between 1920 and 1940.597 Even La Prensa began to decline in the 1940s as the children and
grandchildren of immigrants assimilated into U.S. culture and became decreasingly fluent in Spanish.
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Yet Porfiristas believed that their identity would survive if they implemented their values in their homes
and broader society. The “better class” maintained its cultural standards and passed them on to future
generations. They also continued to engage in the politics of representation, negotiating and
constructing their notions of “self” in relation to the “other,” and that is a process that their descendants
continue today.
This chapter will examine the different ways in which Porfiristas confronted La Revolución, and
how the U.S./Mexico border shaped the politics of representation. The first section will analyze the
ways in which Gamboa and García Naranjo used their memoirs to help them come to terms with the new
political and intellectual culture in Mexico. The second section focuses on Urrutia, who unlike Gamboa,
García Naranjo, and other peers, embraced the myths surrounding his character and did not seek
rectification for his participation in the Huerta regime.598 Nevertheless, the Urrutia family has attempted
to clarify some misconceptions about the surgeon. The third and final section will trace the continuities
and changes within the Porfirista community in the United States. These Porfiristas did not face the
same political ramifications as their peers in Mexico. They and their descendants also increased their
activist efforts throughout the twentieth century in an effort to promote education and Mexican culture
while fighting discrimination. Overall, these experiences reveal the complex ways in which Porfiristas
attempted to stay true to their identities after the dramatic changes of the 1910s.

Porfirista Counter-Memories and the Rejection of La Revolución
Anindyo Roy argues that “diasporic consciousness…seeks to posit its power of representing the
knowledge of its own historical consciousness in ways that concretize the connections between
self/identity and site/home.” However, “the history on which it relies to secure a unified authority of
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national or transnational self is always realized in the form of a ‘countermemory.’” Michel Foucault
used the term “counter-memory” to recognize that the process of constructing “self” and “other” is
unstable, since the “systems of identity and difference” are constantly shifting.599 Foucault, like his
predecessor Friedrich Nietzsche, critiqued the linear analysis that produced homogenous, official
versions of history (“memory”) meant to be accepted as truth. Counter-memories destabilize power
structures that base their legitimacy and hegemony on a specific history. They also make the process of
identity construction volatile by incorporating time, geography, politics, and personal experience into
the act of remembering. Official histories tell people how and what they should remember; countermemories present many versions of the “truth,” while recognizing the loaded and problematic nature of
this concept.
Gamboa and García Naranjo exemplified the production of counter-memories by presenting
different versions of the same narrative over the course of their lives. Although numerous exiles wrote
memoirs related to the Mexican Revolution, this section will focus on Gamboa and García Naranjo
because they provide particular insight into the plight of Porfiristas after the revolution. Their memoirs
demonstrate that after 1920, Díaz remained a prominent figure for both men, but in very different ways.
Gamboa took pride in his Porfirista identity, which he asserted until his death in 1939. García Naranjo,
on the other hand, experienced an identity crisis in the 1920s and questioned his loyalty to the fallen
general. By the time he wrote his memoirs in the 1950s, however, he had come to terms with his
identity and was prepared to defend his allegiance to Díaz and Huerta.
On a basic level, these memoirs simply offer the perspective of a group defeated by the Mexican
Revolution. But a closer reading of these texts demonstrates the ways in which identity politics shaped
the format and content of the memoirs as well as what was absent from them. Silence is an important
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part of the speech act that creates subjectivity. According to Doris Sommer, “secrecy is a safeguard to
freedom...it is the inviolable core of human subjectivity that makes interaction a matter of choice rather
than rational necessity.”600 In writing memoirs, there is always a degree of self-censorship. For
Gamboa and García Naranjo, time and political circumstances determined the amount of external and
internal censorship with which they contended. Gamboa became increasingly silent as time progressed,
and García Naranjo wrote ten volumes of memoirs in the final decade of his life.
In 1920, Gamboa published the memoirs from his time in the Huerta regime and in exile;
thereafter, he felt he had nothing left to prove. He stated his truth and explained what he considered to
be his patriotic reasons for participating in the Huerta regime. He also chronicled the consequences that
he and his family “unjustly” faced because of his patriotic service during the Díaz and Huerta
administrations. Gamboa would not have benefitted from remaining belligerent, especially since his
amnesty could be revoked. He also believed that he was too old and his health too poor to go into exile
again. Gamboa continued chronicling his life in his diary, but less frequently and with fewer details. It
is likely that the self-censorship served to protect himself and his son Miguel. He may have also wished
to keep parts of his life private.
María Sagaseta de Gamboa died in early 1920, and Federico did not write in his diary again until
the following year.601 From that point forward, Gamboa’s annotations were significantly shorter than in
the previous decade, and he focused on his daily activities, visits from friends and colleagues, and work
as the director of the Mexican Academy of Language.602 Two notable events are missing from
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Gamboa’s diary—the deaths of Carranza in 1920 and Woodrow Wilson in 1924. In fact, Gamboa never
mentioned Carranza again, and the year 1924 is entirely absent from the memoirs. One can only
speculate as to why. However, Gamboa did offer clues about how his perceptions changed regarding his
two enemies. On October 31, 1922, he mentioned the execution of Francisco Murguía, one of
Carranza’s most loyal generals, after he was captured inside a church in the state of Durango after
rebelling against Obregón. Gamboa expressed his belief in divine providence and his hope that “God
had forgiven Murguía’s soul.”603 By offering a prayer for Murguía, Gamboa demonstrated that he may
have come to terms with at least one member of the Carrancista regime.
Gamboa’s feelings toward Wilson were more complicated. At the end of Wilson’s second term
in office in March 1921, Gamboa “thought about hanging flags from the balcony of [his] home in order
to express the joy [he] felt” because Wilson, “the most fatal among the fatal…[was] leaving the White
House forever.” He ultimately decided against it, but he did praise the new president Warren G.
Harding for lifting the spirits of the American public in his inaugural address. It is clear that Gamboa
continued to harbor resentment against Wilson, but because there are no diary entries for 1924, there is
no record of his reaction to Wilson’s death.
Later, however, there was a drastic shift in Gamboa’s conception of Wilson. In 1928, he penned
a tribute to the late president, praising Wilson’s achievements and legacy.604 “Without a doubt,”
Gamboa wrote, Wilson was a good president during his first term, but he excelled during his second
term in office. The European conflict moved Wilson to find inspiration in “the democratic spirit” of
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, and he garnered enough courage “from the depths of his
soul” to fight the “German military colossus.” Wilson’s Fourteen Points, “made him immortal,” a
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quality augmented by his insistence on attending the Paris Peace Conference despite his failing health.605
Gamboa believed that “when all of the inhabitants of the enslaved nations of Europe and Asia raised
their voice in thanksgiving to the Almighty, they would mutter the name of President Wilson, asking
heaven to bless him.”606 This homage comes as a surprise, since it is a stark contrast from Gamboa’s
characterization of Wilson a decade earlier as “Lucifer” and a “delirious and egocentric ideologue.”607 It
is difficult to ascertain the exact reasons for this change since Gamboa did not offer commentary or
explanation for his position, nor did he mention Wilson’s involvement in U.S./Mexican affairs.
However, this piece was part of a series of tributes, or “medallones,” that Gamboa began writing in 1927
for various political figures. His first tribute was to Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister
who helped write the Treaty of Versailles. In his diary, Gamboa only included the tributes he penned for
Clemenceau and Wilson, but perhaps this helps to explain his shift in opinion regarding the former U.S.
president. It seemed that by 1927 and 1928, Gamboa had reassessed Wilson’s character and legacy, and
considered him an international hero along with the other leaders who helped to end World War I. On a
personal level, it also seems that he forgave him.
Self-censorship became an important issue when President Calles began his campaign against the
Catholic Church in 1925. Although Carranza and Obregón had granted Gamboa and other exiles
amnesty, Calles revoked it for his most vocal critics, including García Naranjo. In an effort to prevent a
second exile, Gamboa retired from politics and minimized his critiques of the Mexican government.
Gamboa sought to maintain a difficult balance between supporting the Church without explicitly
condemning Calles for his anti-clericism, and his diary (published nine years later) became a private
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outlet for what he could not say publicly.608 For example, on July 20, 1925, Gamboa wrote that Calles
“made declarations that revealed his hatred of Catholicism.” A week later, Gamboa noted that “the
governmental attempt against Catholics [worsened].”609 These were not the lengthy tirades from a
decade before, nor were they attacks against the character of Calles or his officials. Gamboa was
defiant, though, and in his diary he described how he and his son Miguel clandestinely observed Mass in
their home “in spite of the risk.”610 If caught, they could have been incarcerated or executed. Gamboa
also described the prayer vigils at the Basilica of Guadalupe, and the sense of solidarity he felt with
other oppressed Catholics.611 The author had proven over the years that he was willing to sacrifice
everything for Catholicism, risking death in 1913 by running for the presidency against Huerta, but he
was more cautious during the Cristero War. He demonstrated that he would not give up a fundamental
part of his life to appease the revolutionary regime, but he maintained a level of silence in order to
protect himself and Miguel.
Gamboa had difficulty striking that balance between living in revolutionary Mexico and
upholding his Porfirista identity, and he continued to face problems because of his ties to Díaz and
Huerta. In December 1928, he was removed from the faculty of Philosophy and Literature at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) because he “lacked revolutionary ideology.”612 A
year later, Gamboa felt “overwhelmed with indignation” when the Ministry of Finance denied his
pension for his diplomatic service because he “was a prominent servant of the reactionary
governments.” Gamboa feared he would suffer the same fate as his father, who experienced “misery” in
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his final years as punishment for having served in Maximilian’s army (though he later switched his
allegiance to the liberal forces).613
The writer decried the personal difficulties he faced because of the revolution, but he also
criticized the cultural changes brought on by La Revolución. Gamboa was particularly offended by José
Vasconcelos and Diego Rivera, and his opinions of the two men illustrate the clash between the
Porfirista and revolutionary aesthetics. As Rick López argues, “prior to the revolution, Mexico’s middle
and upper classes along with foreign visitors and state officials dismissed popular art as embarrassing
evidence of backwardness. This same art, after the revolution, emerged as proud symbol of Mexico’s
authentic national identity.”614 Vasconcelos was at the forefront of the new cultural movement that
celebrated “mestizaje as the way of the future,” but as López and other scholars have pointed out,
Vasconcelos actually “bemoaned Mexico’s racial mixture.” He “did not believe his own theory” about
mestizos being the “cosmic race,” and only wrote La Raza Cósmica in 1925 as “a mythology meant to
boost self-confidence.” López argues that Vasconcelos “ascribed no value to existing regional traditions
or specific indigenous cultures.” Vasconcelos actually had much in common with Gamboa in this
regard, since both believed that “only intellectual elites like themselves were capable of evaluating and
‘fixing’ popular culture.” This sharply contrasted with the work of Manuel Gamio, director of the
Department of Anthropology at the UNAM, who “argued that Mexico’s ideal should emerge from the
culture of the rural popular classes.”615
In 1922, Gamio invited Gamboa to join him and a group on an excursion to the pyramids at
Teotihuacán. Gamboa noted that he had not visited the pyramids since 1910, when he traveled there
with Díaz as part of the centennial celebrations. The writer seemed annoyed at how the group was
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“astounded, or faked being astounded” by the ancient monuments, which “left [him] cold like a piece of
ice…feeling trillions of leagues apart from those ancestors.” The trip convinced Gamboa that he “did
not have the most minimal kinship with the Aztecs.” Moreover, when the group ate at a grotto named
after Díaz, Gamboa lamented that the space would likely be renamed after “some ‘liberator’” of the
revolution.616
Despite the similarities between Gamboa and Vasconcelos, the two antagonized each other from
the onset of their time at the UNAM. In his diary, Gamboa called his colleague “arrogant” and a
“Jacobin,” and during a social event the two almost engaged in a physical fight over their conflicting
views on socialism (which Vasconcelos supported).617 On one occasion, Gamboa’s “scarce hair stood
on its end” when Vasconcelos, the newly appointed Minister of Education and Fine Arts, said he was
“horrified” by French theatre. These moments demonstrate that they may have had similar ideas about
plebian culture and the lower classes, but their approaches to elevating the masses were very different.
Vasconcelos rejected positivism, and as Minister of Public Education (1921-1924), he set the
institutional framework for the proliferation of La Revolución, successfully replacing the educational
system set in place by Gamboa’s friend Justo Sierra.
In his diary, Gamboa also questioned the taste of Rivera and other artists inspired by the
Mexican Revolution. The writer described Rivera as a “modernist painter…made rotten in Paris, [and]
supposedly Bolshevik,” whose paintings were “horrendous.”618 When Vasconcelos commissioned
Rivera to paint the doors to the entrance of the National Preparatory School in 1922, Gamboa exclaimed
“poor Preparatory!...its venerable murals, respected for so long, are being profaned, and in what
manner!, by the young and wise painters. It is heartbreaking to see how [the school] will end up
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resembling a pulquería.” Later, when Gamboa and some friends walked into the UNAM amphitheatre
after its renovation in 1923, they saw that Rivera “painted it with some very strange things” that
represented “the triumph of ugliness!”619 In 1929, Rivera visited Gamboa and “very effusively offered
to paint [his] portrait.”620 Gamboa made no further comment about the meeting in his diary, but based
on his distaste for Rivera’s work, he likely declined.
Although Gamboa believed in the 1920s that revolutionary culture defiled the remnants of
Porfirista civilization, he seemed to have softened to Vasconcelos in the 1930s. Vasconcelos became
increasingly critical of the revolution in the late 1920s, and he unsuccessfully ran for the presidency
against National Revolutionary Party candidate Pascual Ortiz Rubio in 1929. That year, Vasconcelos
published the Plan of Guaymas, in which he called for an uprising against the government, and it
resulted in his incarceration and exile. In 1935, Vasconcelos published the first volume of his memoirs.
Gamboa read this text, and he commented in his diary that certain parts were “poorly written,” but
others, he believed, were “inspired and brilliant” (though he did not refer to specific passages). Overall,
the text contained “many truths…that revealed the moral and material miseries of the revolution.”621
That same year, Gamboa saw Vasconcelos’ play La Mancornadora at the Palace of Fine Arts and
commented that it was “very nice.”622 However, in spite of these admissions, Gamboa continued to see
Porfiristas as the purveyors of Mexican culture and civilization, and it was a role that the writer took
very seriously.
Perhaps Gamboa’s ego contributed to his conflicts with Vasconcelos, who overshadowed the
Porfirista writer as one of the leaders of Mexico’s literary and intellectual elite. Gamboa’s memoirs
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reveal a self-proclaimed vain man continuously preoccupied with his image and his legacy, a quality
exemplified by the fact that he began writing his memoirs for publication before turning thirty years old.
The recurring theme in Gamboa’s memoirs was his refinement and elevated cultural tastes. Even in
exile, the writer made annotations in his diary about attending the opera and theatre and countless social
events. In Mexico, he enjoyed afternoons in Chapultepec and evenings at the Palacio de Bellas Artes,
and in the 1920s and 1930s, he spent much of his spare time with other members of his (mostly
Porfirista) social circle.623 Even though Gamboa continued to struggle financially, he maintained the
cultured lifestyle that he enjoyed during the Porfiriato.
Gamboa also succeeded in maintaining his cultural relevancy despite representing the old
positivist tradition. His most famous novel, Santa (1903), was the first “best seller” in Mexico. The
story about a noble prostitute in Mexico City sold 60,000 copies worldwide by the time of Gamboa’s
death.624 Numerous scenes took place in Chimalistac, the colonia in which Gamboa lived, and tourists
traveled to see the plaza, also known as the “Garden of Santa” (after the novel’s protagonist). In 1924,
the plaza was renamed Plaza Federico Gamboa and certain streets in the neighborhood were renamed
after Gamboa and the protagonists of Santa. The writer exclaimed in his diary “finally!...No one can
doubt that my humble name will forever be rooted in Chimalistac.”625 From that point forward, Gamboa
referred to the location as “his plaza.”626 The novel was adapted for film and theater, and the first of
four movies based on Santa premiered in 1918. A second version was filmed in 1931 and included a
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theme song by popular singer Agustín Lara. At the premier in Mexico City the following year, Gamboa
basked in the glory of this achievement and the applause he received.627
The popularity and transcendence of Santa demonstrates that Porfirismo continues to have a
place within mexicanidad, and that La Revolución is not the only acceptable ‘truth’ about Mexican
identity. The novel and the protagonist “Santa” have been hailed as “myths” within Mexican culture,
and studied by famed authors including José Emilio Pacheco, who wrote in 2008 that “the novel
continued to sell because every generation could find new charms” within its pages.628 Pacheco
expressed his belief that Gamboa and his Santa would remain in the popular consciousness, and he
imagined the two roaming through present-day Mexico City as “shadows…as if they were riding
together in a hired car along the Reforma in 1899.”629 Gamboa, Santa, and his plaza are inscriptions of
the Porfirista legacy on a city where the public spaces, monuments, cultural figures, and national heroes
were largely recast to honor the revolution.
Gamboa seemed never to waver in his Porfirista identity or his reverence for Díaz, attending
Mass on the general’s birthday and the anniversary of his death. One poignant moment took place in
1922, when he was overcome with “deep emotion” after listening to Díaz’s voice in a phonograph
recording made by Thomas Edison.630 Gamboa, always the faithful Porfirista, was happy to be in the
general’s presence once again. García Naranjo had a similar overwhelming experience when he visited
Díaz’s tomb in Paris in 1928, but with the opposite reaction, feeling an immense sense of guilt. He had
returned to Mexico in 1923 only to be sent into exile three years later under orders from Calles.
Thereafter, García Naranjo toned down his combative rhetoric, and he believed he disappointed Díaz by
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giving up the fight. Gamboa’s diary demonstrated that writer remained firm in his Porfirista identity,
but García Naranjo’s memoirs traced an identity crisis that prompted to reevaluate his Porfirismo.
García Naranjo was sixty-eight years old when he began writing his autobiography in 1951
(publishing one volume per year for ten years), and had already outlived most of his peers. It is not clear
why he waited this long to write his memoirs, but it is possible that he felt the need to speak on behalf of
his colleagues one last time before he and the remaining survivors died. In the introduction to the
memoirs, García Naranjo addressed the process of writing an autobiography. He believed that the best
way to write a memoir was with complete frankness, without self-censorship for any political purpose,
or by using “words that could be interpreted in various ways.” This would differ from a diary, where the
author would express immediate (and often emotional) reactions to events. Moreover, memoirs should
be written with “dignity and decorum,” void of any gossip and “trash that would not contribute in any
way to clarifying the shadows of history.”631 His comment on self-censorship is significant for a
number of reasons. García Naranjo was not known for keeping quiet, as demonstrated through his
journalistic and parliamentary endeavors since 1909. There was already an extensive record of his
opinions and commentary, so what did he have left to say or prove? He claimed he did not “worry about
being absolved or condemned”; all he wanted was for his “compatriots to understand” him.632 The
memoirs served to set the record straight about the events that took place in the 1910s that had “not been
treated with equity” in Mexico, particularly the period of the Huerta regime, since he knew that this was
what interested readers most. Now that forty years had passed, García Naranjo could claim that he had
nothing to lose or gain by attempting to rectify history.
The author warned readers in his introduction that he did not have any secrets to reveal, and he
would not apologize for his loyalty to Díaz and Huerta. All he intended to do was to write the story of
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his life as he remembered it and offer the reasons for the paths in life he had chosen. García Naranjo did
not explicitly affirm that his memoirs served as a political statement, but his work had always been
political, and this project was not the exception. However, his memoirs differed in certain respects from
those written by his colleagues. Moheno and Rodolfo Reyes wrote memoirs in the 1910s through the
1930s specifically to prove that even though they were part of Huerta’s cabinet, they had no personal
affiliations with the general, nor did they like him or support his policies. Moheno claimed that he was
moved by his friendship with the other members of the Cuadrilátero, and Reyes by the love for his
father, who had supported Félix Díaz. Gamboa’s diary inadvertently took on this same purpose. He
began writing it two decades before Madero’s revolution, but when the author became a part of the
opposition, the diary served as a medium through which he justified his political actions. These three
texts were written during a period in which their authors lived in danger. In the 1950s, García Naranjo
wrote in an entirely different historical context. He and his family lived in peace in Mexico after the end
of their second exile in 1934, and he had the freedom to express his political views without fear of
repercussion.633 His contributions to Mexican literature were recognized in Mexico in spite of his
political reputation, and in 1938, he was accepted into the Mexican Academy of Languages. However,
even though several decades had passed since his time in the Huerta administration, like his colleagues
he still felt the need to clarify misconceptions about his actions.
Mexico enjoyed significant economic growth and political stability in the 1950s under the
leadership of the PRI, the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution. The official history provided one
narrative of the Mexican Revolution in which all of the revolutionary leaders (who were all understood
as precursors to the PRI) acted heroically and unanimously against Díaz and Huerta. García Naranjo
rejected La Revolución and the PRI by presenting a counter-memory, a different version of the same
narrative, describing the flaws of these heroes while humanizing the villains. His memoirs also offered
633
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a history of the Porfiriato that highlighted Díaz’s patriotism and the successes of the regime. In doing
so, García Naranjo prompted readers to question La Revolución and think more critically about modern
Mexican history.
García Naranjo recognized that the revolution prompted strong emotions from those who lived
through it and remembered the violence. Since 1914, “of all the cabalistic words…that provoked
epileptic reactions, none could compete with the name of Victoriano Huerta. Simply pronouncing his
name [was] all it [took] for Revolutionaries and those that faked being so…to assume frenetic and
threatening attitudes.” The author argued that Mexicans learned to associate Huerta’s name with the
chaos of the revolution, whether justifiably or not, and it was “useless” to try to reason with Huerta’s
most stubborn opponents. García Naranjo admitted that his memoirs would not change the minds of
many readers, especially those who lived through the war. Nevertheless, he hoped to at least inspire
“new generations to comprehend the group of fighters who were defeated…because they did not support
Woodrow Wilson’s interference in Mexican affairs.”634
This is an important comment about memory and the Mexican Revolution, since it suggests that
as the years passed, it became easier for people to forget certain details about the war in favor of the
collective memory. García Naranjo gave many examples in his memoirs, believing in the propensity of
those involved in the revolution to change their allegiances based on convenience. He reminded readers
that Carranza had been a pro-Díaz senator who did not fully commit to the Madero revolution in its
initial phase, and that even Madero, the martyred apostle of the revolution, was widely unpopular in
early 1913. Also, most of the members of the twenty-sixth legislature accepted Madero’s resignation
and Huerta’s presidency in February 1913. These same men later paid tribute to the dead president
while denouncing Huerta. García Naranjo was most adamant about the fact that Huerta and his cabinet
were strictly against Wilson’s Mexican policies, even though the revolutionaries made it seem like they
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orchestrated the intervention in Veracruz. Most importantly, García Naranjo, like his colleagues,
demonstrated that the Huerta regime was much more complex than the popular perception of them as a
group of puppets blindly following the orders of a bloodthirsty dictator.
García Naranjo admitted that by 1951, he was four decades older, calmer, and in a much
different frame of mind than when he published Revista Mexicana in 1915. In explaining his “arrogant
and rebellious” attitude towards Carranza and then Calles, García Naranjo “had no trouble admitting”
that his fits of rage
took me to the point of exaggeration, especially against the First Chief of the Constitutionalist
movement, but who does not lose…equilibrium when they are forced to leave their national
territory? The revolutionaries executed Alberto García Granados and would execute any other
ex-member of General Huerta’s cabinet; in those circumstances I believed and continue to
believe that by responding to those blows I mounted a legitimate defense. In Mexico, we were
insulted [and] slandered, and the least we could do was attack the regime that shut the doors of
the homeland to us. Was I…unjust at times? Of course, but…my reaction against the
persecutions was human…that is why, as José María Lozano used to say, “I will not repent nor
make amends.”635
García Naranjo stated that his biggest relief at the time of his exile came from Revista Mexicana;
without this emotional outlet, he “would have died of melancholy.” But “naturally, the years passed, the
wounds healed, [he] aged” and no longer felt “belligerent.”636
The healing process was not easy for García Naranjo, particularly after being sent into exile a
second time in 1926-1934. García Naranjo’s children were visiting family in Brownsville, Texas, and
Nemesio and Angelina planned to travel to the border city to pick them up. Before this trip, García
Naranjo received a warning from Leonides González, stating that he would not be allowed to return to
Mexico if he set foot in the United States.637 Leonides had obtained this information from José
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González, who was in charge of La Prensa’s operations in Laredo and had ties to border officials in
Nuevo Laredo. Not only would García Naranjo be forbidden to reenter his country, “immigration
authorities” had prepared a “circus act…to humiliate” the exile through “jeers, offensive shouts” and
“La Cucaracha” playing in the background.638 This information was factual, and the Ministry of the
Interior sent orders to restrict García Naranjo’s entry into Mexico through the northern border with the
United States, as well as the ports at Tampico and Veracruz. García Naranjo stated that Angelina was
particularly distraught due to this news. In 1914, she and her husband only had an infant child; now
they had four children ages seven to thirteen, and it would be more difficult to provide a stable life for
them while living in exile. During the nine years of displacement, García Naranjo worked as a
journalist, lawyer, and unofficial diplomat depending on the circumstances, and he and his family lived
in New York City, Los Angeles, Quebec, Venezuela, and across Europe. García Naranjo believed that
his family was most in danger in the United States, where they were closely monitored by the U.S. and
Mexican governments. After publishing a series of articles in 1927 attacking Wall Street, Calles, and
the U.S. government, García Naranjo received a warning from his friend and former ambassador to the
U.S., Victoriano Salado Álvarez. The writer needed to tone down his critiques or risk expulsion from
the United States. After the warning, García Naranjo moved his family out of the country.
The ninth volume of García Naranjo’s memoirs, which he dedicated to the second exile, includes
a prologue by his eldest daughter Angelina García Naranjo de Olea. She recalled those nine years with
fondness since those travels took place during her formative years (she was thirteen years of age in 1926
and twenty-four when the family returned to Mexico). What she remembered the most was the way in
which her parents made sure to submerge their children in the culture of each location, whether it was
Venice or New York. The children “had to be ready at nine” every morning, and the family would then
walk around each city until one in the afternoon, since her father believed that “only by walking would
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[they] get to know a city and appreciate its beauty.” In the evening, they would attend the theatre or
opera. In retrospect, Angelina “marveled” at her parents’ “resistance…and good humor in the face of
any situation…[or] discomfort.” She then directly addressed her father and wrote “climb the 400 steps
to the top of the Cathedral in Milan? You and Mother led the procession. The beds in the hotel room
were hard? We [the children] complained before either of you did.” 639
Angelina’s recollections show that her parents focused on their children’s well-being; for her
father, this also meant distancing himself from Mexican politics. The experiences that García Naranjo
shared with his family calmed his spirit, but they also detached him emotionally from Mexico. In 1928,
he and his family arrived in Paris, and they visited Díaz’s tomb accompanied by Carmen Romero Rubio.
García Naranjo went a second time, alone, in order to “meditate” in the presence of the general and
“listen to the order” given “by the bones of the caudillo.” García Naranjo wrote
I looked again at the eagle [on] the flag, and the Aztec symbol seemed to carry the mandate to
think of Mexico, always of Mexico. I examined my conscience and realized that I no longer
worried about national problems with the same passion and fervor that I once had. Paris had me
subjugated with its museums, its theatres, its monuments, its cultural centers…I compared exile
[in Paris] with the [displacement] I suffered in San Antonio and New York, and I felt like I lived
in paradise, and I risked being completely absorbed….I had stopped writing about Mexican
issues in order to be delivered from the political obsession, but the Porfirista remains yelled that
slavery had been the core of my existence….I missed what was essential, I was no longer [the
man] I once was…and I shuddered at the possible loss of my mexicanidad. ..I meditated upon all
of this for an hour, and when I left Montparnasse Cemetery, I resolved to be released from the
loving arms of Paris and return to the barricade.640
García Naranjo realized that he and Díaz were inextricably linked; if he turned his back on the general,
he would live a more stable life but lose his identity. For men such as García Naranjo and Gamboa,
becoming complacent about La Revolución and the changes in Mexico represented an act of betrayal
against the general who gave his life in service to the patria. They were the last generation of
Porfiristas, and for them, there was no choice but to maintain their loyalty to Díaz regardless of the cost.
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After that pilgrimage, García Naranjo resumed criticizing Calles in the press, contributing
weekly articles to newspapers including La Prensa and La Opinión. The Callista regime ended in 1934
with the election of Lázaro Cárdenas, and the government granted García Naranjo permission to return
to Mexico the following year. The author had never met or even seen Cárdenas, but he liked the
president because he exiled Calles. García Naranjo noted that he felt mostly neutral about Cárdenas and
his policies, but he experienced a sense of relief because for the first time in three decades, he could live
in Mexico without surveillance or fear. He returned to his journalistic endeavors, writing for the Lozano
newspapers and Mexico City’s Excélsior, but he became more diplomatic in his political commentary.
García Naranjo stated that Cárdenas and “the government…placed no impediment on the expression of
[his] ideas, which were often contrary to theirs,” and he felt the need to show respect for the regime that
did not treat him like a criminal or traitor. Presidents Manuel Ávila Camacho, Miguel Alemán, Adolfo
Ruiz Cortines, and Adolfo López Mateos “also respected” García Naranjo’s freedom of expression.641
He and the revolutionary regime were finally able to peacefully coexist, a result of the dwindling
number of Porfiristas, a decline in the widespread influence (and threat) of Porfirismo, and the
conservatism of the presidents who followed Cárdenas.
With this, García Naranjo ended the autobiographical portion of his memoirs, but his conclusion
offered a “panorama” of the Porfiriato. The now seventy-seven year old wrote the tenth volume in
1960, half a century after Madero’s revolution. He stated that since then, “thousands of speeches had
been given to deplore the Hero of April 2, hundreds of pamphlets distributed with the object of proving
that the greatness of the Porfiriato…was fictitious, and…the textbooks in primary schools were injected
with futile hatred” so that future generations could be taught “to hate the period from 1876 to 1911.”642
García Naranjo “claimed justice for the man…who surely had many defects but set up a constructive
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administration,” and he believed that revisionist history would prevail and give Díaz due credit for his
achievements. He stated that Porfirismo died in 1911, just as “Juarismo” and “Lerdismo” had, and
although “political resurrection was impossible, historical resurrection was necessary so that [Díaz]
could occupy the glorious position he deserved.”643 As for García Naranjo, he “blessed Providence for
allowing [him] to be born in the final decades of the nineteenth-century…seeing humanity in a much
happier state” than in the first half of the twentieth century. He did not care that his critics might say
that he was “an old, stubborn, and retrograde man stuck in the past.”644 The memoirs were a final act in
defense of the general and the modern Mexico that he (not La Revolución) created.
On a broader level, García Naranjo’s memoirs are significant because they traced the story of a
man looking back at his life through the context of significant historical shifts. Gamboa’s diary
examined these shifts as they took place. These memoirs provide only two accounts of the Porfirista
experience, but they offer important insights into the act of remembering, and the impact of time and age
on that process. The texts also reveal the challenges faced by these men in terms of identity as
Porfirismo declined in political and cultural relevance.

The Urrutia Family, Myths, and Public Image
On June 4, 1972, the San Antonio Express News published a story commemorating Urrutia’s
one-hundredth birthday. The author described the “centenarian” as “a medical pioneer in the field of
surgery and living legend both in his native Mexico as well as San Antonio.”645 Urrutia, the lastsurviving Porfirista, died in 1975 at the age of 103. Twenty years later, in 1995, Texas Monthly
published an article about the “horrible secret” that Urrutia may have “carried to his grave,” referring to
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his alleged involvement in the deaths of Belisario Domínguez and General Frederick Funston.646 The
Urrutia family has undertaken extensive research to clarify these “myths,” but Urrutia continues to be
one of Mexico and San Antonio’s most controversial figures.
Brunk defines a “myth” as a “story from which people can derive a sense of shared community
and identity,” adding that myths include elements of historical narrative.647 The revolutionary regime
found it necessary to create heroes, but it also needed to cast them against a set of villains. Peasants in
Morelos may feel a special attachment to Zapata while Chihuahuenses honor Villa, but both groups can
find a common enemy in Huerta. As the dictator’s compadre and right-hand man, Urrutia also occupies
a place as one of Mexico’s villains, and his involvement in the Huerta regime is as well-known as his
medical accomplishments. According to the popular narrative, Urrutia developed “a marked vocation as
a murderer” and became known as the “genius of evil” during his three months as Minister of the
Interior.648 The gruesome details of Urrutia’s alleged assassinations became popular knowledge before
the surgeon left Mexico, adding an element of horror to the already unpopular Huerta regime while
providing greater ammunition against the dictator.
Members of the Urrutia family acknowledge Aureliano’s complicity in the atrocities of the
Huerta administration, but they also criticize the perception of Aureliano as a blood-thirsty killer blindly
following Huerta’s orders. Cristina Urrutia Martínez contradicts the claim that the violence against
Huerta’s enemies began when her grandfather became minister. She argues that Huerta rose to power
“assassinating, and would continue to do so, with or without Urrutia.”649 Bud Urrutia suggests that
Aureliano knew about Huerta’s repressive tactics when he accepted the position of minister, and the
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surgeon “probably authored the elimination of some of those political enemies.” He adds that Aureliano
mistakenly “bet that [Huerta] would restore legal order and prosperity… he never justified himself, and
instead confronted his actions and accepted his responsibility” for anything that took place during his
tenure as minister.650
The most famous death attributed to Urrutia took place after his resignation from the Huerta
cabinet, as he is linked to the murder of Senator Belisario Domínguez on October 7, 1913. According to
popular legend, Domínguez was forced out of his hotel by Huerta’s henchmen and taken to the
Sanatorio Urrutia in Coyoacán. Urrutia told the senator that his “viperous tongue would never again say
stupidities,” and with “one swift movement with a sharp scalpel” the surgeon sliced it off . Urrutia then
forced Domínguez to bleed into a bucket so as “not to stain the floor.” Before the senator died, Urrutia
placed the tongue in a jar with formaldehyde, showed it to his victim, and commanded him to speak, and
after the body was buried, Urrutia sent the tongue as a trophy to his compadre Huerta.
Cristina Urrutia Martínez states that “this version has been repeated for years and is considered
historical fact,” despite the contradictory evidence available as early as 1914. Huertista agents José
“Mataratas” (Rat Killer) Hernández, Gilberto Márquez, and Ismael Gómez confessed to the murder and
claimed that they kidnapped Domínguez at his hotel, took him to the outskirts of Coyoacán, and
Márquez shot him in the back of his head. Quiroz shot him twice more, and the assassins then buried
Domínguez. The body was exhumed in August 1914 (after the fall of the Huerta regime) by orders of a
judge, and the autopsy reports confirmed the agents’ version.651 Nevertheless, the myth of “Belisario’s
tongue” persisted. Mexican scholars including Enrique Florescano and Carlos Monsiváis argued that
this type of tale became “one of the first methods used to narrate the Revolution,” an important part of
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the process of state formation and rewriting the nation’s historical narrative that began in the 1920s.652
Mexico needed heroes and villains, and since Huerta was dead and could not be held accountable for his
actions, Urrutia “inherited” the responsibility for the crimes committed during the Huerta regime.
Domínguez, on the other hand, became a martyr for the revolution and a symbol of standing up
against tyranny. In 1957, surviving members of the Twenty-sixth Legislature of 1913 described
Domínguez as a “chosen one” and a hero who represented the “flag” against Huertismo. They also
recounted the details of his torture and execution by Urrutia. Not all of the surviving members of that
legislature agreed in particular about the means of his death, and Maderista senator Aquiles Elorduy
suggested that his colleagues exalted Domínguez in order to “clear their consciences” after supporting
Madero’s resignation and allowing Huerta to assume the presidency.653
Despite these differences of opinion, the “black legend” involving Urrutia prevailed in Mexico as
well as Texas, in part because the surgeon never cared to clear up the mystery. In fact, he seemed to
bask in it. The 1995 Texas Monthly article featuring Urrutia noted that his “mystique never dimmed,
and he did his best to preserve it.” Bud stated that he and his father Adolfo “spent hours wondering
about [Domínguez’s murder]…did [Aureliano] do it or didn’t he? Finally one day my daddy got the
courage and went to ask his father whether it was true or not. When he came back, he told me that the
old man just sat there and [responded], ‘I will not say.’”654 Aureliano always avoided giving a straight
answer, and Bud recalls that once when a San Antonio reporter asked about Domínguez’s murder,
Aureliano replied that “people who talk too much frequently lose their tongues.”655
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Although Urrutia gained the reputation for ordering executions and disappearances, he did claim
to have prevented the deaths of some of the prominent opponents of the regime, including Jesús Flores
Magón and Manuel Calero. In 1951, Urrutia stated that “the intrigue had multiplied against innocent
people…in brief trials they were condemned to death [and] executed an hour after the fatal sentence was
pronounced.”656 His “opposition to [these] drastic measures created serious conflicts with the
president.” During his one-hundred days as Minister of the Interior, Urrutia recognized that Huerta was
a “pathological personality” and chose to resign.657 Huerta then ordered Blanquet to execute Urrutia.
Blanquet did not carry out the orders, knowing that Huerta could suddenly change his mind, but Urrutia
decided to leave Mexico anyway.
In exile, Urrutia became the protagonist of another myth. As the surgeon attempted to flee
Mexico in 1914, he was arrested in Veracruz by General Fredrick Funston and escorted out of Mexico.
In February 1917, the two coincidentally ran into each other one night at the St. Anthony Hotel in
downtown San Antonio. Urrutia allegedly “[looked] up at Funston, [said] ‘well, this bastard is
following me everywhere I go,’ [looked] him directly in the eye and Funston [keeled] over dead.”658
The general officially died of a heart attack, but it did not stop San Antonio residents from attributing
the death to Urrutia and his ability to give the mal ojo (evil eye). Bud recalled a conversation with a
female patient, “a little old lady” who lived on Funston Avenue (which ends on Broadway Street,
ironically at the intersection where Urrutia’s house was located). She asked Bud if he knew “the story
about [how] Aureliano killed Funston with evil eye.” He responded “yes I know that story; my dad and
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my uncles were always making up stories, and maybe they invented it.” The “little lady [then] looked
up and said 'oh, well I was a waitress at the St. Anthony Hotel, and [I] saw [Aureliano] do it.’”659
This myth only enhanced the public’s fear of Urrutia and his reputation in San Antonio as a
murderer, but Urrutia did not worry about setting the record straight. In fact, he crafted a flamboyant
public persona that added a mysterious quality to his image. According to Bud, his grandfather was a
“showman” with a “flare for the dramatic.”660 For example, Aureliano owned a black opera cape that
he would wear out in public, at Mass, and even at the hospital where he worked. San Antonio librarian
Carmen Perry recalled in an interview in 1988 that “people used to go to the [San Fernando] cathedral
for mass on Sunday at 12:00 just to watch him because he always would come in with a cape with a big
red lining and a top hat…it was quite a ceremony to see him walk down the aisle” to sit at the front of
the church.661 Charles González also remembers Urrutia, “and to us as children…he was a mysterious
figure...I know there are photos out there of Dr. Urrutia walking…on Houston Street with a cape.”
González attributed Urrutia’s dramatic fashion to the tradition of older generations to dress more
elegantly.662 More likely it was Urrutia’s way of drawing attention, which he did in other ways as well.
In 1940, Aureliano commissioned a bronze statue of himself in which he is wearing the cape; the statue
remains on the former grounds of Urrutia’s property Miraflores. Holiday Magazine featured Urrutia in
1948, describing him as “the acknowledged leader of Latin society in San Antonio.” The article
includes a photo of the surgeon in front of his house (the Quinta Urrutia), standing in a dignified pose in
his cape.663
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Urrutia was certainly a one-of-a-kind character, but his children and grandchildren knew the
surgeon, family man, and “strict disciplinarian” who had little to do with this public persona. In fact,
Bud claims that he never actually saw his grandfather wear the opera cape. But even Bud attests to a
“supernatural side” to his grandfather. Aureliano’s “mother claimed he had psychic and intuitive
powers such as being able to sense a person’s presence on the other side of a wall or being able to open a
door without touching it.” This supernatural quality, Bud believes, enhanced Aureliano’s diagnostic
abilities, helping him to detect problems before the widespread use of x-ray technology.664 It also adds
another layer of mystery to the complex man.
In addition to being known as a respected surgeon and possible murderer, Urrutia is remembered
in San Antonio for his home Miraflores, the mansion he commissioned in 1916 on his fifteen-acre
property. Mexican architect Porfirio Treviño designed the home, which was constructed on Urrutia’s
property adjacent to Brackenridge Park on Broadway Street. Ironically, one street that bordered
Miraflores would be named after General Funston, much to Urrutia’s chagrin. The surgeon sold the
property in 1962, and the house was demolished. Today much of the property is in ruins, but the major
art pieces located throughout what were the gardens at Miraflores remain standing.
Scholars Kathryn O’Rourke and William Hoar have closely examined the architecture,
monuments, sculptures, and icons present throughout Miraflores, which represented elements of
“Mexico’s cultural influences: the indigenous, the colonial, [and] the classical.”665 O’Rourke adds that
Miraflores “tells the story of a homesick exile’s striving to re-invent his once-glorious life.”666 Urrutia
wanted to feel the sense of living in Mexico City, and he purchased this property because, like Reforma
boulevard, “Broadway was a long, wide street that led out of downtown at a diagonal, toward, and past
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the verdant public playground [at Brackenridge Park] that served many of the same needs that
Chapultepec did.”667 By the time Miraflores was completed in 1930, it included “various garden
environments, two sizeable buildings, several grottos, an esplanade and stage area, a fountain that
emptied water into a number of shallow channels, reflecting pools, a small swimming pool, huge
concrete-and-ceramic benches, and a collection of decorative pieces and statuary.” The pools and
gardens were designed primarily to resemble the floating gardens in Urrutia’s homeland of Xochimilco,
as well as the bodies of water in Coyoacán (where he established his sanatorium) and Chapultepec Park
(a popular recreational space in Mexico City).668
In the exterior gardens, Urrutia commissioned art that paid homage to important figures in
Mexican history. Walking along the pathways, one can find a bust of Porfirio Díaz, a bench dedicated
to Hernán Cortés, and, at the entrance to Miraflores, a tile mosaic of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Urrutia
was not to be outdone by these historical characters. The gates at the entrance have a tile mosaic with
the following inscription: “Hernán Cortés founded Mexico City in 1521 […] Dr. Aureliano Urrutia
founded this institution [Miraflores] in 1921 [the date completed].”669 The artwork throughout the
property also incorporates Aztec iconography; one concrete bench has a jaguar carved on the side, and
one of the major arches on the property features two leopards. There is also a giant replica of the head
of Coyolxauhqui (the Aztec Moon Goddess), and a statue of Cuauhtémoc. The surgeon also
commissioned other grandiose pieces, including the bronze statues of himself and a replica of the
Winged Victory of Samothrace (possibly inspired by the Angel of Independence on Reforma).
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Urrutia claimed his mestizo heritage through monuments and public exhibition the way the Díaz
regime did by manipulating public spaces throughout Mexico City.670 Urrutia’s sanatorium in Coyoacán
(completed in 1911) had the same grandiosity and mixture of European and indigenous influences as
Miraflores, Urrutia’s way of proving to Mexico’s elites that he had aristocratic tastes. O’Rourke
suggests that Urrutia commissioned Miraflores for the same reason, to show Anglo society that he (the
dark-skinned Indian) was a cultured man knowledgeable about art and history. However, this was
different from the colonial mimicry performed by the científicos before Western society. Unlike Díaz,
who whitened his skin, Urrutia did not deny his heritage, and he imparted this lesson to his children.
They could be descendants of the Aztecs, enjoy European culture, and legitimately participate in
Mexican and U.S. society in spite of the racism they encountered. Three miles from the Alamo, which
represented Anglo dominance over Mexicans, Miraflores stood as a fifteen-acre monument to Mexico
and heterogeneous Mexican identity.
Spanish, other European, and indigenous symbols converged in Miraflores, but Urrutia also
acknowledged the Islamic influence on Mexican culture. According to one author, the Quinta Urrutia,
the family’s house, “was organized around a rectangular courtyard, off of which high-ceilinged rooms
opened…tall narrow windows lined the exterior and interior facades and were framed by alternating red
and white voussoirs, an unmistakable reference to the arches of the Great Mosque of Córdoba.” The
Quinta Urrutia exemplified “neo-Islamic” art in Mexico, which “affirmed Mexico’s special cultural
status by implicitly celebrating sixteenth-century Mexican history.” Treviño, the architect of Miraflores
and the Quinta Urrutia, “referenced the complex legacy of early Islamic design in colonial Mexico” and
“the distinctive character of Spain and…what was unique about Mexico.”671 Urrutia and the promoters
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of neo-Islamic art appropriated the elements of this culture that “civilized” Spain and eventually
Mexico, marking Moorish identity as desirable during a period of widespread xenophobia and violence
against “oriental” groups.672 This is similar to the approach taken by the científicos at the world’s fairs,
where they emphasized their connections with the “civilized” Aztecs, even though indigenous groups
were marginalized across Mexico.
At the same time, the Quinta Urrutia and Miraflores, when considered as a whole, reflect an
understanding of Mexican identity that La Revolución claimed as its own years later. The art located on
the property represented a vision of mexicanidad that went beyond the indigenous/European paradigm.
López argues that La Raza Cósmica “celebrated mestizaje as the wave of the future, with Mexico at the
vanguard.”673 Urrutia (who commissioned Miraflores in 1917) defined “Mexican” as Indian, European,
African, and Arab almost a decade before Vasconcelos published his seminal text in 1925. The Quinta
Urrutia and Miraflores publicly showcased the cosmic Mexican race.
Today, passersby can still glimpse the major sculptures and the gates of Miraflores. Although
the elaborate buildings commissioned by the surgeon are no longer a significant part of the landscape,
people continue to recall the eccentric man with a taste for spectacle. Urrutia’s flamboyance displayed
his sense of humor regarding his reputation. Many of his peers took their tarnished reputations
seriously, and they worked to ensure that they were remembered for their patriotic contributions to
Mexican society. Urrutia enjoyed being known for making dramatic entrances and wearing a cape, and
he never revealed the “truth” about the deaths of Domínguez and Funston in order to keep people
guessing and likely believing that he was a villain.
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Almost a century after his tenure as Minister of the Interior, people still remember the
“mysterious” Dr. Urrutia, and the myths related to him remain in the popular consciousness. In 2009,
for example, Mexican playwright David Olguín wrote and directed La Lengua de los Muertos (the
Tongue of the Dead), a story centered on a confrontation between Urrutia and Domínguez. Olguín
focuses on the “myth” of Domínguez’s tongue to demonstrate “two different [political] visions” for
Mexico that were patriotic in very different ways. The play also serves as a commentary about how
myths can be more powerful that “historical truth.”674 North of the U.S./Mexico border, Lionel and
Kathy Sosa produced a documentary in 2010 entitled The Children of the Revolución. This series traces
the stories of immigrants who fled to San Antonio during the revolution. In a short segment on Urrutia,
Lionel asks “was Urrutia a miracle worker or a war criminal? It depends on who you talk to.”675
Like Gamboa and García Naranjo, Urrutia placed great importance on the ways in which others
perceived him. He expressed his identity much differently than his peers, however, demonstrating that
not all Porfiristas sought historical rectification. Moreover, a case study of Urrutia shows that historical
memory can also be an ongoing public process influenced by cultural myths.

The Legacy of Porfirismo in the United States
Although President Obregón granted amnesty to the exiles in the early 1920s, some chose to stay
in the United States. In San Antonio, Lozano, Urrutia, González, his brother Joaquín González
Cigarroa, and their peers were known as the ricos, who Richard A. García describes as politically
“conservative…politicians, generals, businesspeople, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and government
officials.” The community expanded in the 1920s as the supporters of the Cristero War fled Mexico,
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and by 1930, San Antonio’s ricos numbered at least 25,000.676 García argues that Lozano acted as the
group’s de facto leader, and through La Prensa and La Opinión, he and other ricos promoted their
Porfirista ideology to the U.S. Mexican community for generations. However, Lozano was not the only
Porfirista to make a lasting impact north of the U.S./Mexico border. The Urrutia and Cigarroa families
remain active in the medical field, the Cigarroas have also worked to improve the education system in
the border region, and the González family has had a family member in the U.S. House of
Representatives since 1961. Porfiristas in the U.S. dealt with a different set of issues compared with
their counterparts in Mexico, particularly acculturation, assimilation, and racism. However, they
considered themselves the gente decente of the ethnic Mexican communities in the United States, and
they continued to uphold and promote their Porfirista ideals as they had in the 1910s.
Roberto Treviño argues that as the children of Mexican immigrants came of age in Texas in the
1920s, the process of “biculturation” took place, a “cultural synthesis” where Tejanos dealt with “the
intellectual and social dilemma of being not quite American, yet not quite Mexican.”677 The Spanish
language became the most important point of contention between ‘real’ Mexicans and pochos,
Americanized Mexican Americans. La Prensa promoted Spanish-language literature throughout the
1910s, but it also began publishing children’s stories and comics in the 1920s in an effort to appeal to
children while encouraging parents to teach their children to speak and read in Spanish. Vasconcelos
applauded Lozano and his staff for this effort, stating that “La Prensa acted in a manner that was ‘prohomeland and pro-race.’” He added that a “people that loses its tongue is a people that loses its spiritual
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quality…The Mexican will continue to be Mexican as long as he speaks Spanish…In these conditions,
LA PRENSA [played] an enormous role in preserving the spirit of the race” in the United States.678
Language had “different class and racial implications” in Texas.679 For Porfiristas, speaking
proper Spanish was a sign of being educated. This implied having the economic means to receive a
formal education, which was a privilege attributed to the largely white upper class. García Naranjo, who
spent his early years in Encinal, Texas, recalled his first day in the “North American” school at age
seven in 1890. He “instantly realized the hatred with which his [Anglo] schoolmates treated” the
Mexican children, but he and his sisters were not discriminated against “because their skin was white,”
and because Julia had grey/green eyes and Nemesio and Aurora had blue eyes. Moreover, their mother
“paid special attention” to dressing her children well and ensuring their cleanliness. “In these
circumstances, the little Americans insisted on telling [them] that they could not possibly be Mexican,”
so the García Naranjo children spoke Spanish to prove that they were.680 García Naranjo learned at an
early age that the Spanish language was highly politicized in Texas. Retaining the native language
became a way for him and his sisters to assert their cultural identity in schools that punished students for
being Mexican. However, García Naranjo understood his position of privilege. He had full access to
education and bilingualism because he was protected by his skin color, whereas darker-skin children
might refuse to speak Spanish in order to avoid mistreatment by their peers. Other light-skinned
Porfiristas in Mexico had a similar privilege (though as Urrutia demonstrated, money could help a
person move beyond these racial barriers), and the most prominent were fluent in multiple languages,
particularly English and French. This helped them to fully participate in the modern world, attain better
jobs, interact with foreign diplomats, enjoy European operas and plays, and read literature in multiple
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languages. Porfiristas in the United States wanted their children and the broader ethnic Mexican
community to enjoy social mobility through bilingualism, and La Prensa and La Opinión became
instruments for promoting this ideal.
In 1927, La Opinión blamed parents for failing to understand “how important it [was] to
inculcate patriotic spirit among Mexican children who [were] born” in the United States or immigrated
“when they [were] very small.”681 This statement implied that parents who did not teach their children
to be Mexican were ignorant, unlike the cultured gente decente. Despite their efforts, Porfiristas fought
a losing battle, and the younger generations of Mexican Americans became less interested in the native
language of their parents and grandparents. From the 1930s to the 1950s, the leaders of the “Mexican
American Generation” embarked on a “quest for equal status in the United States,” and “aspired to
integrate themselves more fully into mainstream American society.”682 Mexico was not their home, and
La Prensa did not speak on their behalf.
The newspaper declined in the 1940s and 1950s as the immigrant population in San Antonio
dwindled. Lozano died in 1953 and Alicia Lozano sold La Prensa in 1957. La Opinión, however,
remained successful because of a stronger immigrant presence in Los Angeles. Ignacio Lozano Jr. took
control of La Opinión, and his daughter Mónica Lozano currently acts as publisher and CEO. In a
testament to its continuing popularity, La Opinión is still the largest-selling Spanish-language newspaper
in the United States. It also continues to pay special attention to issues related to Mexicans in the United
States. For example, La Opinión devoted extensive coverage to the Mexican presidential elections of
2012. La Opinión and the Lozano family carry on the work of Ignacio Lozano Sr., who founded La
Prensa a century ago to serve Mexicans in the United States.
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Although Porfiristas encouraged fluency in Spanish and a love for the homeland with mixed
results after the 1920s, they successfully imparted these values within their families. Even after three or
four generations of living in the United States, the Spanish language remains important for cultural and
family identity.683 Dr. Francisco Cigarroa, grandson of Joaquín González Cigarroa Sr., recalled a
tradition in which the paternal side of his family would gather on Sundays for a comida, or meal. He
stated that “my paternal grandparents, [I] used to call them abuelita and abuelito…my father, his brother
Leonides [González], and his sister Rebecca…all the families would get together with their spouses and
all their children.”684 Cigarroa and the other small children would listen to the adult conversations (in
Spanish) and learn about the history of their family’s possible ties to the Díaz administration. He added
that in listening to his older relatives speak, he could tell that “there was obviously this love of Mexico
and yearning” which “probably…resulted in [the younger generation] really valuing the Mexican
traditions.”685 Bud Urrutia shared a similar story about his family gathering for Sunday lunch every
week at the Quinta Urrutia. Bud described his grandfather’s “ability to speak continuously in a very
charming way,” and the family listened to Aureliano discuss a broad range of topics in Spanish, from
“Freud and Mein Kampf, and bullfighting” to “ballet, and opera.”686 These family gatherings were
significant, for both Cigarroa and Urrutia, as moments in which they learned about their history and
culture in a Mexican family setting.
Catholicism played an important role in these family dynamics as well. Francisco recalls that his
grandparents were active in the Catholic Church. Joaquín Jr. states that he and two of his sons are
683
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currently members of the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre in the diocese of Laredo; his wife Bárbara (who
passed away in 2008) was a Lady of the Sepulchre, Grand Cross. This group is a “Papal Order reserved
solely for practicing Roman Catholics who are active in their parish, in their diocese and in their
community,” and one of the primary goals of the Order is to spread the Catholic faith in the Holy
Land.687 For Joaquín Jr. and Bárbara Cigarroa service in the church became an extension of their civic
activism in Laredo.
Aureliano Urrutia also took his Catholic faith very seriously. Bud recalls that all of Aureliano’s
eleven children eloped, which their father sternly disapproved of because he believed that they should be
married through the church. Aureliano solved this problem in the early 1930s, when he gathered all of
his children and their spouses and took them to San Fernando Cathedral to be married all at once.688
Although moments like these revealed the quality of “strict disciplinarian” in Urrutia, there were other
instances in which he showed a much softer side. For example, on Christmas Eve 1948, Urrutia wrote a
letter to his children in which he reflected upon the meaning of Christmas. He stated “‘Peace and
Goodwill to all people on earth.’ Wise people can not grasp this phenomenon, but simple people with
great spirits do. Our family is blessed to experience this every Christmas Eve, and in this, the year of
the Lord 1948, I give you my blessing.”689
These stories about Catholicism demonstrate the ways in which men took charge or participated
alongside their wives in religious activities, which were generally considered part of the feminine realm
in this patriarchal society. Gender roles were also blurred as Porfiristas taught their children and
grandchildren the importance of education, particularly in the sciences. Joaquín Cigarroa Sr., a surgeon,
and his wife Josefina González de la Vega, a pharmacist, emphasized “how important education was,
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and…they were very, very focused on making sure that their three children (Joaquín Jr., Leonides, and
Rebecca) received a higher education degree.” Francisco recalled that during Sunday meals in the
1960s, his grandmother would give him and the other children one dollar each. She would then take the
money back and tell them that she would save it for their college education. They were well aware of
Josefina’s expectation that they “would do well in school…and go to college.” According to Francisco,
“all twenty-three grandchildren got a higher education degree; many became doctors and lawyers.” This
anecdote is telling because Francisco remembers his grandmother setting aside money for his college
education. All of the women in the family were expected to earn degrees in higher education, and it was
acceptable for them to study the sciences. Francisco stated that he did not “remember anybody from that
generation…formally discussing higher [education] in such a disciplined way” as his grandmother
did.690
This represented a stark contrast from the days of the Porfiriato, where women were generally
only allowed to study ‘sentimental’ subjects such as literature and the arts. However, it falls in line with
the changing ideas of Porfirista women. In 1924, La Prensa’s Ladies’ Page came under the direction of
Mexican journalist Beatriz Blanco, and it depicted ideals about Porfirista femininity, including
domesticity, Catholic piety, and a respect for patriarchy. However, as the decade progressed, the
Ladies’ Page embraced attributes of the “modern woman,” including an increasing presence in the
public sphere and women’s progress through education. Porfirista women were still called to serve the
homeland by raising educated and cultured Catholic children who spoke Spanish and loved Mexico.
However, in supporting all of their children and grandchildren Josefina González de la Vega and
Joaquín Cigarroa Sr. practiced their belief that women and men should have an equal opportunity at
education and choosing a career.
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Aureliano Urrutia also supported his sons and daughters, though he geared them all towards a
medical profession. Regardless of any controversies and his public persona, Urrutia served his
community as a dedicated physician. He practiced at Christus-Santa Rosa, a Catholic hospital, and in
1917, he became the first in the world to successfully separate Siamese twins. Urrutia charged his
patients low rates and at times offered free services, while supplementing his income with profits from
his drugstore. He understood the importance and necessity of affordable medical care for the Mexican
community in San Antonio, especially for immigrants with low incomes, and he felt that he could
promote public health as he had during the Huerta regime. According to Bud, Aureliano “wanted
everybody to be a doctor.” Of Aureliano’s eleven children with Luz Fernández, three sons became
doctors, one was a dentist, and one of the daughters worked as a pharmacist and took charge of the
family pharmacy.691 Bud is part of the third generation of Urrutia surgeons, and he states that
Aureliano’s zeal for having physicians in the family extended beyond his immediate kin. Bud recalled
having “some cousins that were not Urrutia’s, [and Aureliano] changed their name to Urrutia and sent
them to medical school.”692
The children and grandchildren of Porfiristas had the opportunity to attend prestigious
universities such as Harvard, Tulane, and Notre Dame, but they were still aware of the discrimination
present in the public education system in Texas. According to Joaquín Cigarroa Jr., “the border was
ignored by the state of Texas for many years as far as higher education is concerned. [Administrators]
were of the belief that we should have junior colleges, but not four-year universities.” As a member of
the Coordinating Board of Texas Colleges and Universities, Cigarroa served as a principal witness in a
lawsuit against the University of Texas in the 1960s. He stated that “they had allocated 200 million
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dollars over a ten year period to higher education in the state of Texas; the border was to get $200,000
[and] no universities…fortunately, we won, and through a border coalition extending from El Paso to
Matamoros…universities have developed…including Texas A&M International University in
Laredo.”693
Three decades later, Cigarroa continued to speak out against racist views of minorities. In a
meeting of the Coordinating Board of Higher Education in October 1997, he “issued a public
statement…taking exception to recent comments by…University of Texas law professor [Dr. Lino
Graglia] about blacks and Hispanics. Cigarroa stated
Some of us have been taught not to respond to ignorance. I, however, cannot be silent in its face.
As a young boy growing up in San Antonio, I was taunted by my classmates because my parents
were Mexican. My father signed me up for boxing classes so that I could defend myself. He said,
"never start a fight, but if someone starts one with you, then fight the fight." All of my life I have
followed his counsel. I fight not with my fists, though, but with my education and through the
positions, like member of the Coordinating Board of Higher Education, which I hold. So when
Professor Graglia says, “Blacks and Mexican-Americans are not academically competitive with
whites in selective institutions,” and when he says “they belong to a culture that seems not to
encourage achievement,” he has personally affronted me; he has affronted our ethnicity, our
races, our identities as Texans. I will not stand passively aside.694
The Cigarroa family remains active in public education in various capacities, and though Joaquín Jr. is
not longer on the Coordinating Board of Higher Education, his son Francisco is currently the Chancellor
of the University of Texas System.
The González family, the cousins of the Cigarroas, have also left a lasting legacy of political
activism. Enrique Barbosa Prince de González, also known as “Henry B.,” followed the footsteps of his
father Leonides, the former mayor of Mapimí. He became the first Mexican American elected to the
San Antonio City Council (1953) and he was elected to the State Senate in 1956. Henry B. became
famous for participating in the longest filibuster at the time in the Texas State Legislature. He and
Abraham Kazen carried out the thirty-six hour ordeal to keep Texas lawmakers from implementing bills
693

Joaquín Cigarroa, interview.

694

“Cigarroa Blasts UT Silence, Receives Standing Ovation,” Laredo Morning Times, Oct. 17, 1997.

283

that would overturn Brown vs. Board of Education. In 1961, Henry B. became the first Mexican
American from Texas elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he worked closely with his
friend Lyndon B. Johnson on measures such as the Civil Rights Act. One photo from the period shows
Henry B. with his father Leonides, standing together with Johnson and John F. Kennedy.695 This image,
taken in 1963, captures a moment in which leadership passed from one generation to the next. Henry B.
continued the trend, and when he retired from politics in 1998, his son Charles was elected to his seat in
the House of Representatives.
These are only a few of the more well-known stories about the descendants of the Porfirista
exiles, and there are many more to be research and told. Scholars, film producers, artists, museum
directors, and the descendants themselves are engaging in a widespread effort to document the history of
this group in the United States. The commemorations of the centennial of the Mexican Revolution were
a step in that direction, but they revealed the complex politics of representation still present on a local
and broader transnational level.
As the Mexican government in Mexico City organized tributes to the official heroes of La
Revolución, San Antonio commemorated its own heroes. When the Museo Alameda inaugurated
“Revolution & Renaissance: Mexico and San Antonio 1910–2010,” it was fitting that the organizers
reunited the families of Lozano and his “alter ego” González.696 These Porfiristas and their peers were
honored for their service to the Mexican and Mexican American communities, and for upholding the
spirit of the homeland in the face of struggle. In contrast, the Urrutia family continues to deal with
Aureliano’s reputation as a murderer in spite of his contributions to medicine and public health. There
were no tributes to Urrutia in San Antonio in 2010, and the family was not represented among the guests
of honor at the inauguration of the Museo Alameda’s exhibit. Furthermore, The Children of La
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Revolución includes interviews with Charles González and other prominent San Antonio leaders such as
former mayor Henry Cisneros and poet Rose Catacalos. The participants shared the stories of their
parents and grandparents and the obstacles they overcame as they settled in the United States. Although
the series features a two-minute segment on Urrutia’s capacity to silence his victims, Bud Urrutia (who
has extensively researched his family’s history) was not invited to participate.697 One-hundred years
after the Mexican Revolution, the politics of representation continue to determine the heroes and villains
within the narrative.
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Conclusion
On November 20, 2010, Mexico City officials re-inaugurated the Monument to the Revolution
after extensive renovations. This ceremony honored the heroes of the revolution on the centennial of
Madero’s call to arms against Porfirio Díaz. That same day, across the street from the monument, Don
Porfirio Caffe opened to the public. Patrons can see images of the elderly, stoic Díaz at the entrance to
the café, on an interior wall, and on advertisements and menus. Customers familiar with the history of
the Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution might find the position of these two buildings ironic. The
monument is located on the Plaza of the Republic, where Díaz commissioned a grandiose Legislative
Palace during the late Porfiriato, setting the first stone in September 1910. The original structure (never
completed) was incorporated into the Monument to the Revolution, and what was supposed to be
another architectural triumph of the Díaz regime became a tribute to his overthrow. However, Don
Porfirio Caffe, also located on the Plaza of the Republic, serves as a defiant testament to Díaz’s enduring
presence in the capital.
Today, remnants of the Porfiriato remain scattered across Mexico City’s urban landscape. Many
buildings and public spaces crafted during the Díaz regime have been appropriated and renovated by the
revolutionary government. For example, Lecumberri prison, where Madero and Pino Suárez were
assassinated, now houses the national archives.698 The Moorish Kiosk, the Mexican pavilion at the 1886
and 1902 World’s Fairs, is now in the central plaza of the Santa María la Ribera neighborhood, a colonia
that also features homes from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In 1904, Díaz laid the
first stone in what would become the Palace of Fine Arts (Palacio de Bellas Artes), located near the
monument to Benito Juárez in the Central Alameda, which was inaugurated in September 1910.
Chapultepec Castle, the presidential residence during the nineteenth century, was converted into the
National Museum of History in 1939. It exhibits memorabilia from the Porfiriato, including personal
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belongings of Díaz and his wife Carmen. From the top of the castle, visitors can see the most famous
public project of the Porfiriato—Reforma Boulevard.
Remnants of Porfirismo can also still be found in the United States. La Opinión, the Los
Angeles newspaper that circulates daily across the United States, began as a Porfirista publication. San
Antonio residents and visitors can still see the remnants of Miraflores, and in El Paso, drivers will see
the Porfirio Díaz exit along Interstate-10. Porfirio Díaz Street, located within a short distance from the
U.S./Mexico border, was named to commemorate the general’s meeting with President Howard Taft in
El Paso and Ciudad Juárez in 1909.
These public spaces continue to reflect the tension between the Porfiriato and the revolution,
memory, and official history in both Mexico and the United States. The revolution thrust Mexicans into
an ambiguous position where they had to negotiate their identities in the midst of national and global
violence and chaos. Porfiristas believed that the revolution represented “the most dreadful and
unfruitful of all wars,” a civil conflict that disrupted Mexico’s peace and modernization.699 The
revolutionaries, in turn, projected themselves as champions of democracy against the tyrannical Díaz
and Huerta regimes, and they exiled the Porfiristas for betraying the liberal principles of freedom and
democracy. Despite these differences, the values of the Porfiristas and the revolutionaries sometimes
coincided (as demonstrated in the similarities between the 1857 and 1917 constitutions).
Every faction believed that its agenda was the best for ruling Mexico. This study does not seek
to answer whether the Porfiristas were right or wrong for supporting Díaz and Huerta. Instead, I attempt
to explain their complex reasons for doing so, analyzing their perceptions as the events between 1910
and 1920 unfolded, and also in hindsight. For Porfiristas, “Mexican” and Díaz were one and the same,
and they believed that the successes of the dictatorship far outweighed any of the problems that had
arisen in Mexico by 1910. This was not the popular view, but in demonstrating how one group
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interpreted nationalism, liberalism, and Juárez’s legacy from 1910 to 1920, it had a sort of validity
within the Mexican context. The exiles were most offended by the accusation that they were unpatriotic
traitors, and they attempted to prove that they had an “intransigent Mexican spirit, Mexican without
reservations…Mexican in the face of possible catastrophe.”700
This study broadens the scholarship on the Mexican Revolution by recounting this history from
the perspective of exiled members of the Huerta regime. Identity formation is the central theme of this
work and it complicates the narrative on mexicanidad developed by the revolutionaries and explored by
previous scholars.701 It also contributes to the historiography produced by Cano, Piccato, and others on
media and identity during the Porfiriato, while expanding this analysis to include Porfirista media during
the revolution.702 Porfiristas believed that it was their patriotic duty to sustain the cultural status quo of
the Porfiriato, and their identity served as an important coping mechanism as they struggled with the
global changes of the 1910s.
Furthermore, this project casts exile as an important part of the Mexican experience during the
revolution. Scholars have examined the political and cultural impact of the U.S./Mexico border on the
revolution, but this study builds on the work of historians, including Katz and Ramírez Rancaño, who
have expanded the transnational analysis to include Europe and Cuba.703 I bridge the themes of identity
and exile in order to trace the changes in the Porfirista community as it moved across political, temporal,
and racial borders. Most of the work on the exiled Porfiristas focuses on their activities in the United
States, and scholars, activists, and artists have undertaken the effort to recover and preserve this history.
However, there is much left to be done in the United States, as well as in Havana and Mexico. I focus
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Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State after the Revolution.

702

Cano, “The Porfiriato and the Mexican Revolution: Constructions of Feminism and Nationalism;” Piccato, The Tyranny
of Opinion: Honor in the Construction of the Mexican Public Sphere.
703

Katz, The Secret War in Mexico; Ramírez Rancaño, La Reacción Mexicana.

288

primarily on exile activity in San Antonio, and Macías-González has examined the Porfirista community
in El Paso. However, there were also exiles in New York, New Orleans, and Los Angeles, and there is
little scholarship on the activities of Díaz and Huerta supporters in those cities. There is also a need to
examine the role of Havana as a center for exile activity in the 1910s. I argue that the exiles in the
United States had a different experience than their compatriots in Havana because they faced Anglo
discrimination. Though it was not clear in the memoirs of Gamboa and Moheno what these might have
been, the exiles in Havana surely dealt with their own set of circumstances as a result of living in Cuba.
It is necessary to explore this topic from both a political and cultural perspective for a better
understanding of the transnational scope of the Mexican Revolution.
There is also a need to further examine Porfiristas in Mexico during the 1910s. This project
deals with urban professionals, but a closer analysis of class might reveal tensions not only between this
group and the aristocracy, but also between it and lower-class Porfiristas. Also, a comparative regional
analysis of Porfirismo would complicate our understanding of the revolution. For example, members of
the González family remained in Mapimí during and after the revolution, and members of the Naranjo
family remained in the state of Nuevo León. What implications did this have for these families and for
these regions? How did this compare to areas such as Oaxaca, where popular Porfirismo was strong and
Félix Díaz maintained a great deal of support? More importantly, what has been the legacy of
Porfirismo in Mexico, and how does it compare to the United States?
The issues of gender and religion also warrant greater attention from future scholars. Historians
such as Kristina A. Boylan and Patience A. Schell have examined the activism of conservative women
in early twentieth-century Mexico, and their participation in organizations such as the Association of
Catholic Ladies (ADC), Union of Mexican Catholic Ladies (UDCM) and the Mexican Catholic

289

Feminine Union (UFCM).704 However, most of this scholarship focuses on the 1920s, particularly
during the Cristero War of 1926-1929. There is also a growing historiography on conservative women
in the United States, specifically in Texas. Juanita Luna Lawhn has studied the Pan American
Roundtable, a charity group established in San Antonio in 1916, and the increasing participation of
upper-class Mexican women in this organization in 1919. I have also examined women’s contributions
to La Prensa during the 1910s and 1920s.
Records related to the ADC, UDCM, UFCM, and Pan American Roundtable are important in
analyzing the relationship between Porfirista femininity and Catholicism in Mexico during the
revolution. Catholic Church records and oral histories from the descendants of Porfiristas might be
especially useful in documenting the experiences of women in the Porfirista community before 1920.
Church documents would also be useful in a more thorough analysis of the role of exiled clergy in the
counter-revolutionary efforts. These various primary sources would help to gage the role of Catholicism
in the public and private lives of Porfirista women and men.
In the 1910s, Porfiristas lost their hero and their homeland to a revolution that destroyed the
Mexico they idealized. This group experienced various forms of displacement, but reverence for Don
Porfirio inspired them to fight for the national identity he created. After 1920, Porfiristas had to find
their place in a much different world than the one they celebrated ten years before. Regardless of their
struggles, Porfiristas worked to sustain their vision for Mexico during their tenure in the Mexican
government as well as in exile. The Porfirista experience offers important insight into the process of
identity formation on individual, national, and transnational levels during a decade of extreme global
turmoil and change.
704 Kristina A. Boylan, “The Feminine ‘Apostolate in Society’ versus the Secular State: The Unión Femenina Católica
Mexicana, 1929-1940,” in Right Wing Women: From Conservatives to Extremists around the World, ed. Paola Bacchetta and
Margaret Power (New York: Routledge, 2002); Patience A. Schell, “Of the Sublime Mission of Mothers of Families: The
Union of Mexican Catholic Ladies in Revolutionary Mexico,” in Women’s Revolution in Mexico, 1910-1953, ed. Stephanie
E. Mitchell and Patience A. Schell (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Juanita Luna Lawhn, “The Mexican Revolution
and the Women of El México de Afuera, the Pan American Roundtable, and the Cruz Azul Mexicana,” in War Along the
Border: The Mexican Revolution and Tejano Communities.
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